{"id":65872,"date":"2004-02-18T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-02-18T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/02\/18\/le-triumvirat-se-rencontre-a-berlin\/"},"modified":"2004-02-18T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-02-18T00:00:00","slug":"le-triumvirat-se-rencontre-a-berlin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/02\/18\/le-triumvirat-se-rencontre-a-berlin\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>Le \u201ctriumvirat\u201d se rencontre \u00e0 Berlin<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Le triumvirat se rencontre \u00e0 Berlin<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t18 f\u00e9vrier 2004  Aujourd&rsquo;hui, les trois chefs d&rsquo;\u00c9tat et de gouvernement des trois principales puissances europ\u00e9ennes se rencontrent \u00e0 Berlin. Blair, Chirac et Schr\u00f6der ont tenu diverses r\u00e9unions de la sorte, la plus r\u00e9cente en septembre dernier, et d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e0 Berlin. Mais  depuis cette rencontre de septembre 2003 et avec celle-ci plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, la crainte est n\u00e9e qu&rsquo;on assiste \u00e0 une institutionnalisation d&rsquo;une sorte de triumvirat europ\u00e9en. Il faut dire que les facteurs poussant \u00e0 cette d\u00e9marche ne manquent pas, ne serait-ce que les arguments que donnent ceux-l\u00e0 m\u00eames qui, aujourd&rsquo;hui, s&rsquo;inqui\u00e8tent de la perspective d&rsquo;un triumvirat.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est en effet parce que l&rsquo;\u00e9largissement \u00e0 25 arrive, que les premiers effets de cet \u00e9largissement se sont faits sentir avec le blocage de la constitution en d\u00e9cembre 2003, que les r\u00e9unions \u00e0 trois prennent du corps et peuvent ressembler \u00e0 une sorte de triumvirat. Le probl\u00e8me est bien l\u00e0 : ceux qui d\u00e9noncent le triumvirat pourraient bien \u00eatre les m\u00eames qui, \u00e0 cause de leur comportement, donnent tous les arguments du monde pour que s&rsquo;\u00e9tablisse un triumvirat. (On verra notamment, pour expliciter cette question, l&rsquo;article <a href=\"http:\/\/www.csmonitor.com\/2004\/0210\/p01s04-woeu.html\" class=\"gen\">publi\u00e9 le 10 f\u00e9vrier 2004 dans le Christian Science Monitor<\/a>, sous le titre de \u00ab <em>Europe&rsquo;s small states fear domination by big three<\/em> \u00bb.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEn attendant que ces craintes p\u00e9riph\u00e9riques soient apais\u00e9es (elles le seront aussi vite que les Polonais s&rsquo;apercevront de l&rsquo;impasse o\u00f9 les m\u00e8ne leur politique pro-am\u00e9ricaine, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire rapidement), une partie tr\u00e8s importante du sommet sera consacr\u00e9e \u00e0 la mise en place d&rsquo;une proposition de force de r\u00e9action rapide europ\u00e9enne. Ce devrait \u00eatre l\u00e0 la partie essentielle de la rencontre, de m\u00eame qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de la partie essentielle de l&rsquo;association \u00e0 trois.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLes indications pr\u00e9c\u00e9dant le sommet montrent qu&rsquo;effectivement un accord a \u00e9t\u00e9 conclu entre les trois pays pour la constitution d&rsquo;une force d&rsquo;intervention rapide de l&rsquo;Union europ\u00e9enne. Cet accord porte sur une force o\u00f9 la rapidit\u00e9 d&rsquo;action (d\u00e9ploiement en 15 jours) a \u00e9t\u00e9 privil\u00e9gi\u00e9e par rapport \u00e0 l&rsquo;importance du contingent (1.500 hommes). Le mod\u00e8le d&rsquo;intervention choisi est l&rsquo;op\u00e9ration <em>Artemis<\/em>, qui fut <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=764\" class=\"gen\">d\u00e9clench\u00e9e d\u00e9but juin<\/a> et qui a dur\u00e9 jusqu&rsquo;en septembre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Le choix de cette formule tient essentiellement aux moyens disponibles (au d\u00e9but, on parlait d&rsquo;une force de 60.000 hommes, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 20.000 hommes avec la possibilit\u00e9 de deux rotations). Les forces arm\u00e9es de tous les pays occidentaux sont aujourd&rsquo;hui surcharg\u00e9es par les interventions et limit\u00e9es par les moyens budg\u00e9taires.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; La formule permet d&rsquo;autre part une pr\u00e9sentation politique avantageuse pour ceux qui craignent des r\u00e9actions am\u00e9ricaines d\u00e9favorables, ou pour ceux qui craignent l&rsquo;affirmation d&rsquo;une concurrence avec l&rsquo;OTAN.