{"id":65829,"date":"2003-12-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2003-12-29T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/12\/29\/des-voeux-amers-pour-lirak\/"},"modified":"2003-12-29T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2003-12-29T00:00:00","slug":"des-voeux-amers-pour-lirak","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2003\/12\/29\/des-voeux-amers-pour-lirak\/","title":{"rendered":"Des voeux amers pour l’Irak<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Des voeux amers pour l’Irak <\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t29 d\u00e9cembre 2003 Qu’est-ce qui nous indique la dur\u00e9e ? Qu’est-ce qui nous restitue la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 ? Entre la capture de Saddam et tout le cirque organis\u00e9 autour et la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de la situation en Irak, il est difficile d’h\u00e9siter longtemps. Les montages virtualistes, s’ils ont le poids imm\u00e9diat du conformisme des \u00e9lites qui le r\u00e9percutent comme des automates pour eux, ne cessent de montrer leur fragilit\u00e9 dans l’imm\u00e9diate confrontation avec la duret\u00e9 de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tConcernant l’Irak, situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale et r\u00e9elle, disons, les nouvelles sont mauvaises, tr\u00e8s mauvaises. La capture de Saddam n’a gu\u00e8re chang\u00e9 la tendance et elle risque \u00e0 terme, par contraste, de la rendre encore plus embarrassante. La tendance, c’est le Washington Post<\/em>, pourtant in\u00e9branlable soutien du r\u00e9gime washingtonien, qui nous entretient l\u00e0-dessus, dans deux articles dans l’\u00e9dition du m\u00eame jour.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• D’une part, un long texte nous dit que le Grand Dessein irakien se meurt<\/a>. Les ambitions US, aujourd’hui dans ce pays, sont au niveau du rabibochage et du compromis contraint. Les n\u00e9o-conservateurs restent \u00e0 leur poste mais leur grande id\u00e9e d’une d\u00e9mocratisation (c’est-\u00e0-dire l’am\u00e9ricanisation) de l’Irak, entra\u00eenant celle du Moyen-Orient, puis celle du monde, ne cesse de s’ab\u00eemer dans les remous irakiens.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The United States has backed away from several of its more ambitious initiatives to transform Iraq’s economy, political system and security forces as attacks on U.S. troops have escalated and the timetable for ending the civil occupation has accelerated.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Plans to privatize state-owned businesses a key part of a larger Bush administration goal to replace the socialist economy of deposed president Saddam Hussein with a free-market system have been dropped over the past few months. So too has a demand that Iraqis write a constitution before a transfer of sovereignty.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb With the administration’s plans tempered by time and threat, the U.S. administrator of Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, and his deputies are now focused on forging compromises with Iraqi leaders and combating a persistent insurgency in order to meet a July 1 deadline to transfer sovereignty to a provisional government.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb There’s no question that many of the big-picture items have been pushed down the list or erased completely, said a senior U.S. official involved in Iraq’s reconstruction, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Right now, everyone’s attention is focused [on] doing what we need to do to hand over sovereignty by next summer.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• La situation de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Irak continue \u00e0 se d\u00e9grader. Les attaques pour la p\u00e9riode de No\u00ebl ont \u00e9t\u00e9 s\u00e9v\u00e8res et le Washington Post du m\u00eame jour<\/a> trace un tableau consternant de l’\u00e9volution de la tendance pour les troupes am\u00e9ricaines.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The number of U.S. service members killed and wounded in Iraq has more than doubled in the past four months compared with the four months preceding them, according to Pentagon statistics.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb From Sept. 1 through Friday, 145 service members were killed in action in Iraq, compared with 65 from May 1 to Aug. 30. The two four-month intervals cover counterinsurgency operations, far costlier than major combat operations, which President Bush declared over on May 1.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Increases in those wounded in action have been equally dramatic this fall. Since Sept. 1, 1,209 soldiers have received battlefield wounds, more than twice the 574 wounded in action from May 1 through Aug. 30.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Nor have casualties tapered off since the capture of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein on Dec. 13. Through Friday, 12 service members were killed in action and 105 were wounded with Hussein in custody.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tOn rel\u00e8ve toutes ces conditions apr\u00e8s huit mois de troubles et deux ou trois occurrences o\u00f9 il nous fut annonc\u00e9 que les forces am\u00e9ricaines r\u00e9ussissaient enfin \u00e0 s’imposer et \u00e0 r\u00e9tablir le calme. Aujourd’hui, comme note Robert Fisk avec une ironie fatigu\u00e9e<\/a>, la technique dialectique du plus \u00e7a va plus mal, plus \u00e7a va mieux s’est g\u00e9n\u00e9ralis\u00e9e. Paul Bremer en use et en abuse.