{"id":65885,"date":"2004-03-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-03-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/03\/02\/sacrilege-la-stealth-mise-en-cause\/"},"modified":"2004-03-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-03-02T00:00:00","slug":"sacrilege-la-stealth-mise-en-cause","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/03\/02\/sacrilege-la-stealth-mise-en-cause\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>Sacril\u00e8ge: la \u201cstealth\u201d mise en cause<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Sacril\u00e8ge: la stealth mise en cause<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t2 mars 2004  Et voil\u00e0, c&rsquo;est fait : pour la premi\u00e8re fois, un officiel en fonction, le chef d&rsquo;\u00e9tat-major de l&rsquo;U.S. Army, a commis le sacril\u00e8ge ultime, et, au nom de ce sacril\u00e8ge, justifi\u00e9 d&rsquo;une d\u00e9cision bureaucratique et budg\u00e9taire exceptionnelle : l&rsquo;abandon du programme du nouvel h\u00e9licopt\u00e8re RAH-66 <em>Comanche<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVoici l&rsquo;objet du d\u00e9lit, tel que nous le rapporte <a href=\"http:\/\/www.defensenews.com\/story.php?F=2683540&#038;C=america\" class=\"gen\">Defense News, du 1er mars 2004<\/a> :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Army officials say the move reflects the more elusive enemies and weapons that have emerged since Comanche was conceived in 1983 to find and fight Soviet tank formations. Stealth, once the RAH-66&rsquo;s biggest selling point, is now deemed unnecessary and expensive.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Comanche was a wonderful idea up until about 1989, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, Army chief of staff, told lawmakers Feb. 25, two days after the Army announced its decision. We started seeing that kind of threat disappear, and then it continued to disappear over the last decade.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>After two years of war, it has become obvious that the Army should not put all our eggs in one basket  the expensive RAH-66, Schoomaker said. It makes sense to do other things.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe sacril\u00e8ge, le crime de l\u00e8se-majest\u00e9, c&rsquo;est simplement la d\u00e9claration <em>in fine<\/em> que la technologie furtive (<em>stealth<\/em>) n&rsquo;a aujourd&rsquo;hui aucune utilit\u00e9 op\u00e9rationnelle. Bien s\u00fbr, la chose est dite, susurr\u00e9e ou exprim\u00e9e clairement, depuis longtemps, souvent par des voix autoris\u00e9es (voir, sur ce site, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=256\" class=\"gen\">la position de l&rsquo;ancien secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la Navy John Lehman<\/a>). Cette fois, elle vient du coeur de la bureaucratie en place.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl y a des r\u00e9actions. Le m\u00eame article s&rsquo;en fait l&rsquo;\u00e9cho. On observera qu&rsquo;elles sont faiblardes, puisque appuy\u00e9es sur l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e9tique utilit\u00e9 de la <em>stealth<\/em> dans le futur (type on ne sait jamais). Mieux, ou pire, elles renforcent objectivement la d\u00e9nonciation sacril\u00e8ge de la <em>stealth<\/em> en reconnaissant <em>de facto<\/em> que cette technologie n&rsquo;est pas utile aujourd&rsquo;hui.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Not everyone agrees. One senior Army official cautioned that the military should not expect every future war to mirror the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Today&rsquo;s threats are not using so much radar, so low observability [or stealth] is not an important thing. But not in the future? the official said. I take issue with that.  This is going to be a very real threat.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Comanche&rsquo;s stealth and other capabilities would confer battlefield advantages in just about any area where we conceive of having ground forces  even against terrorists, the official said.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t Les n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s bureaucratiques et budg\u00e9taires poussent \u00e0 ces positions extr\u00eames. L&rsquo;abandon du <em>Comanche<\/em> est plus important par les raisons donn\u00e9es de cet abandon, que par l&rsquo;abandon lui-m\u00eame. La mise en cause de la <em>stealth<\/em> met en cause les fondements m\u00eames du d\u00e9veloppement technologique dans les syst\u00e8mes d&rsquo;arme et les structures m\u00eames de la puissance am\u00e9ricaine, en plus d&rsquo;un investissement qui n&rsquo;a jamais pu \u00eatre calcul\u00e9 (voir plus loin) mais qui pourrait largement se situer entre $200 et $300 milliards depuis 1975.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette mise en cause de la <em>stealth<\/em> est un \u00e9l\u00e9ment important de la crise ontologique qui secoue le Pentagone et le complexe militaro-industriel am\u00e9ricain. D&rsquo;autres bombes \u00e0 retardement sont en route : le F-22 et le JSF\/F-35 sont les plus spectaculaires d&rsquo;entre elles, puisqu&rsquo;elles impliquent des programmes dont le co\u00fbt astronomique et les difficult\u00e9s techniques ont beaucoup \u00e0 voir avec cette m\u00eame <em>stealth<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAvec l&rsquo;abandon du <em>Comanche<\/em>, nous sommes entr\u00e9s dans le coeur du malstrom.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<h3>Combien co\u00fbte la technologie stealth&#8230; ?<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&#8230; C&rsquo;est une bonne question (\u00ab <em>C&rsquo;est une putain de bonne question<\/em> \u00bb [bis : selon Depardieu dans <em>Rive droite, rive gauche<\/em>]). On se la pose depuis longtemps, sans r\u00e9ponse pr\u00e9cise.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVoici une tentative de r\u00e9ponse datant de 1990 (extrait de <em>Armed Forces Journal International<\/em>, f\u00e9vrier 1991), \u00e9poque o\u00f9 la <em>stealth<\/em> \u00e9tait encore sacro-sainte. On peut tout de m\u00eame distinguer, d\u00e9j\u00e0, quelques raisons de frayeurs extr\u00eames. (Que penser, par exemple, de l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se : \u00ab <em> The cost is infinite if you only buy a couple of airplanes.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Lockheed&rsquo;s Ben Rich (whose Skunk Works built the F-117A) tells AFJI that stealth adds only about 10% to an air- plane&rsquo;s cost, and should be viewed as a trade-off like any other feature. <\/em>[John J. Welch, Jr., the Assistant Secretary of the Air force for Acquisition] <em>, has a slightly different answer. How much does stealth cost? We have tried to figure that out. The answer I want to give you is, `Not much-10% to over 20%&rsquo; but I&rsquo;m becoming convinced that answer is wrong. There&rsquo;s a helluva big R&#038;D bill. If you don&rsquo;t buy a lot of airplanes, the R&#038;D cost as a percentage of production cross gets into very large numbers, well into double digits. The cost is infinite if you only buy a couple of airplanes.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Sacril\u00e8ge: la stealth mise en cause 2 mars 2004 Et voil\u00e0, c&rsquo;est fait : pour la premi\u00e8re fois, un officiel en fonction, le chef d&rsquo;\u00e9tat-major de l&rsquo;U.S. Army, a commis le sacril\u00e8ge ultime, et, au nom de ce sacril\u00e8ge, justifi\u00e9 d&rsquo;une d\u00e9cision bureaucratique et budg\u00e9taire exceptionnelle : l&rsquo;abandon du programme du nouvel h\u00e9licopt\u00e8re RAH-66 Comanche&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4233,249,250],"class_list":["post-65885","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-comanche","tag-f-22","tag-jsf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65885","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65885"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65885\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65885"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65885"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65885"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}