a research specialist focusing on terrorism and trans-Atlantic relations at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.<\/em> \u00bb Bref, un homme s\u00e9rieux et un Am\u00e9ricain pur sucre du syst\u00e8me de l’am\u00e9ricanisme. Cela ne l’emp\u00eache pas de n’\u00eatre pas sot.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tMainland s’attache \u00e0 l’affaire Microsoft versus<\/em> UE, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 US \u00e9tant punie par une \u00e9norme amende (497,2 millions) pour son activit\u00e9 monopolistique, apr\u00e8s des n\u00e9gociations infructueuses avec l’UE. C’est effectivement l’UE qui a d\u00e9cid\u00e9 cette sanction. Apr\u00e8s la d\u00e9cision, le sentiment \u00e0 la Commission \u00e9tait \u00e9galement celui de l’in\u00e9luctable (impossible et, surtout, impensable de prendre une autre d\u00e9cision) et de la pr\u00e9occupation nettement inqui\u00e8te devant cette d\u00e9cision (selon une source, les fonctionnaires des services qui ont pris cette d\u00e9cision \u00ab s’attendent \u00e0 une r\u00e9action extr\u00eamement forte des \u00c9tats-Unis, et ils en sont fort pr\u00e9occup\u00e9s bien s\u00fbr<\/em> \u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’int\u00e9r\u00eat du texte de Mainland est qu’il trace une analogie entre la bataille UE-Microsoft et l’affrontement Chirac-GW Bush sur la question de la guerre de l’Irak, esquissant ainsi une d\u00e9finition plus large que de coutume, \u00e9ventuellement plus riche, des relations conflictuelles entre la France et les \u00c9tats-Unis. L’int\u00e9r\u00eat de cette approche est que le terme conflictuel n’\u00e9voque pas, dans l’esprit de Mainland, une situation de comp\u00e9tition, comme il est si souvent, et si grossi\u00e8rement \u00e9voqu\u00e9 \u00e0 propos de la France (la France se posant comme comp\u00e9titeur des USA, pr\u00e9tendant d\u00e9passer les USA dans leur position de puissance). Il s’agit, d’une fa\u00e7on diff\u00e9rente en substance, d’une situation d’alternative : Mainland voit tr\u00e8s justement que la France pr\u00e9sente une alternative \u00e0 la situation am\u00e9ricaine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00ab This is what Chirac has in mind when he speaks of a multipolar world a political alternative to Washington’s dominating product, not a military competition designed to counterbalance the Pentagon. Europeans recall better than anyone that true multipolar military competition led to an aggressive imperialism that ultimately claimed millions of lives in two world wars. Paris and Berlin have neither the resources nor the bad judgment to return to such a framework.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tMainland consid\u00e8re donc la question de l’affrontement Microsoft vs<\/em> UE comme une resuc\u00e9e, ou un prolongement sous une autre forme de l’affrontement Bush-Chirac de l’ONU et \u00e0 propos de la guerre contre l’Irak. L’affrontement est entre une force \u00e0 finalit\u00e9 monopolistique, donc n\u00e9cessairement pr\u00e9datrice des autres et une force cherchant la diversit\u00e9 des centres de production et d’influence (ou p\u00f4les de puissance pour l’analogie politique), les rapports \u00e9tant r\u00e9gl\u00e9s par une comp\u00e9tition qui peut \u00eatre cr\u00e9atrice mais qui ne recherche certainement pas la destruction de l’autre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t(C’est l\u00e0 un point int\u00e9ressant : finalement, il y a effectivement une comp\u00e9tition dans une action monopolistique, mais cette comp\u00e9tition recherche la destruction des concurrents pour \u00e9tablir un monopole. La comp\u00e9tition que voudraient les Fran\u00e7ais, selon Mainland, devrait \u00eatre cr\u00e9atrice et ne pas aboutir \u00e0 la destruction des concurrents sans quoi l’on tombe dans la logique monopolistique, c’est cette diff\u00e9rence essentielle qui exprime la diff\u00e9rence de conceptions, et c’est le point qui devrait \u00eatre examin\u00e9 au plus pr\u00e8s.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00ab The diplomatic fight over the war in Iraq became a virtual boxing match between President Jacques Chirac of France and President George W. Bush. Today, it is as if that battle is being fought through proxies: Steven Ballmer, Microsoft’s chief executive, and Mario Monti, the EU’s self-described competition minister.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb None of this is explicit. Ballmer, previously under fire from America’s own antitrust authorities, is an unlikely representative of the U.S. government. Nor is there reason to believe Monti came to his decision on the basis of anything but reasoned antitrust analysis. But it is easy to see why Europeans might view Microsoft a powerful behemoth led by a brash, imperious chief executive as a metaphor for America under Bush.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Consider the two basic principles underlying antitrust a skepticism of concentrated power and a belief in the virtue of competition. Both of these principles apply as much to European thinking about international politics as economics.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Europeans view America’s concentration of power like that of a huge corporation with bottomless pockets and an army of lawyers. Much as Microsoft settles lawsuits with large sums of cash only to resume its aggressive business practices, America buys off its allies and opponents alike and then charges forward ruthlessly with its own agenda.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tDans cette analyse, Mainland confirme l’\u00e9volution de l’Am\u00e9rique, que la pr\u00e9sidence Bush (et la crise post-9\/11) n’a fait que confirmer. Il la concr\u00e9tise dans son jugement sur l’\u00e9tat d’esprit, aujourd’hui \u00e0 Washington, par rapport \u00e0 la question du monopole : \u00ab This view of America as a corporation that needs to be cut down to size is only confirmed by the Bush administration’s position on antitrust. Antitrust has fared poorly in Bush’s Washington. While it remains orthodoxy it is still taught in economics and law classes, and the Justice Department has yet to close its antitrust division it has been attacked by the antiregulation crowd, most obviously in the Federal Communication Commission’s aggressive campaign for media deregulation.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tCette \u00e9volution am\u00e9ricaine, qui a d\u00e9but\u00e9 au d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1970 par l’\u00e9volution du monde du business avec le Manifeste Powell dont l’importance est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral ignor\u00e9e<\/a>, est un \u00e9v\u00e9nement consid\u00e9rable. C’est la premi\u00e8re fois depuis la loi antitrust de 1876, sous la pr\u00e9sident Grant, que l’id\u00e9e de monopole n’est plus d\u00e9nonc\u00e9e, officiellement et dans son esprit, mais qu’elle commence \u00e0 \u00eatre appr\u00e9ci\u00e9e comme une sorte de stade ultime de l’am\u00e9ricanisme. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Voici un Am\u00e9ricain qui comprend l’antagonisme USA-France 29 mars 2004 Grant R. Mainland, qui publie un article dans l’International Herald Tribune (26 mars) intitul\u00e9 : \u00ab Europe vs. America’s operating system \u00bb, est, selon la note qui nous est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e avec l’article : \u00ab a research specialist focusing on terrorism and trans-Atlantic relations at the… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4246,3565,4245,1391],"class_list":["post-65913","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-competition","tag-manifeste","tag-monopole","tag-powell"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65913","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65913"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65913\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65913"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65913"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65913"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}