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; D&rsquo;autre part, l&rsquo;affirmation politique que constitue cet accord a un poids plus grand que l&rsquo;outil militaire sur laquelle elle porte. C&rsquo;est ainsi que la d\u00e9cision sera principalement interpr\u00e9t\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMilitairement, il n&rsquo;est pas assur\u00e9 que l&rsquo;appr\u00e9ciation selon laquelle cette formule t\u00e9moigne d&rsquo;une faiblesse des moyens et d&rsquo;une prudence politique soit fond\u00e9e sur le terme. Elle refl\u00e8te une appr\u00e9ciation de circonstance mais, sur le fond, la formule d&rsquo;intervention type-<em>Artemis<\/em> repr\u00e9sente un choix fondamentalement diff\u00e9rent du type d&rsquo;intervention lourde, comme celle des Am\u00e9ricains en Irak. <em>Artemis<\/em> est plus le choix d&rsquo;une approche politique et militaire sp\u00e9cifique que l&rsquo;illustration d&rsquo;une faiblesse par rapport \u00e0 <em>Iraqi Freedom<\/em>. (Voir notre texte sur <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=895\" class=\"gen\">une comparaison des deux formules et des deux op\u00e9rations<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tCi-dessous, le texte de pr\u00e9sentation de l&rsquo;accord et de la r\u00e9union d&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/story.php?F=2647522&#038;C=europe\" class=\"gen\">publi\u00e9 par l&rsquo;hebdomadaire Defense News<\/a>, \u00e0 partir d&rsquo;une d\u00e9p\u00eache AFP.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<h2 class=\"common-article\">Bold Military Plans on Table As EU&rsquo;s Big Three&rsquo; Hold Summit<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>By Agence France Presse, Brussels, 126 Febbruary, 2004.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tBritain, France and Germany head into summit talks this week on the back of unprecedented cooperation on the military front that is finally putting flesh on the bones of the EU&rsquo;s common defense policy. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tTheir burgeoning military alliance is expected to be one of the themes addressed by Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder when they meet in Berlin on Feb. 18. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe three countries &#8212; the largest and most powerful in the European Union &#8212; have been trying to rebuild their ties after falling out spectacularly over the U.S.-led war in Iraq last year. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tTheir rapprochement bore fruit at a Blair-Chirac summit in November where the British prime minister and French president announced plans to create rapid reaction forces deployable at short notice to hotspots, notably in Africa. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tGermany has now come on board the Franco-British initiative, diplomats said last week, to create battle groups of about 1,500 troops which could be dispatched rapidly to flash-point areas on behalf of the EU. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe troop contingents, in particular ready to take on missions in support of the United Nations, would be deployable within 15 days and able to remain on the ground for a month, diplomats said. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe initiative is based directly on experience of the EU&rsquo;s first-ever military mission outside Europe, in the Democratic Republic of Congo last summer, when a French-led force helped quell fighting in the Bunia region. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIn December the EU adopted plans for an independent military planning cell proposed by Britain, France and Germany which would seek to enhance the bloc&rsquo;s defense capability. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe unit will be based with the EU&rsquo;s existing military staff in Brussels, where NATO also has its headquarters. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tBlair has been at pains to reassure Washington that the EU initiatives will not rival NATO, the U.S.-led military alliance that forms the bedrock of Europe&rsquo;s defense. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tBut Chirac and the German chancellor are known to favor beefing up the EU&rsquo;s own ability to act in the military field. The bloc, however, does not yet have the means to match their ambitions. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe EU originally wanted to create a rapid-reaction force of 60,000, but this has been scaled back because military capabilities do not stretch to the soldiers and equipment needed. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNevertheless, with the backing of its three most powerful nations, the EU is now in a much better position to advance its fledgling common defense policy, which is widely seen as a non-starter without British involvement. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong><em>[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit,  Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le triumvirat se rencontre \u00e0 Berlin 18 f\u00e9vrier 2004 Aujourd&rsquo;hui, les trois chefs d&rsquo;\u00c9tat et de gouvernement des trois principales puissances europ\u00e9ennes se rencontrent \u00e0 Berlin. Blair, Chirac et Schr\u00f6der ont tenu diverses r\u00e9unions de la sorte, la plus r\u00e9cente en septembre dernier, et d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e0 Berlin. Mais depuis cette rencontre de septembre 2003 et&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65872","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65872","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65872"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65872\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65872"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65872"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65872"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}