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa technique consiste \u00e0 dire que les attentats et les attaques augmentent parce que la reconstruction ne cesse de marquer des points, c’est-\u00e0-dire que les choses vont plus mal parce que les choses vont mieux. Il fallait y penser, on y a pens\u00e9. D’ailleurs, les autorit\u00e9s am\u00e9ricaines annoncent r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement, depuis la fin de l’\u00e9t\u00e9, qu’il va y avoir une recrudescence des troubles, comme s’ils assuraient contr\u00f4ler la situation et conna\u00eetre le secret ultime, car apr\u00e8s ces troubles, c’est bien s\u00fbr, les choses vont s’arranger (sorte de apr\u00e8s la pluie, le beau temps, preuve que les forces arm\u00e9es am\u00e9ricaines, l’administration GW et tutti quanti<\/em> de la m\u00eame bande ont une sorte de culte pour la pens\u00e9e et les conceptions d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es par le flaubertiens Bouvard et P\u00e9cuchet, au si\u00e8cle dernier, \u00e9poque de la b\u00eatise triomphante par le culte du lieu commun).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00c9coutons Robert Fisk :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab But the looking-glass effect seems to have taken hold of US pro-consul Paul Bremer’s entire authority. Like President George Bush, Bremer has now taken to repeating the absurdity that the greater the West’s success in Iraq, the more frequent will be the attacks on American troops.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb I personally feel that we’ll actually have more violence in the next six months, he said a couple of week ago, and the violence will be precisely because of the fact that we’re building momentum toward success. In other words, the better things become, the worse they’re going to get. And the greater the violence, the better we’re doing in Iraq.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tC’est comme si la situation semblait \u00eatre fix\u00e9e dans une chute r\u00e9guli\u00e8re. Parfois, la machine virtualiste semble reprendre le dessus, une visite-surprise de GW avec fausse dinde au menu, quatre jours de r\u00e9pit ; capture de Saddam, une semaine de r\u00e9pit ; comme on le sait, cela ne dure pas. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa situation irakienne s’installe dans une d\u00e9gradation structurelle. Elle y est aid\u00e9e par l’\u00e9tonnante persistance du d\u00e9sordre impliqu\u00e9 par l’effort am\u00e9ricain de reconstruction, notamment en raison de la compl\u00e8te libert\u00e9 laiss\u00e9e aux contractants US, des firmes priv\u00e9es souvent proches de personnalit\u00e9s de l’administration.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEn t\u00e9moigne, ci-dessous, le rapport de l’intervention de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Bechtel dans la reconstruction d’\u00e9coles en Irak<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab According to the Defense Department’s own figures, only 1,812 schools out of 11,939 schools damaged in some way by the US attack have been rehabilitated. Bechtel International Systems holds the lucrative USAID (US Agency for International Development) contract to repair more than 1,200 Iraqi schools.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reports that One frustrated American, Maj. Linda Scharf, a civil affairs officer, ordered a survey of 20 Bechtel-repaired schools in her area. She found dangerous debris left in playgrounds, sloppy paint jobs and broken toilets. The work was horrible,’ she said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Bechtel won the largest Iraq reconstruction contract, worth about $1 billion, to repair everything from schools to hospitals to ports. The corporation has received about $48 million for school repair, or about $38,000 per school.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Bechtel’s work has been remarkably shoddy. Baghdad primary school principal Fawzyia al Ali expressed her disappointment in an interview with the Boston Globe (December 21, 2003): When they came, they promised me a lot and had an agreement with a big company for construction,’ Ali said recently while standing by the sewage, which welled up after workers dug in the wrong place to find a septic tank. I had a lot of hope. They promised a lot, and the result was the opposite.’<\/em> \u00bb<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Des voeux amers pour l’Irak 29 d\u00e9cembre 2003 Qu’est-ce qui nous indique la dur\u00e9e ? Qu’est-ce qui nous restitue la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 ? Entre la capture de Saddam et tout le cirque organis\u00e9 autour et la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de la situation en Irak, il est difficile d’h\u00e9siter longtemps. Les montages virtualistes, s’ils ont le poids imm\u00e9diat du… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65829","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65829","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65829"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65829\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65829"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65829"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65829"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}