{"id":65914,"date":"2004-03-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-03-29T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/03\/29\/il-faut-sauver-le-programme-fa-22-avec-larme-de-linformation\/"},"modified":"2004-03-29T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-03-29T00:00:00","slug":"il-faut-sauver-le-programme-fa-22-avec-larme-de-linformation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/03\/29\/il-faut-sauver-le-programme-fa-22-avec-larme-de-linformation\/","title":{"rendered":"Il faut sauver le programme F\/A-22 avec l’arme de l’information<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Il faut sauver le programme F\/A-22 avec l’arme de l’information<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t29 mars 2004 L’USAF vient de donner son accord pour commencer \u00e0 la fin avril (un mois de retard par rapport aux derni\u00e8res pr\u00e9visions) la phase d’essais op\u00e9rationnels du programme F\/A-22 Raptor<\/em>, ouvrant la voie vers une production et un d\u00e9ploiement op\u00e9rationnels. (La d\u00e9cision finale de d\u00e9ploiement op\u00e9rationnel sera prise en d\u00e9cembre prochain.) Cette d\u00e9cision est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e sous la forme d’une affirmation pompeuse et enthousiaste de l’excellent \u00e9tat du programme F\/A-22. Un exemple de cet enthousiasme nous est donn\u00e9 par un extrait d’un texte de Reuters du 23 mars :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab Air Force acquisition chief Marvin Sambur told Reuters on Tuesday <\/em>[…] in an interview that the terms agreed by the Air Force and Lockheed were exactly on the target price curve and would allow the Air Force to buy a total of 277 F\/A-22s by 2013 and possibly more.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb He confirmed that top Pentagon officials on Monday approved the start of operational testing of the F\/A-22 at the end of April after the Air Force and Lockheed showed progress in improving the stability of the plane’s avionics. Michael Wynne, the Pentagon’s acting chief weapons buyer, was very encouraged by the progress so far, said his spokeswoman, Cheryl Irwin.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb We’ve turned this program around, Sambur said of the $72 billion radar-evading multirole F\/A-22, which was designed to replace the F-15C as the top U.S. air-superiority fighter.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tA lire ces quelques phrases, on ne peut \u00eatre que convaincu, sinon admiratif, de l’\u00e9tat du programme F\/A-22 tel qu’il est d\u00e9crit. On a \u00e9galement le loisir d’\u00eatre surpris, car cette d\u00e9cision, ce ton, cet enthousiasme, forment un extraordinaire contraste avec ce que la presse sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9e ainsi que le General Accounting Office (GAO) ont dit et \u00e9crit dans les jours<\/strong> pr\u00e9c\u00e9dant la d\u00e9cision de l’U.S. Air Force, sinon simultan\u00e9ment \u00e0 l’annonce de cette d\u00e9cision.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Un article d’Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/em> (AW&ST) en date du 22 mars, le jour m\u00eame o\u00f9 l’USAF prenait sa d\u00e9cision dans l’enthousiasme, \u00e9crivait : \u00ab There are signs the F\/A-22 Raptor program is running into the same lethal combination of financial pressures, uneven progress in development and intensified congressional scrutiny that led to the cancellation of the U.S. Army’s RAH-66 Comanche.<\/em> \u00bb (On sait que le programme d’h\u00e9licopt\u00e8re de combat Comanche a \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9 fin f\u00e9vrier<\/a> pour d\u00e9passement de co\u00fbts, probl\u00e8mes techniques, etc.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le 14 mars, le directeur du GAO pr\u00e9sentait un nouveau rapport sur le F\/A-22, avertissant l’USAF de peser toutes les cons\u00e9quences possibles d’une \u00e9ventuelle d\u00e9cision favorable \u00e0 la production op\u00e9rationnelle de l’avion.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The U.S. General Accounting Office on Monday blasted Lockheed Martin Corp.’s F\/A-22 fighter jet, saying the Pentagon should weigh the high risk of future cost increases and program delays before deciding in December to start full production.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The investigative arm of Congress said costs for the program that began during the Cold War era were expected to grow to $80 billion from an Air Force estimate of $72 billion, and the Pentagon had not explained why it still needed the pricey fighter in a changed military environment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In an annual report to Congress, GAO said the Pentagon estimated it would cost $11.7 billion to expand the air-to-ground attack capability of the F\/A-22 Raptor, of which only $3.5 billion had been earmarked through fiscal 2009.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Keith Ashdown at Taxpayers for Common Sense said the new data put the per-unit cost of each F\/A-22 into the realm of absurdity at $330 million, up from $257 million last year. This is a damning report, he said, predicting intense debate in Congress, although he acknowledged it would be tough to cut the program, which has subcontractors in 44 states.