{"id":65833,"date":"2004-01-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-01-03T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/01\/03\/pourquoi-il-est-bon-que-nous-entrions-dans-lannee-2004\/"},"modified":"2004-01-03T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-01-03T00:00:00","slug":"pourquoi-il-est-bon-que-nous-entrions-dans-lannee-2004","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/01\/03\/pourquoi-il-est-bon-que-nous-entrions-dans-lannee-2004\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>Pourquoi il est bon que nous entrions dans l&rsquo;ann\u00e9e 2004<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Pourquoi il est bon que nous entrions dans l&rsquo;ann\u00e9e 2004<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t3 janvier 2004  L&rsquo;ann\u00e9e 2003 restera comme un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne unique dans l&rsquo;histoire, par le volume de mensonges, leur puissance, leur diffusion  extraordinaire, par la rapidit\u00e9 \u00e9galement extraordinaire avec laquelle ces mensonges sont mis \u00e0 jour, par la d\u00e9marche massive suivie par les principales autorit\u00e9s de la plan\u00e8te pour s&rsquo;agiter autour d&rsquo;une politique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de crise compl\u00e8tement bas\u00e9e sur le mensonge, dont tout le monde sait qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de mensonges  et ainsi de suite. Cela est \u00e9puisant pour la psychologie. Nous quitterons 2003 sans regret.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;ann\u00e9e 2004 risque d&rsquo;\u00eatre plus int\u00e9ressante. Il y a plusieurs rendez-vous. Pour \u00eatre dramatique, on dirait : avec l&rsquo;Histoire, mais il suffit de dire avec la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, et c&rsquo;est bien aussi extraordinaire. L&rsquo;un des immenses handicaps que nous avons \u00e0 surmonter pour y voir clair est la massive r\u00e9v\u00e9rence \u00e0 laquelle la plupart des experts et commentateurs, ceux qui ont pour mission d&rsquo;\u00e9clairer l&rsquo;opinion, sont in\u00e9vitablement conduits devant les autorit\u00e9s en place.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe principal probl\u00e8me qui se pose \u00e0 notre entendement est d&rsquo;accepter l&rsquo;id\u00e9e que cette immense puissance, l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique, avec ses divers satellites plus ou moins r\u00e9tifs, plus ou moins consentants, est conduite par des gens sans aucune envergure, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de moralit\u00e9 douteuse et d&rsquo;intelligence (on entend, dans ce qu&rsquo;elle a de bon sens) bien en-dessous de la moyenne, et qui ne sont absolument pas s\u00e9rieux,  des individus sans la moindre envergure historique en un mot. Nous ne disons pas qu&rsquo;ils sont mauvais (\u00e9cartons leur rh\u00e9torique \u00e0 quat&rsquo;sous), nous disons qu&rsquo;ils sont insignifiants par rapport \u00e0 la t\u00e2che qui est la leur. Ils ne sont donc pas s\u00e9rieux. L&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat de l&rsquo;ann\u00e9e 2004 est qu&rsquo;elle devrait aider, par contraste avec 2003, \u00e0 mettre cela en \u00e9vidence, par simple plong\u00e9e dans la r\u00e9alit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tQuelques commentateurs comprennent bien cela, et nous recommandons leur lecture. (Ceux qui sont cit\u00e9s ici sont quelques-uns parmi beaucoup d&rsquo;autres, ce qui est un grand motif d&rsquo;espoir et la preuve <em>a contrario<\/em> que les sommets, aujourd&rsquo;hui, sont occup\u00e9s par les plus m\u00e9diocres.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Par exemple, Geov Parrish, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.workingforchange.com\/article.cfm?itemid=16212\" class=\"gen\">a publi\u00e9 sur le site Working For Change, le 31 d\u00e9cembre un texte sur 2003<\/a>. Parrish rappelle les grands dossiers de l&rsquo;ann\u00e9e 2003, ceux qui furent d\u00e9mesur\u00e9ment grossis \u00e0 partir de rien, ceux qui furent r\u00e9duits \u00e0 rien \u00e0 partir de ce qu&rsquo;ils repr\u00e9sentaient, qui \u00e9tait important. Une le\u00e7on de lucidit\u00e9 aux d\u00e9pens d&rsquo;un monde de l&rsquo;information perverti dans une mesure qu&rsquo;il ne distingue plus lui-m\u00eame. Parrish d\u00e9bute son texte en nous disant ceci pour 2004 :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Every year since <\/em>[1996], <em>it&rsquo;s gotten worse, and the gulf between what people in this country and those elsewhere in the world are told about the same events has continued to widen. But the year 2004 will be a particularly critical one in our nation&rsquo;s, and world&rsquo;s, modern history. The chain of events set in motion by the U.S. invasion of Iraq is likely to take a definitive turn; beyond that, the American public will be asked to pass judgment on four years&rsquo; performance of one of the most radical regimes in our country&rsquo;s history. Understanding what&rsquo;s actually happening has never been more important  and spinmeisters&rsquo; efforts to obscure what&rsquo;s actually happening will be stronger and more technologically savvy than ever. It&rsquo;s time to get smart.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Un autre texte met en lumi\u00e8re la nature r\u00e9elle de la puissance am\u00e9ricaine aujourd&rsquo;hui, avec une description o\u00f9 l&rsquo;ironie, par bonheur, n&rsquo;est pas absente. On pense, pour d\u00e9finir ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne extraordinairement fabriqu\u00e9, au <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=936\" class=\"gen\">titre d&rsquo;une chronique de William Pfaff de 1992, reprise sur ce site<\/a>, qui correspond si bien \u00e0 la situation : \u00ab <em>And To Finish in a Burlesque Of An Empire<\/em> \u00bb. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un texte <a href=\"http:\/\/www.alternet.org\/story.html?StoryID=17477\" class=\"gen\">de Tom Engelhardt, publi\u00e9 sur Alternet.org le 2 janvier<\/a>, qui nous parle de l&#8217;empire en ces termes (le titre) : \u00ab <em> The Imperial Gong Show Year<\/em> \u00bb. (Engelhardt termine sa revue de 2003 par le constat de l&rsquo;importance de 2004 : \u00ab <em>2004 should be a fierce holding action for them. The question is  as with Richard Nixon in 1972  can they make it through to November before the seams start to tear. They might be able to. But here&rsquo;s the thing: Sooner or later, the children will leave the stage and some set of adults will have to start picking up the pieces. If the 2004 election is theirs, however&#8230; well, sometimes there are just things, our planet included, too broken to fix.