{"id":65814,"date":"2003-12-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-12-10T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/12\/10\/lirak-ou-le-plus-court-chemin-vers-la-barbarie\/"},"modified":"2003-12-10T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-12-10T00:00:00","slug":"lirak-ou-le-plus-court-chemin-vers-la-barbarie","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/12\/10\/lirak-ou-le-plus-court-chemin-vers-la-barbarie\/","title":{"rendered":"L’Irak, ou le plus court chemin vers la barbarie<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’Irak, ou le plus court chemin vers la barbarie<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t9 d\u00e9cembre 2003 Cette tr\u00e8s forte parole du colonel Nathan Sassaman, commandant de bataillon de l’U.S. Army en Irak, r\u00e9sume la nouvelle philosophie de l’action militaire US en Irak : \u00ab With a heavy dose of fear and violence, and a lot of money for projects, I think we can convince these people that we are here to help them<\/em> \u00bb. Parole aussit\u00f4t relay\u00e9e et explicit\u00e9e par celle-ci, du capitaine Todd Brown, commandant de compagnie de la 4\u00e8me division d’infanterie de l’U.S. Army, et parole de Brown qui montre qu’en plus, ce n’est pas rien, on fait dans la psychologie, m\u00eame si la finesse qu’on y met a le poids cliquetant des chenilles des chars Abrams<\/em> M1 : \u00ab You have to understand the Arab mind. The only thing they understand is force force, pride and saving face.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’arm\u00e9e am\u00e9ricaine progresse donc. D\u00e9sormais, elle pense et philosophe pour mieux faire comprendre son action, comme le montre un int\u00e9ressant article du New York Times du 7 d\u00e9cembre<\/a>. Ou bien, autre interpr\u00e9tation, elle ne fait que se mettre aux normes isra\u00e9liennes de la guerre sous l’inspiration de Sharon. C’est ce que nous dit le Guardian<\/a> du 9 d\u00e9cembre en nous expliquant avec beaucoup de d\u00e9tails que \u00ab Israel trains US assassination squads in Iraq<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOu bien… il y a d’autres interpr\u00e9tations encore. On y vient, notamment, en identifiant les inspirateurs de cette \u00e9volution. Les r\u00e9f\u00e9rences de cette transformation de l’action am\u00e9ricaine en Irak sont r\u00e9v\u00e9latrices, r\u00e9sumons et \u00e9largissons :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Les Isra\u00e9liens, certes, comme on l’a vu, mais des Isra\u00e9liens men\u00e9s par Sharon sur une voie que des voix isra\u00e9liennes de plus en plus nombreuses, notamment au sein de l’arm\u00e9e<\/a>, d\u00e9noncent de plus en plus fortement. (Et embarquer Van Cleveld dans cette affaire rel\u00e8ve de l’habituel d\u00e9tournement, voir plus loin.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le plus int\u00e9ressant, le plus r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur, est l’apparition du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Boykin dans cette affaire, comme inspirateur de la nouvelle orientation de l’action des forces arm\u00e9es US. Le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Boykin est un homme fameux. A cause de lui, certains observateurs soulev\u00e8rent, il y a quelques semaines, certaines questions concernant une situation o\u00f9 un homme (Boykin) est mis \u00e0 un poste de responsabilit\u00e9s (au Pentagone) alors que ses th\u00e8ses affich\u00e9es, et proclam\u00e9es publiquement<\/a> concernent d’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale la guerre sainte que l’Occident doit mener contre l’Islam, ou d’autres th\u00e8ses telles celle qui nous indique que Bush n’a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9lu mais \u00ab choisi par Dieu<\/em> \u00bb pour conduire les USA. C’est Seymour Hersh, le fameux reporter du New Yorker<\/em>, qui, le premier, d\u00e9taille cette implication du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Boykin dans la formulation de la nouvelle strat\u00e9gie<\/a> des forces arm\u00e9es am\u00e9ricaines en Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab One of the key planners of the Special Forces offensive is Lieutenant General William (Jerry) Boykin, Cambone’s military assistant. After a meeting with Rumsfeld early last summerthey got along like two old warriors, the Pentagon consultant saidBoykin postponed his retirement, which had been planned for June, and took the Pentagon job, which brought him a third star. In that post, the Pentagon adviser told me, Boykin has been an important piece of the planned escalation. In October, the Los Angeles Times reported that Boykin, while giving Sunday-morning talks in uniform to church groups, had repeatedly equated the Muslim world with Satan. Last June, according to the paper, he told a congregation in Oregon that Satan wants to destroy this nation, he wants to destroy us as a nation, and he wants to destroy us as a Christian army. Boykin praised President Bush as a man who prays in the Oval Office, and declared that Bush was not elected President but appointed by God. The Muslim world hates America, he said, because we are a nation of believers.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb There were calls in the press and from Congress for Boykin’s dismissal, but Rumsfeld made it clear that he wanted to keep his man in the job. Initially, he responded to the Times report by praising the General’s outstanding record and telling journalists that he had neither seen the text of Boykin’s statements nor watched the videotape that had been made of one of his presentations. There are a lot of things that are said by people in the military, or in civilian life, or in the Congress, or in the executive branch that are their views, he said. We’re a free people. And that’s the wonderful thing about our country. He added, with regard to the tape, I just simply can’t comment on what he said, because I haven’t seen it. Four days later, Rumsfeld said that he had viewed the tape. It had a lot of very difficult-to-understand words with subtitles which I was not able to verify, he said at a news conference, according to the official transcript. So I remain inexpertthe transcript notes that he chuckles at that momenton precisely what he said. Boykin’s comments are now under official review.