{"id":65868,"date":"2004-02-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-02-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/02\/12\/des-armes-europeennes-pour-la-chine-la-dimension-politique\/"},"modified":"2004-02-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-02-12T00:00:00","slug":"des-armes-europeennes-pour-la-chine-la-dimension-politique","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/02\/12\/des-armes-europeennes-pour-la-chine-la-dimension-politique\/","title":{"rendered":"Des armes europ\u00e9ennes pour la Chine? La dimension politique<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Des armes europ\u00e9ennes pour la Chine? La dimension politique<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t12 f\u00e9vrier 2004 La question de l’\u00e9ventuelle lev\u00e9e, par l’Union Europ\u00e9enne, de l’embargo des armements pour la Chine, soul\u00e8ve de plus en plus de commentaires. (Voir aussi notre texte sur cette question.<\/a>)Il s’agit de la politisation in\u00e9luctable d’un probl\u00e8me dont les dimensions strat\u00e9giques apparaissent d\u00e9j\u00e0 clairement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe qui est int\u00e9ressant, c’est de voir combien c’est la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence europ\u00e9enne qui compte, puisque, par ailleurs, la Chine peut acheter toutes les armes russes qu’elle veut. M\u00eame si l’armement russe est technologiquement d’un niveau l\u00e9g\u00e8rement inf\u00e9rieur \u00e0 l’armement europ\u00e9en le plus avanc\u00e9, surtout pour l’environnement logistique et de maintenance, ce n’est pas dans une mesure qui justifie \u00e0 elle seule l’alarme qu’on constate.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous publions ci-dessous un texte du groupe PINR (The Power and Interest News Report)<\/a> sur cette question. L’article pr\u00e9sente la question d’une fa\u00e7on qui nous fait comprendre que cette \u00e9ventuelle d\u00e9cision europ\u00e9enne est aussi importante pour l’Europe que la Chine. La conclusion a cet \u00e9gard est int\u00e9ressante (le texte assume que l’essentiel de cette d\u00e9cision provient de la position de la France et de l’Allemagne, ce qui n’est pas une explication compl\u00e8tement assur\u00e9e) :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The motivations for France and Germany are strongly tied to their countries’ economic weaknesses. But this may also be one route that the countries are pursuing in the attempt to create a multi-polar world to balance the power of the U.S. This may explain why they are pushing for a vote on the subject before the March inauguration of 10 new members, many of which have close ties to Washington. If the E.U. pursues the path of boosting China to a position to challenge the power in the region that the U.S. currently controls, the effects of this realignment could spread around the world. Any move by the E.U. to arm China will have to account for the reaction that this power shift could unleash.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

France and Germany Move to Resume Arms Sales to China<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Adam Wolfe, The Power and Interest News Report (PINR), 11 February, 2004<\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn January 27, French President Jacques Chirac held a joint conference with Chinese President Hu Jintao to celebrate the "Year of China" in Paris. Chirac used the occasion to publicly call for the lifting of the European Union arms embargo on China. France and Germany have succeeded in pushing the E.U. to review the embargo and have urged the E.U. to take action before the March entrance of ten new members. On February 4, Javier Solana, the E.U. foreign policy chief, was quoted in the Geneva newspaper Le Temps as saying, "It seems to me, after discussions we had a few days ago [that] the E.U. is ready to do it." <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhile the United States is opposed to lifting the bans, it is a 1998 E.U. law that may ultimately render any change to the embargo insignificant; the E.U. arms business remains tightly controlled by a 1998 code of conduct barring the sale of equipment that could be used in regional conflicts or domestic repression, which would still be enforceable on sales to China.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAfter the military repression of pro-democracy demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the U.S. and the member states of the E.U. placed embargos on sales of arms to China. U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said, "We believe that the U.S. and European prohibitions on arms sales are complementary, were imposed for the same reasons, specifically serious human-rights abuses, and that those reasons remain valid today." Despite Boucher’s statement, the French have begun to see the issue differently. Dominique de Villepin, the French foreign minister, recently argued, "Our feeling is that the embargo is out of date as relations between Europe and China improve. [Beijing is] a privileged partner and a responsible one." <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFrance and Germany are pushing for an end to the embargo largely for economic reasons. The E.U. is China’s third largest trade partner and, according to an October strategy paper, China expects the E.U. to become its largest source of foreign investment within five years. China’s military spending has been growing by an annual rate of 17 percent even though the state has not recently been involved in any major conflicts. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGermany’s and France’s economies have suffered since the late 1990s and may be subject to E.U. action for government deficit spending above the maximum levels allowed as members in the Union. The coming growth of the E.U. from 15 states to 25 will weaken the two countries’ negotiating position within the trading bloc. Both countries are hoping that investment in China will help to pull their economies out of stagnation and near flat growth rates. China has used this situation to make ending the embargo its top priority with the E.U. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe U.S. objects to the dropping of the prohibitions because it threatens to upset the balance of power in the region and because China has not advanced on the human rights issues that triggered the embargos. The lifting of the sanctions will certainly exacerbate the tensions surrounding the March 20 presidential elections in Taiwan. Currently, Taiwan has been protected from a Chinese invasion from U.S. guarantees of security and the island’s technological edge. Should weapons sales resume between the E.U. and China, including Mirage jets from France and missiles from Germany, this technological superiority could diminish without the U.S. releasing new weapons to the island for purchase. The possibility of this situation is beginning to stoke the nationalistic streak in Taiwan that even the U.S. has not been able to support. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe economic and geopolitical rise of China also threatens the ability of the U.S. to act as a unique balancing power in the region. As China emerges as a great power, and Japan’s slacking economy continues to marginalize its regional influence, the power structures that the U.S. has relied on in the region are being overturned. Although the bilateral security alliance and access to Japanese naval bases will remain important to the U.S. for the foreseeable future, Washington has been trying to maintain its influence in the region through other state players. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlthough some individuals in Washington have begun to see China as a security collaborator, rather than a "strategic competitor," the U.S. is not prepared to strengthen the Chinese government’s military power out of concern for other regional allies such as Taiwan and South Korea. France and Germany are not as hesitant to disrupt the balance of power in the region because the European powers have not had strong ties with Japan, Taiwan or South Korea.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe U.S. also objects to the dropping of the embargo because the ban was put in place for human rights abuses, and Washington argues that the prohibitions should not be lifted simply in reaction to the liberalization of the Chinese economy. China continues to occupy Tibet and suppress free speech in the press. However, E.U. members claim that China has made progress on these fronts and should not be lumped into the same category as North Korea, Myanmar, Liberia and Sudan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEven if the E.U. does lift the embargo, which looks increasingly likely, it seems that any weapons sales to China will still be illegal under the 1998 code of conduct on arms exports. As China continues to direct some 450-plus missiles at Taiwan, there is little chance that any long-range missile technology could be sold to the country. Some in the E.U. argue that this code would provide a safety net to the easing of the embargo — that it would prevent the sale of any technology that could be used to threaten another state.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe motivations for France and Germany are strongly tied to their countries’ economic weaknesses. But this may also be one route that the countries are pursuing in the attempt to create a multi-polar world to balance the power of the U.S. This may explain why they are pushing for a vote on the subject before the March inauguration of 10 new members, many of which have close ties to Washington. If the E.U. pursues the path of boosting China to a position to challenge the power in the region that the U.S. currently controls, the effects of this realignment could spread around the world. Any move by the E.U. to arm China will have to account for the reaction that this power shift could unleash.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Des armes europ\u00e9ennes pour la Chine? La dimension politique 12 f\u00e9vrier 2004 La question de l’\u00e9ventuelle lev\u00e9e, par l’Union Europ\u00e9enne, de l’embargo des armements pour la Chine, soul\u00e8ve de plus en plus de commentaires. (Voir aussi notre texte sur cette question.)Il s’agit de la politisation in\u00e9luctable d’un probl\u00e8me dont les dimensions strat\u00e9giques apparaissent d\u00e9j\u00e0 clairement.… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65868","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65868","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65868"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65868\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65868"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65868"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65868"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}