<\/em> \u00bb) Voici donc quelques lignes de cet Empire qui n&rsquo;est rien d&rsquo;autre qu&rsquo;une farce \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9chelle plan\u00e9taire, mais une farce, on le comprend, qui pourrait nous co\u00fbter cher :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>In instant retrospect, 2003 already looks like a Gong Show year for the American Empire. Put another way, when early in the year the administration reached into its mighty imperial arsenal, all it pulled out was brute force applied brutally in a three-week shock-and-awe campaign against Saddam Hussein&rsquo;s pathetic military (and then reapplied with counterproductive ineffectiveness ever since). No one can deny that empires work on a principle of brute force. It&rsquo;s a necessity if you plan to conquer others and rule them against their wishes, but it can&rsquo;t be the only arrow in your quiver. A little finesse is usually necessary, if you plan to stick around for a while. Some plums need to be offered, at least to some of the conquered and those from elsewhere who fight in your legions. There has to be some way to join the empire as a junior partner and benefit somehow. None of this was available in the Bush version of shouldering the imperial burden.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>To the extent that we proved imperial in 2003, it was largely in the Pentagon&rsquo;s long-term planning for weapons systems, large and small, slated to dominate the planet for the next half-century or more. Can there be any doubt that we already have the weaponry of 40 Roman empires and 20 British ones with more to come? After all, we even have futuristic weapons on the drawing boards for 2050.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; <a href=\" http:\/\/www.iht.com\/articles\/123480.html\" class=\"gen\">Pour William Pfaff, effectivement, 2004 sera une ann\u00e9e cruciale<\/a>, \u00ab <em>the year of all the answers<\/em> \u00bb. Il y aura, principalement, l&rsquo;\u00e9volution de la situation irakienne vers sa phase cruciale et l&rsquo;\u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle de 2004. Dans ces deux domaines, toutes les tromperies sont possibles et toutes seront essay\u00e9es ; mais, cette fois, l&rsquo;adversaire principal sera la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 des situations et l&rsquo;issue pourrait \u00eatre moins facile que lorsqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de convaincre ce qui fait office de commentateurs des affaires courantes,  journalistes, experts, etc. Voici ce que Pfaff dit de l&rsquo;\u00e9volution irakienne, qu&rsquo;il tient pour le plus important facteur de l&rsquo;\u00e9quation de l&rsquo;ann\u00e9e 2004.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Iraq&rsquo;s fate is the most important variable in any attempt to assess where the United States will stand a year from now. If a secure and at least nominally sovereign Iraqi government exists a year from today, alongside American bases in that country, the United States will have won the Iraq war. The odds are low that there will be such a government.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The possibility that the United States might lose the Iraq war has yet to be seriously discussed at the level of national politics and policy. There is an all but universal assumption that American power will in the end crush anything that resists it.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t(&#8230;)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Washington initially projected a two-year democracy-building program under U.S. supervision. Military resistance in the \u00a0\u00bbSunni triangle,\u00a0\u00bb an ominous growth of anti-American tension within the Shiite community, and the lack of convincing national leadership caused the administration to decide in November to accelerate the \u00a0\u00bbIraqization\u00a0\u00bb of the occupation.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Now there is supposed to be an Iraq government in Baghdad by July, still under overall American suzerainty and with 100,000 U.S. troops still stationed in the country. That does not appeal to Iraq&rsquo;s nationalists.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>There is debate in the United States over the Iraq invasion, but surprisingly little dissent among U.S. foreign policy elites, officials, commentators and presidential candidates concerning the general American policy of intervention in the Middle East and elsewhere, meant to install democracy.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>If the administration&rsquo;s Iraq policy fails, not only the Bush presidency will be in jeopardy in 2004. So will this complacent cross-party assumption that Pax Americana is America&rsquo;s new destiny. That, in itself, would not be a bad thing.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Pourquoi il est bon que nous entrions dans l&rsquo;ann\u00e9e 2004 3 janvier 2004 L&rsquo;ann\u00e9e 2003 restera comme un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne unique dans l&rsquo;histoire, par le volume de mensonges, leur puissance, leur diffusion extraordinaire, par la rapidit\u00e9 \u00e9galement extraordinaire avec laquelle ces mensonges sont mis \u00e0 jour, par la d\u00e9marche massive suivie par les principales autorit\u00e9s de&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[1381,4196,1131],"class_list":["post-65833","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-engelhardt","tag-parrish","tag-pfaff"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65833","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65833"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65833\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65833"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65833"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65833"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}