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• Une autre influence, moins directe certes mais certainement bien pr\u00e9sente, est celle du colonel Peters, d\u00e9j\u00e0 bien connu de nos lecteurs sous les traits du visage jubilant du barbare<\/a>. Peters est un ardent supporteur de la nouvelle strat\u00e9gie et son commentaire montre que le barbare est capable de r\u00e9alisme et qu’il a bien compris de quoi l’on parle et ce que l’on veut faire en Irak : \u00ab But I think what you’re seeing is a new realism. The American tendency is to try to win all the hearts and minds. In Iraq, there are just some hearts and minds you can’t win. Within the bounds of human rights, if you do make an example of certain villages it gets the attention of the others, and attacks have gone down in the area.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe programme envisag\u00e9 par l’U.S. Army est compar\u00e9 au programme Phoenix, de la guerre du Viet-n\u00e2m<\/a>, fameux parce qu’il entra\u00eena la liquidation physique de pr\u00e8s de 41.000 Sud-Vietnamiens, tout cela en toute ill\u00e9galit\u00e9 (comme on dirait : en toute innocence). Hersh mentionne effectivement le fait : \u00ab But many of the officials I spoke to were skeptical of the Administration’s plans. Many of them fear that the proposed operationcalled pre\u00ebmptive manhunting by one Pentagon adviserhas the potential to turn into another Phoenix Program. Phoenix was the code name for a counter-insurgency program that the U.S. adopted during the Vietnam War, in which Special Forces teams were sent out to capture or assassinate Vietnamese believed to be working with or sympathetic to the Vietcong. In choosing targets, the Americans relied on information supplied by South Vietnamese Army officers and village chiefs.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAssez curieusement, et l’on a ainsi les limites de la compr\u00e9hension des choses par les journalistes comme de la grossi\u00e8ret\u00e9 de la d\u00e9sinformation de la part des militaires, l’expert militaire isra\u00e9lien Martin Van Cleveld est cit\u00e9 dans l’article du New York Times<\/em> d’une fa\u00e7on suffisamment ambigu\u00eb pour qu’il paraisse compl\u00e8tement appuyer la nouvelle tactique-strat\u00e9gie US : \u00ab If you do nothing, they will just get stronger, said Martin van Creveld, professor of military history and strategy at Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He briefed American marines on Israeli tactics in urban warfare in September.<\/em> \u00bb On devrait pourtant \u00e9videmment savoir, et il aurait \u00e9t\u00e9 honn\u00eate (l’\u00e9trange mot que voil\u00e0) de le rappeler dans l’article, que Van Cleveld est loin d’\u00eatre optimiste et d’approuver la strat\u00e9gie US<\/a>, cela dans le cadre d’une critique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale faite contre cette m\u00eame strat\u00e9gie<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVan Cleveld \u00e9crit notamment ceci, dans son article du 19 novembre dans l’International Herald Tribune<\/a> : \u00ab \u00ab As the promise to advance the Iraqi elections to mid-2004 shows, the United States will lose in fact already has lost the war. The Americans will leave the country in the same way as the Soviets left Afghanistan: with the Iraqi guerrillas jeering at them.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe mot de la fin pourrait revenir, apr\u00e8s tout, ce ne serait que justice, si ce mot est encore convi\u00e9 \u00e0 cette sorte de r\u00e9flexion, \u00e0 un Irakien. On choisit celui-ci, un nomm\u00e9 Tariq, cit\u00e9 dans le New York Times du 7 d\u00e9cembre<\/a> : \u00ab I see no difference between us and the Palestinians. We didn’t expect anything like this after Saddam fell.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNon, le mot de la fin sera plut\u00f4t un constat, outre le rappel que cette nouvelle orientation strat\u00e9gique am\u00e9ricaine renvoie \u00e0 un principe \u00e9nonc\u00e9 par un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral am\u00e9ricain au g\u00e9n\u00e9ral belge Briquemont alors que celui-ci commandait les forces de l’ONU \u00e0 Sarajevo (\u00ab Nous autres, en Am\u00e9rique, nous ne r\u00e9solvons pas les probl\u00e8mes, nous les \u00e9crasons<\/em> \u00bb). Ce constat est que, certes, l’Irak n’est pas le Viet-n\u00e2m. Les Am\u00e9ricains mirent plus de dix ans \u00e0 commettre toutes les erreurs qui aboutirent au d\u00e9sastre vietnamien. Il semble bien qu’en Irak, ils mettront dix mois au plus \u00e0 commettre \u00e0 nouveau les m\u00eames erreurs. C’est ce qu’on appelle l’acc\u00e9l\u00e9ration de l’Histoire. La formule fameuse d’un journal d\u00e9mocrate US, en 1933, constatant l’\u00e9tat de pauvret\u00e9 o\u00f9 la crise du capitalisme avait plong\u00e9 la population US (\u00e9poque de la Grande D\u00e9pression), disait : \u00ab L’Am\u00e9rique est le seul pays qui soit pass\u00e9 directement de la barbarie \u00e0 la d\u00e9cadence.<\/em> \u00bb Aujourd’hui, ils renversent la formule, passant directement de la d\u00e9cadence \u00e0 la barbarie, avec le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Boykin comme inspirateur.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’Irak, ou le plus court chemin vers la barbarie 9 d\u00e9cembre 2003 Cette tr\u00e8s forte parole du colonel Nathan Sassaman, commandant de bataillon de l’U.S. Army en Irak, r\u00e9sume la nouvelle philosophie de l’action militaire US en Irak : \u00ab With a heavy dose of fear and violence, and a lot of money for projects,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4179,4180,3250,4181],"class_list":["post-65814","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-boykin","tag-hersh","tag-peters","tag-phoenix"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65814","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65814"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65814\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65814"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65814"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65814"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}