{"id":65860,"date":"2004-02-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-02-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/02\/02\/la-crise-de-la-psychologie-occidentale-anglo-saxonne\/"},"modified":"2004-02-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-02-02T00:00:00","slug":"la-crise-de-la-psychologie-occidentale-anglo-saxonne","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/02\/02\/la-crise-de-la-psychologie-occidentale-anglo-saxonne\/","title":{"rendered":"La crise de la psychologie occidentale (anglo-saxonne)<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

La crise de la psychologie occidentale (anglo-saxonne)<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t2 f\u00e9vrier 2004 Les patrons tremblent sur leurs bases. On fait le n\u00e9cessaire pour les sauver, \u00e9crivions-nous<\/a>, mais cela sera-t-il suffisant ? Il y a un aspect insaisissable dans la crise qui est sa caract\u00e9ristique la plus remarquable avec sa rapidit\u00e9 (les deux caract\u00e9ristiques allant de pair : insaisissable en grande partie, parce que si rapide). Aujourd’hui, on assiste au d\u00e9roulement d’une logique de d\u00e9structuration du pouvoir anglo-saxon, les deux, britannique et am\u00e9ricain, pour une fois tr\u00e8s proches, conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 leurs discours, mais c’est tr\u00e8s proches dans l’intensit\u00e9 des crises qu’ils subissent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa raison de cet \u00e9trange ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne pourrait \u00eatre que, au vu des pr\u00e9cisions et r\u00e9v\u00e9lations qui s’accumulent, des explications nouvelles s’offrent \u00e0 nous. Cette \u00e9norme montagne de crise qu’est l’affaire irakienne accouche par instants de curieuses souris.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tParmi les pr\u00e9cisions int\u00e9ressantes qui nous arrivent, en voici quelques-unes qui m\u00e9ritent quelques instants de r\u00e9flexion.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• D’abord, la r\u00e9v\u00e9lation apport\u00e9e par The Observer, hier<\/a>, que les officiels am\u00e9ricains savaient, d\u00e8s le courant mai 2003, qu’il n’y avait pas d’armes de destruction massive (AMD) en Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Among those interviewed by The Observer was a very senior US intelligence official serving during the war against Iraq with an intimate knowledge of the search for Iraq’s WMD. We had enough evidence at the beginning of May to start asking, where did we go wrong?’, he said last week. We had already made the judgment that something very wrong had happened [in May] and our confidence was shaken to its foundations.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The source, a career intelligence official who spoke on condition of anonymity, was also scathing about the massive scale of the failure of intelligence over Iraq both in the US and among its foreign allies alleging that the intelligence community had effectively suppressed dissenting views and intelligence.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The claim is confirmed by other sources, as well as figures like David Albright, a former UN nuclear inspector with close contacts in both the world of weapons inspection and intelligence. It was known in May, Albright said last week, that no one was going to find large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. The only people who did not know that fact was the public.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLes implications de ces r\u00e9v\u00e9lations sont consid\u00e9rables. Elles signifient que l’\u00e9quipe de David Kay (qui vient de d\u00e9missionner), reform\u00e9e en septembre 2003 \u00e0 partir de l’\u00e9quipe initiale de recherche des AMD en Irak et pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e partout comme une initiative de la Maison-Blanche pour r\u00e9gler le probl\u00e8me des ADM (c’est-\u00e0-dire, en trouver), a commenc\u00e9 ses recherches en Irak alors qu’il \u00e9tait connu qu’on ne trouverait rien. Elles signifient que Blair a affront\u00e9 toute la crise du suicide de David Kelly, les auditions du juge Hutton, etc, avec cette information cruciale \u00e0 l’esprit. Et ainsi de suite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais il y a mieux, ou pire, si l’on adopte un point de vue froidement r\u00e9aliste ou cynique. Si tout le monde savait qu’il n’y avait pas d’ADM en Irak, dans des gouvernements rompus \u00e0 toutes les manipulations diverses, connues sous le nom de communication, pourquoi n’a-t-il pas \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9cid\u00e9 de monter une op\u00e9ration secr\u00e8te pour mettre en place de fausses ADM, et ainsi \u00e9carter l’essentiel des effets d\u00e9sastreux de la crise qui \u00e9clate aujourd’hui ? Ce contraste entre la perversion compl\u00e8te du processus qui conduisit \u00e0 la guerre, o\u00f9 toutes les informations \u00e9taient manipul\u00e9es (consciemment ou pas, peu importe pour ce cas), et la na\u00efvet\u00e9 surprenante de l’attitude qu’on d\u00e9couvre ici, est sans doute le fait le plus \u00e9trange de cette affaire. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous ne tenterons pas d’expliquer cette \u00e9trange situation par un subit acc\u00e8s de vertu, comme une contagion inattendue, bien qu’il ne faille pas \u00e9carter cette possibilit\u00e9 hollywoodienne. Une autre approche nous est sugg\u00e9r\u00e9e, qui nous semble plus ad\u00e9quate, qui rejoint nos diverses hypoth\u00e8ses sur le virtualisme. Elle ne donne pas une r\u00e9ponse directe \u00e0 notre question mais permet de voir combien les hypoth\u00e8ses psychologiques, concernant le comportement des directions occidentales, ne cessent de gagner du terrain. Les bizarreries de comportement deviennent alors plus faciles \u00e0 envisager, m\u00eame sans r\u00e9ponse pr\u00e9cise.