{"id":65922,"date":"2004-04-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-04-05T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/04\/05\/les-ambiguites-postmodernistes-suite-le-cas-de-george-davis-hanson-historien-neo-conservateur\/"},"modified":"2004-04-05T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-04-05T00:00:00","slug":"les-ambiguites-postmodernistes-suite-le-cas-de-george-davis-hanson-historien-neo-conservateur","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/04\/05\/les-ambiguites-postmodernistes-suite-le-cas-de-george-davis-hanson-historien-neo-conservateur\/","title":{"rendered":"Les ambigu\u00eft\u00e9s postmodernistes (suite) : le cas de George Davis Hanson, historien n\u00e9o-conservateur<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les ambigu\u00eft\u00e9s postmodernistes (suite) : le cas de George Davis Hanson, historien n\u00e9o-conservateur<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t5 avril 2004 L’historien n\u00e9o-conservateur George Davis Hanson est connu. Il fait marcher l’histoire au son du canon et du tambour, enr\u00f4le Thucydide sous sa banni\u00e8re pour nous parler avec passion de Sherman et de Patton, et de l’invincible sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 de la d\u00e9mocratie occidentale sur les champs de bataille. Sa phrase exalt\u00e9e est souvent aussi lourde qu’une canonnade \u00e0 Verdun, en 1916. Par ailleurs, cela n’emp\u00eache rien comme on va le voir.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans un tr\u00e8s r\u00e9cent article, datant du 1er avril sur National Review Online<\/a>, Hanson nous parle de l’Europe. Sa phrase, les termes qu’il choisit, les images dont il use ne sont pas toujours flatteuses. Par contre, l’id\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale m\u00e9rite qu’on s’y arr\u00eate. Elle est bien r\u00e9sum\u00e9e, apr\u00e8s tout, par son titre \u00ab Lovin’ Europe by Leavin’<\/em> \u00bb, dont l’id\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale peut se traduire comme ceci : la meilleure fa\u00e7on pour l’Am\u00e9rique de bien aimer l’Europe, c’est de la quitter.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici donc ce que nous dit Hanson.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le d\u00e9saccord USA-Europe n’est pas la cons\u00e9quence de l’attitude US apr\u00e8s l’attaque 9\/11 (unilat\u00e9ralisme, etc). Il existait avant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Hanson nous dit encore (avec quelque m\u00e9pris) que la faiblesse de l’Europe ne date pas d’aujourd’hui. \u00ab Yet this litany is ancient history now. So is the record of America’s role as savior since World War II the Marshall Plan, protection of Europe from Soviet Communism, American support for German unification, our leadership in NATO, pledging our cities to save Europe from Soviet nuclear blackmail, and the current protection of Europe itself. Blah, blah, blah we’ve all heard it ad nauseam and its recitation leads us nowhere.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• C’est avec de tels liens, qui sont cens\u00e9s am\u00e9liorer les relations et pr\u00e9venir les crises, qu’au contraire les relations ne cessent de se d\u00e9t\u00e9riorer et les crises de s’accumuler. Les r\u00e9actions aux USA sont alors en train de se d\u00e9velopper, et l’on imagine bien dans quel sens :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Meanwhile, the American people who don’t read Foreign Affairs or go to briefings at Brookings grow increasingly cynical. It is not just that they grow tired with the French, or expect predictable German ingratitude and are disgusted by Belgian silliness, Scandinavian moralizing, or Spanish and Greek antics. No, most Americans have simply lost their old willingness to support and protect Old Europe. This is a grassroots feeling, and it is relatively new and even the cheap anti-European rhetoric of the cable news shows does not capture the simmering anger of the American people.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• … Et il n’y a aucune raison de se r\u00e9jouir de cela, apr\u00e8s tout. Hanson reconna\u00eet que l’Europe lui est pr\u00e9cieuse, qu’il y a un h\u00e9ritage commun, une culture idem, et bla bla bla. Cela m\u00e9rite d’\u00eatre sauv\u00e9, justement … \u00ab But it is for those very reasons of wishing to preserve some sort of relationship that we must abandon the status quo and think of radically new ways to relate to our friends and stewards of our common cultural ancestry.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Hanson poursuit son raisonnement en posant cette \u00e9vidence, \u00e0 partir du constat que les relations transatlantiques doivent \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9es dans le domaine o\u00f9 elles s’exercent pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, qui est le psychologique : \u00ab Precisely because we protect Europe, Europe will need ever more protecting, and will grow ever more weak. And because it will need the United States to defend it, it will ever more resent the United States.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• D’o\u00f9 cette p\u00e9roraison : si nous (Am\u00e9ricains) voulons \u00e0 la fois une Europe plus puissante, qui nous soit \u00e9ventuellement d’une aide appr\u00e9ciable, et si nous voulons pr\u00e9server la qualit\u00e9 de nos relations avec elle, alors nous devons quitter l’Europe, en quelque sorte lui donner son ind\u00e9pendance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Yet I am not sure that these old arguments for either staying or downsizing in Europe are the chief reasons we should continue our radical reassessment. True, we pay for the costs of very wealthy peoples’ own defense when they are more than able to foot the bill. There is no more Soviet Union on the borders of Europe no raison d’\u00eatre, in other words, for NATO as we once knew it. At a time of enormous budget deficits and trade imbalances with the Europeans, it makes no sense to spend billions to patrol the German countryside, keep Spanish airspace safe, or guard the Cretan Sea. All these are legitimate, practical economic concerns; but again, they are not the chief grounds to begin leaving Europe.