{"id":65821,"date":"2003-12-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-12-19T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/12\/19\/e-finita-la-comedia-so-whats-the-difference\/"},"modified":"2003-12-19T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-12-19T00:00:00","slug":"e-finita-la-comedia-so-whats-the-difference","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/12\/19\/e-finita-la-comedia-so-whats-the-difference\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201c\u00c9 finita la comedia\u201d… \u201cSo, What’s the difference ?\u201d<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u00c9 finita la comedia… So, What’s the difference ?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t19 d\u00e9cembre 2003 Cela se passe en douceur, en catimini, avec aussi peu de fanfares qu’il y en eut beaucoup lorsqu’on affirmait le contraire : les chercheurs de WMD (finalement, Weapons of Mass Deceiption<\/em> plut\u00f4t que Mass Destruction<\/em>) vont sans doute rentrer chez eux. D’ailleurs, il n’en resterait plus gu\u00e8re (40 sur 1.400 affect\u00e9s initialement \u00e0 cette t\u00e2che, selon The Independent<\/a>). D’ailleurs, leur patron, David Kay, est en vacances et l’on annonce qu’il va quitter pr\u00e9matur\u00e9ment (\u00ab comme une grossesse avant terme<\/em> \u00bb, plaisante une source de l’administration GW), son poste de chercheur-en-chef. D’ailleurs, l’on vous dit aussi qu’ils (les chercheurs de WMD) cherchent plut\u00f4t les rebelles du cru que les WMD. D’ailleurs, les WMD, finalement, on s’en fout. (Ou, plut\u00f4t, selon les termes de GW, r\u00e9pondant \u00e0 une journaliste qui lui faisait remarquer qu’on n’en avait gu\u00e8re trouv\u00e9, des WMD : \u00ab So, What’s the difference ?<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes petits esprits qui dirigent les grandes affaires du monde devraient d\u00e9couvrir un jour, ce sera bien trop tard, bien s\u00fbr, qu’ils ont bien eu tort, avec leur raisonnement \u00e0 si court terme, de prendre l’affaire des WMD aussi \u00e0 la l\u00e9g\u00e8re. Ils n’ont m\u00eame pas pens\u00e9 \u00e0 en planter des fausses lorsque l’Irak est tomb\u00e9, pour faire croire qu’il y en avait, d’ailleurs parce qu’ils croyaient qu’il y en avait effectivement, signe suppl\u00e9mentaire de leur \u00e9trange petitesse. Ils ont plant\u00e9, par contre, le d\u00e9cor d’une telle architecture de mensonges nomm\u00e9e virtualisme qu’ils pourraient bien avoir secou\u00e9 les fondations du syst\u00e8me qu’ils honorent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPour parler un peu plus platement, m\u00eame les plus endurcis parmi les politiciens de Washington sont stup\u00e9faits par ce qui leur para\u00eet un cynisme extraordinaire, qui est peut-\u00eatre plus s\u00fbrement identifiable comme une inconscience incroyable, par syst\u00e8me naturellement, des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s du monde. Jim Lobe rapporte cette confidence d’un v\u00e9t\u00e9ran du Capitole<\/a> : \u00ab In my many years on Capitol Hill, I don’t know that I’ve seen anything quite as cynical as this<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab With former president Saddam Hussein in the bag, the administration of President George W. Bush appears determined to make U.S. voters forget Washington invaded Iraq on the pretext that its apparently nonexistent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) posed a direct threat to the United States and its allies.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The effort so far has taken two forms: the suggestion by administration officials, including Bush himself, that ousting and capturing Saddam were ample justifications for going to war; and the quiet dissolution of the nearly billion-dollar effort to find WMD in Iraq.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In a nationally televised interview earlier this week, Bush appeared to dismiss the relevance of whether Iraq actually had WMD and the possibility that Saddam might eventually move to acquire them.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb So what’s the difference? asked Bush, who later added that he was persuaded Saddam constituted a gathering threat, after 9\/11 … that needed to be dealt with. And so we got rid of him, and there’s no doubt the world is a safer, freer place as a result of Saddam being gone, he went on.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tLobe l’explique bien : \u00ab Who Needs WMD When You’ve Got Saddam?