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• Un article r\u00e9cent (le 27 f\u00e9vrier) de Defense News<\/em> d\u00e9crit les difficult\u00e9s extraordinaires qui attendent le programme F\/A-22, notamment pour le d\u00e9veloppement d’une version d’appui tactique (le A pour Attack<\/em> dans le signe F\/A-22). L’article apporte des pr\u00e9cisions surprenantes, notamment sur le fait qu’on se trouve, avec le F\/A-22, coinc\u00e9 dans la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 de continuer \u00e0 d\u00e9velopper l’avion sinon l’on perd l’avantage des six derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es d’int\u00e9gration des technologies avanc\u00e9es. (\u00ab The Defense Department has skipped several generations of technology getting to the F\/A-22. If they stop, and don’t finish this generation of technology and try to immediately progress along to the next-generation technology, they won’t have pressed out all the concerns, he said. You’re just going to end up with the same collection of problems six years down the road if they don’t see it out.<\/em> \u00bb) Les pr\u00e9cisions concernant le co\u00fbt de la version A sont \u00e9galement remarquables. On a l’impression de se trouver devant une direction qui refuse d\u00e9sormais de peser le long terme, de crainte de ce qu’elle y trouvera. (C’est un peu la m\u00eame chose avec la d\u00e9cision du 22 mars : d\u00e9cision de lancer la production d’avions suppl\u00e9mentaires jusqu’en d\u00e9cembre en affirmant que tout va bien, contre l’unanimit\u00e9 des estimations de sources ext\u00e9rieures.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Adding the ground-attack capabilities will create a whole new set of problems. The addition of every unanticipated feature or extension typically is more difficult to add into the software, hence, it becomes brittle, difficult to maintain and harder to change over time, said Daniel Plakosh, who has reviewed the F\/A-22 program and works with Marz at Carnegie Mellon. Also, these additions may not always work the way you really would want them to.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The changes they had to make to improve stability of the software to begin with depends on what types of mistakes they were correcting, said Plakosh, a former lead software engineer at the Naval Surface Warfare Center. If they were architectural mistakes, you may have to compromise your architecture to get it to work right.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb [Major General Jack] Welsh contends it’s too early to tell strike Raptor’s pricetag. Talking about the cost of things is really premature, Welsh said. We have to start with what are the requirements? What is the actual capability you need to bring to the fight out there?<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCes exemples et comparaisons montrent \u00e0 quel point la version officielle de l’\u00e9tat du programme F\/A-22 diff\u00e8re aujourd’hui de la version donn\u00e9e par le monde de l’information, avec les sources les plus respectables, ayant tous les acc\u00e8s possibles pour faire normalement son travail, et ayant montr\u00e9 dans le pass\u00e9 l’excellence de ces sources et des analyses qui en \u00e9taient d\u00e9duites.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBien \u00e9videmment, l’attitude du Pentagone, si l’on s’en tient seulement \u00e0 l’historique du programme et \u00e0 ses avatars constants, est la plus hautement suspecte. Cette fa\u00e7on de sortir le programme F\/A-22 comme d’un chapeau, soudain en miracul\u00e9 \u00e0 qui tout r\u00e9ussit, indique \u00e9videmment une op\u00e9ration d’urgence pour sauver au forceps ce programme tr\u00e8s fortement menac\u00e9. Bien \u00e9videmment encore, cette op\u00e9ration ne r\u00e9sout en rien tous les probl\u00e8mes F\/A-22. Elle constitue simplement une bonne mesure de la compl\u00e8te relativit\u00e9 de ce qu’on ne peut plus qualifier d’information sur le programme F\/A-22, alors que les pouvoirs officiels entendent d\u00e9sormais faire de l’information un outil pour promouvoir leurs propres int\u00e9r\u00eats. Il s’agit d’une guerre entre les autorit\u00e9s officielles, qui se trouvent conduites \u00e0 cr\u00e9er de toutes pi\u00e8ces une image euphorique des programmes militaires, et le simple constat des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t(Dans la rubrique Notes de Lecture, nous avons regroup\u00e9 quelques articles significatifs sur cette affaire<\/a>, ceux qui sont cit\u00e9s ici. Ils permettent de juger de la compl\u00e8te relativit\u00e9, de la manipulation constante, de l’intervention op\u00e9rationnelle dans le domaine de l’information.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Il faut sauver le programme F\/A-22 avec l’arme de l’information 29 mars 2004 L’USAF vient de donner son accord pour commencer \u00e0 la fin avril (un mois de retard par rapport aux derni\u00e8res pr\u00e9visions) la phase d’essais op\u00e9rationnels du programme F\/A-22 Raptor, ouvrant la voie vers une production et un d\u00e9ploiement op\u00e9rationnels. (La d\u00e9cision finale… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4195,3019,4248,4003,41,4247],"class_list":["post-65914","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-aviation","tag-defense","tag-gao","tag-news","tag-usaf","tag-week"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65914","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65914"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65914\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65914"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65914"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65914"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}