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb No, the real reason is not to end the European relationship, but to save it. And thus we must not see the current problem merely in a context of money or troops or even ingratitude, hypocrisy, and perfidy but rather in psychological terms of dependency and its associate pathologies of enablement and passive-aggressive angst.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Precisely because we protect Europe, Europe will need ever more protecting, and will grow ever more weak. And because it will need the United States to defend it, it will ever more resent the United States. Without a real menace like the Soviet Union on its borders, Europe will find ever more outlets to vent cheaply and without consequences at precisely the time it is most threatened by terrorists and rogue states.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In contrast, the withdrawal of Americans throughout Old Europe sober analysts can adjudicate a remnant figure of about 30,000 or so, down from our present numbers in Spain, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Greece will encourage Europe to rearm or face the consequences of institutionalized appeasement. That radical step despite popular misconceptions that it is either impossible or unwise is more a good thing than a bad one.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb That way we will not be dealing with a spiteful teenager any longer, but a mature adult partner. And if after we leave Germany invades France or Poland a third time, then there is simply no answer to the European problem anyway. Instead we must trust in our confidence that Europeans are wise enough to settle their own affairs peacefully. Perhaps socialists who won’t fight much abroad at least won’t be likely to fight among themselves either.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb So we must be farsighted and confident enough to encourage the emergence of an associate rather than a dependent. Parents are happy when their sixty-year-old sons move out and get apartments not angry that they have lost the opportunity to feed and launder balding and perpetual adolescents.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb We wish to save Europe by leaving it, to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance by altering it, and to encourage maturity and responsibility by ending dependency. Begging miffed Europeans to help in Iraq or Afghanistan in real numbers while tens of thousands of Americans are stationed in Europe is the stuff of fairy tales. The sham should end now, for the well-being of everyone involved.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tL’int\u00e9r\u00eat de ce texte est double : par ce qu’il dit d’abord (la seule solution pour que l’Europe devienne plus forte et ait de meilleures relations avec les USA, et cela \u00e0 l’avantage des USA finalement, c’est que les USA s’en aillent d’Europe et restituent leur autonomie aux Europ\u00e9ens) ; par la fa\u00e7on dont il le dit (la plupart des outrances qu’on a l’habitude de trouver chez les n\u00e9o-conservateurs restent pr\u00e9sentes, notamment les jugements peu rago\u00fbtants sur les valeurs morales des Europ\u00e9ens). L’int\u00e9r\u00eat est bien dans ce que, m\u00eame avec une logique et des pr\u00e9jug\u00e9s de n\u00e9o-conservateurs, on (Hanson) parvient \u00e0 une conclusion renfor\u00e7ant les partisans d’une Europe autonome et, par la force des choses, \u00e9videmment souveraine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn rapprochera le cas de Hanson de celui de McCain, que nous avons vu hier<\/a>. C’est \u00e9galement en restant lui-m\u00eame, c’est-\u00e0-dire belliciste, interventionniste, que John McCain parvient \u00e0 s’inqui\u00e9ter de la question \u00e9cologique de la crise climatique, pr\u00e9occupation d’habitude soulev\u00e9e par des personnes de tendance pacifiste ou gauchiste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’int\u00e9r\u00eat de ces situations est qu’elles nous disent qu’il existe aujourd’hui des id\u00e9es et des logiques \u00e9chappant \u00e0 l’interpr\u00e9tation (la d\u00e9formation) id\u00e9ologique, c’est-\u00e0-dire \u00e0 la d\u00e9formation du jugement humain par cons\u00e9quent, et qui l’emportent sur ces interpr\u00e9tations id\u00e9ologiques sans pour autant provoquer une crise de conscience chez l’individu (abandon de ses convictions id\u00e9ologiques). Il s’agit l\u00e0 d’un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne qui pourrait s’expliquer par la puissance de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 par rapport \u00e0 des engagements id\u00e9ologiques qui sont souvent conditionn\u00e9s par des conditions virtualistes, finalement assez fragiles et \u00e9voluant dans des cadres diff\u00e9rents du cadre historiques. (Ces conditions virtualistes sont donc ais\u00e9ment transperc\u00e9es sans pour autant \u00eatre dissip\u00e9es.) Apr\u00e8s McCain, Hanson est un autre cas de l’ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 postmoderne, avec ses \u00e9chapp\u00e9es explosives et particuli\u00e8rement r\u00e9v\u00e9latrices.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les ambigu\u00eft\u00e9s postmodernistes (suite) : le cas de George Davis Hanson, historien n\u00e9o-conservateur 5 avril 2004 L’historien n\u00e9o-conservateur George Davis Hanson est connu. Il fait marcher l’histoire au son du canon et du tambour, enr\u00f4le Thucydide sous sa banni\u00e8re pour nous parler avec passion de Sherman et de Patton, et de l’invincible sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 de la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[398,4252,4253,2746,4251],"class_list":["post-65922","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-europe","tag-patton","tag-sherman","tag-souverainete","tag-thucydide"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65922","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65922"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65922\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65922"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65922"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65922"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}