<\/em> \u00bb. Cela signifie que, pour GW, la capture de Saddam suffit \u00e0 justifier r\u00e9trospectivement toute cette affaire, y compris l’attaque (l’agression disent certains), le changement de r\u00e9gime, l’occupation, etc. Cette tournure d’esprit est \u00e9videmment compl\u00e8tement, absolument sophistique, la chose \u00e0 d\u00e9montrer (Saddam coupable, m\u00e9ritant d’\u00eatre \u00e9limin\u00e9) gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sence des preuves de la culpabilit\u00e9 (les WMD) devenant la preuve de la culpabilit\u00e9 une fois qu’elle a \u00e9t\u00e9 accomplie (\u00e9limination de Saddam) sans la moindre preuve de la culpabilit\u00e9 (pas de WMD), ainsi rendue inutile. C’est un \u00e9trange univers o\u00f9 effectivement, le soup\u00e7on sert de preuve, l’anath\u00e8me d’argument et ainsi de suite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’esprit sophistique est d’ailleurs d\u00e9sormais r\u00e9pandu, comme le montre cet extrait d’un article du Guardian sur la question<\/a> : \u00ab The former deputy chief UN weapons inspector Charles Duelfer said: What is important is Saddam’s intentions. The case can be made that he may not have had existing weapons, but his intention was to outlast the inspectors and reconstruct his weapons capabilities.<\/em> \u00bb L’important n’est plus de prouver que l’accus\u00e9 est coupable, mais d’arr\u00eater l’accus\u00e9 puisque son arrestation devient la preuve de sa culpabilit\u00e9 ; sur le fond, on sait bien que Saddam, s’il n’avait pas de WDM, avait \u00e9videmment l’intention d’en avoir, alors, est-il bien n\u00e9cessaire de trouver des WMD ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’aventure des WMD est en train de se terminer dans une atmosph\u00e8re intellectuelle compl\u00e8tement d\u00e9l\u00e9t\u00e8re, dans le d\u00e9sordre le plus complet marqu\u00e9 simplement par l’\u00e9trange personnalit\u00e9 de GW. Des sources dans l’administration, \u00e0 nouveau, le d\u00e9crivent comme \u00ab transform\u00e9 par la capture de Saddam<\/em> \u00bb, comme s’il s’agissait effectivement d’une victoire personnelle qui ach\u00e8verait de faire de lui un grand chef de guerre. M\u00eame le New York Times a le souffle coup\u00e9 de cette l\u00e9g\u00e8ret\u00e9 du pr\u00e9sident et de l’administration<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab On Tuesday, with Mr. Hussein in American custody and polls showing support for the White House’s Iraq policy rebounding, Mr. Bush suggested that he no longer saw much distinction between the possibilities. So what’s the difference? he responded at one point as he was pressed on the topic during an interview by Diane Sawyer of ABC News.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb To critics of the war, there is a big difference. They say that the administration’s statements that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons that it could use on the battlefield or turn over to terrorists added an urgency to the case for immediate military action that would have been lacking if Mr. Hussein were portrayed as just developing the banned weapons.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tD’ailleurs, <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tcomme vous l’explique Jonathan Freeland<\/a>, tout cela est affaire de famille. Une sorte de trag\u00e9die grecque, certes, si l’on veut, mais alors au petit pied, une trag\u00e9die dont le livret aurait confondu h\u00e9ro\u00efsme et m\u00e9diocrit\u00e9, dont les batailles des protagonistes se feraient devant un miroir plus que sur un champ de bataille ; une trag\u00e9die grecque revue par Hollywood, indeed<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab The former dictator’s capture should also draw to a close a family feud that is the stuff of Greek drama. Since the first Gulf war in 1990, the stand-off between the US and Iraq has also been a battle of dynasties. Saddam’s hatred for George Bush Snr was transferred to the man he called the son of the viper or little Bush. For the American president too, Operation Iraqi Freedom was, in part, a family affair. Last year he reminded an interviewer of Saddam’s 1993 assassination attempt on his father: There’s no doubt he can’t stand us. After all, this is a guy that tried to kill my dad. Now the Bushes have their revenge: Saddam’s sons are slain and he is their captive. As one Bush family associate told the New York Times yesterday: It’s a psychologically nice moment. A theatre full of ancient Greeks would understand that perfectly.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\u00c9 finita la comedia… So, What’s the difference ? 19 d\u00e9cembre 2003 Cela se passe en douceur, en catimini, avec aussi peu de fanfares qu’il y en eut beaucoup lorsqu’on affirmait le contraire : les chercheurs de WMD (finalement, Weapons of Mass Deceiption plut\u00f4t que Mass Destruction) vont sans doute rentrer chez eux. D’ailleurs, il… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[868,981,4002],"class_list":["post-65821","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-bush","tag-saddam","tag-wmd"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65821","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65821"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65821\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65821"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65821"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65821"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}