{"id":65863,"date":"2004-02-08T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-02-08T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/02\/08\/les-neo-conservateurs-exultent-la-cia-sest-trompee\/"},"modified":"2004-02-08T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-02-08T00:00:00","slug":"les-neo-conservateurs-exultent-la-cia-sest-trompee","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/02\/08\/les-neo-conservateurs-exultent-la-cia-sest-trompee\/","title":{"rendered":"Les n\u00e9o-conservateurs exultent : la CIA s’est tromp\u00e9e<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les n\u00e9o-conservateurs exultent : la CIA s’est tromp\u00e9e<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t8 f\u00e9vrier 2004 Comment vont les n\u00e9o-conservateurs ? Tr\u00e8s bien, en v\u00e9rit\u00e9. On pourrait les croire d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9s, incertains, voire contrits et silencieux par l’absence totale d’armes de destruction massive en Irak, apr\u00e8s les diff\u00e9rentes d\u00e9clarations de David Kay et l’\u00e9volution s\u00e9mantique de l’administration GW<\/a> sur ce sujet.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl faut se rappeler que, bien entendu, les n\u00e9o-conservateurs ont \u00e9t\u00e9 des avocats enthousiastes dans la question des ADM irakiennes. Ils n’ont cess\u00e9 de d\u00e9noncer leur pr\u00e9sence massive, le risque qu’elles nous faisaient courir et ainsi de suite. Dans un article publi\u00e9 hier<\/a> et justement nomm\u00e9 \u00ab America’s Orwellian moment<\/em> \u00bb, Paul Krugman nous rappelle ce qu’il faut savoir l\u00e0-dessus, en quelques phrases.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t \u00ab A tip from Joshua Marshall, of www.talkingpointsmemo.com, led me to a stark reminder of how different the story line used to be. Last year Laurie Mylroie published a book titled Bush vs. the Beltway: How the CIA and the State Department Tried to Stop the War on Terror. Mylroie’s book came with an encomium from Richard Perle; she’s known to be close to Paul Wolfowitz and to Dick Cheney’s chief of staff. According to the jacket copy, Mylroie describes how the CIA and the State Department have systematically discredited critical intelligence about Saddam’s regime, including indisputable evidence of its possession of weapons of mass destruction.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tPourtant, non. L’accueil que font les n\u00e9o-conservateurs \u00e0 la nouvelle de l’absence d’ADM est particuli\u00e8rement enthousiaste, et David Kay devient le h\u00e9ros du jour … Le New York Times du 2 f\u00e9vrier<\/a> observe ceci, citant Frank J. Gaffney, un des plus purs et durs parmi les n\u00e9o-conservateurs, qui nous parle de David Kay effectivement comme d’un h\u00e9ros qu’il faudrait mettre vite fait \u00e0 la t\u00eate de la CIA : \u00ab Not only does he say he was wrong, but he is willing to tackle the institutional questions of being in error, said Frank J. Gaffney Jr., the president of the Center for Security Policy in Washington. Mr. Gaffney urged President Bush to swallow any annoyance he might feel and ask Dr. Kay to replace Mr. Tenet in his job.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe chroniqueur Jim Lobe, toujours vigilant, a effectivement observ\u00e9 ce stup\u00e9fiant changement des n\u00e9o-conservateurs sur le fond du probl\u00e8me consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme fondamental pour la crise irakienne, puisque pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral comme la cause imm\u00e9diate et pressante de la guerre. Lobe parle, notamment \u00e0 propos de Richard Perle<\/a>, d’une compl\u00e8te impudence, d’une attitude d\u00e9finie en yiddish par le mot Chutzpah<\/em>, et joliment illustr\u00e9e par l’anecdote suivante : \u00ab Chutzpah is when a man kills his mother and his father and then throws himself on the mercy of the court on the grounds that he is an orphan.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici ce que Lobe nous dit des n\u00e9o-conservateurs face \u00e0 la crise de l’inexistence des ADM saddamesques :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab No, now Perle and his fellow neoconservatives are hailing chief U.S. weapons-of-mass-destruction hunter, David Kay. On resigning from his post last week, Kay charged that the intelligence community, and particularly the CIA, clearly exaggerated the size and scope of Saddam Hussein’s alleged WMD programs. I don’t think they existed, he said, insisting that he himself, as well as the intelligence community, were almost all wrong about Iraq’s alleged WMD stockpiles and reconstitution of Iraq’s nuclear-arms program.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb I have always thought our intelligence in the Gulf has been woefully inadequate, Perle, former chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board (DPB), confided to The New York Times after Kay disclosed his findings.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Their campaign now and there is an orchestrated campaign underway, make no mistake is to blame the CIA for exaggerating the Iraqi threat must rank right up there with parenticidal orphans.