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Dans une chronique qui examine le comportement des services de renseignement anglo-saxons,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMartin Woollacott, dans le Guardian du 31 janvier<\/a>, examine comment, litt\u00e9ralement, selon le titre qu’il nous propose, \u00ab Our spies were hostage to their mistrust of Saddam The Iraq intelligence failures built up over more than a decade.<\/em> \u00bb La chronique de Woollacott est int\u00e9ressante dans la mesure o\u00f9 elle va franchement au coeur du probl\u00e8me en posant l’hypoth\u00e8se que, dans cette confusion, dans cette valse d’\u00e9valuations et de mensonges qui n’en sont pas compl\u00e8tement, il semble bien qu’on ne sache pas vraiment pourquoi nos gouvernements sont partis en guerre, et, au-del\u00e0, parce que nous disposons de plus en plus d’informations que ces gouvernements sont oblig\u00e9s de donner, on peut avancer l’hypoth\u00e8se que, d\u00e9sormais, ces gouvernements eux-m\u00eames ne savent plus, ou ne savent toujours pas pourquoi ils sont partis en guerre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Neither the Hutton report, nor David Kay’s evidence before the Senate armed forces committee, have changed what we know about the beliefs and motives of the US and British governments before the war. We knew then and we know now that they believed he had some minor WMD holdings and expected to find them, or encounter them in battle. They were not lying when they said this, yet it was not the reason they went to war. If that reason was principally to do with weapons, it was to do with weapons not yet made, whose connection with the present was established only on the basis of an assumption about what was in Saddam’s mind.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Did our governments and our intelligence services know that mind as well as they thought they did ? A few, like Ritter, questioned the assumptions that grew up inside the secret world during the 90s. Tim Trevan, once spokesman for Rolf Ekeus, the first head of the UN special commission for Iraq, has commented on the contradiction between the objectives of disarmament and regime change.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• Les r\u00e9v\u00e9lations et informations qui continuent \u00e0 affluer nous montrent de plus en plus des situations d’obsession, des personnalisations ou des d\u00e9monisations qui rel\u00e8vent plus de la pathologie que de la politique, aussi comploteuse f\u00fbt-elle. Il est manifeste que nous sommes dans le domaine de la psychologie, pas dans celui de la strat\u00e9gie, et que c’est bien la psychologie qui compte dans cette affaire. Maureen Dowd va au coeur des choses<\/a> avec sa chronique consacr\u00e9e \u00e0 l’effet-miroir (la projection sur l’autre, qui est pourtant compl\u00e8tement diff\u00e9rent, de sa propre psychologie, de sa propre logique, de son propre mode de pens\u00e9e).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Bush officials, awash in the vice president’s Hobbesian gloom, deduced that Saddam would not hide if he had nothing to hide. Even after all their talk about a Bernard Lewis clash of civilizations and a battle of good versus evil, they still projected a Western mind-set on Saddam.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Ms. Rice argued that the U.S. was right to conclude that Saddam had W.M.D. and attack him because the dictator was not behaving rationally. But why did she think someone President Bush deemed a madman would behave rationally?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Cheney & Company were so consumed with puffing the intelligence to try to connect Saddam with 9\/11, Al Qaeda and nuclear material, they failed to challenge basic assumptions.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The closer the inspectors got to the truth that Iraq didn’t have weapons, the more the Bush hawks asserted that only war would uncover weapons. Their threats to Saddam made him bluff that he had the weapons that they said he had.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Most intelligence failures are about missing something happening, said a former Bush official. What’s so bizarre about this is, they thought something was happening that wasn’t. This is right up there with Pearl Harbor and Bay of Pigs.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La crise de la psychologie occidentale (anglo-saxonne) 2 f\u00e9vrier 2004 Les patrons tremblent sur leurs bases. On fait le n\u00e9cessaire pour les sauver, \u00e9crivions-nous, mais cela sera-t-il suffisant ? Il y a un aspect insaisissable dans la crise qui est sa caract\u00e9ristique la plus remarquable avec sa rapidit\u00e9 (les deux caract\u00e9ristiques allant de pair :… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65860","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65860","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65860"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65860\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65860"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65860"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65860"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}