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb It was Gaffney, a long-time Perle prot\u00e9g\u00e8 who worked under him in Sen. Scoop’ Jackson’s office and later at the Pentagon during the Reagan administration, for example, who was raising alarms over Hussein’s non-existent atomic and perhaps even thermonuclear weapons even before 9\/11.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb He (Hussein) has weapons of mass destruction, Perle stated unequivocally as early as November 2001even as his friends in the Pentagon were setting up their Office of Special Plans (OSP), an informal intelligence unit whose job it was to mine raw intelligence to find and disseminate the most threatening possible evidence of Iraq’s WMD programs and alleged ties to Al Qaeda that the neoconservatives thought the CIA or even the Pentagon’s own Defense Intelligence Agency had not given adequate credence.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Perle even used his good offices as DPB chairman to ensure that defectors’ handled by his good friend Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress (INC) such as Khidir Hamza, a former nuclear scientist who stoked totally unfounded fears that Hussein was reconstituting his nuclear-weapons program were given the widest possible exposure to policy-makers. Senior intelligence officials have since identified the INC’s defectors as the source of a great deal of the mis-, if not dis-information, that skewed its assessments.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb For Perle, Hussein’s WMD program was simply a given. If (Hussein) eludes us and continues to refine, perfect and expand his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, he testified to Congress in the fall of 2002, the danger to us, already great, will only grow. The problem, of course, was that the arsenal whose existence was never subject to the slightest doubt by Perle and his friends didn’t exist. Indeed, just two weeks before his friend Kay acknowledged there were simply no weapons to be found, Perle insisted to an audience at his home base, the American Enterprise Institute, I don’t think that you can draw any conclusion from the fact that stockpiles were not found.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCes r\u00e9actions sont particuli\u00e8rement significatives. Elles ne peuvent \u00eatre expliqu\u00e9es qu’en partie par la duplicit\u00e9 habituelle dans le jeu politique, notamment et particuli\u00e8rement washingtonien. Lobe avance aussit\u00f4t l’explication de l’hostilit\u00e9 des n\u00e9o-conservateurs et, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, des conservateurs activistes \u00e0 l’encontre de la CIA. L’agence est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme un nid de lib\u00e9raux, avec une tendance syst\u00e9matique \u00e0 d\u00e9former les r\u00e9alit\u00e9s : \u00ab Perle and his fellow-neocons’ contempt for the CIA dates to the 1970s when he and then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld accused the agency of being naive about Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions. That set the pattern. To Perle, the CIA, like the State Department, has long been a haven for naive and foolish liberals incapable of understanding just how dangerous and threatening the enemyany enemyreally is.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPeu importe que la soi-disant d\u00e9formation, largement contest\u00e9e par ailleurs puisque les charges contre la CIA \u00e9voqu\u00e9es ici sont l’objet de critiques tr\u00e8s violentes, soit dans le sens d’un durcissement de la menace, donc dans le sens que voulaient les conservateurs et n\u00e9o-conservateurs eux-m\u00eames, dans le sens qu’ils accusent explicitement, depuis plus d’un quart de si\u00e8cle, la CIA de ne pas suivre. Ce qui importe est l’abaissement de la CIA : il s’agit d’abord d’une bataille bureaucratique, d’une bataille pour le pouvoir \u00e0 Washington. Le probl\u00e8me de l’Irak et le probl\u00e8me de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 des ADM semblent les derniers de leurs soucis, et ils le sont effectivement par eux-m\u00eames. Les rapports de force \u00e0 Washington concernent le pouvoir washingtonien, beaucoup plus que ce que ce pouvoir parvient \u00e0 accomplir. C’est un des \u00e9l\u00e9ments importants du virtualisme qui caract\u00e9rise la politique washingtonienne : toute politique ext\u00e9rieure am\u00e9ricaine doit d’abord \u00eatre mesur\u00e9e en fonction de son impact int\u00e9rieur, de fa\u00e7on imp\u00e9rative et majoritaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les n\u00e9o-conservateurs exultent : la CIA s’est tromp\u00e9e 8 f\u00e9vrier 2004 Comment vont les n\u00e9o-conservateurs ? Tr\u00e8s bien, en v\u00e9rit\u00e9. On pourrait les croire d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9s, incertains, voire contrits et silencieux par l’absence totale d’armes de destruction massive en Irak, apr\u00e8s les diff\u00e9rentes d\u00e9clarations de David Kay et l’\u00e9volution s\u00e9mantique de l’administration GW sur ce sujet.… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65863","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65863","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65863"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65863\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65863"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65863"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65863"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}