{"id":65923,"date":"2004-04-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-04-05T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/04\/05\/la-menace-du-terrorisme-et-le-pessimisme-des-analystes-americains\/"},"modified":"2004-04-05T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-04-05T00:00:00","slug":"la-menace-du-terrorisme-et-le-pessimisme-des-analystes-americains","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/04\/05\/la-menace-du-terrorisme-et-le-pessimisme-des-analystes-americains\/","title":{"rendered":"La menace du terrorisme et le pessimisme des analystes am\u00e9ricains<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

La menace du terrorisme et le pessimisme des analystes am\u00e9ricains<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t5 avril 2004 On retiendra avec int\u00e9r\u00eat ce texte de Eric Marquardt, du groupe PINR (The Power and Interest News Report)<\/a> parce qu’il est particuli\u00e8rement \u00e9clairant sur la r\u00e9flexion en cours dans certains milieux d’analystes am\u00e9ricains \u00e0 la suite de deux \u00e9v\u00e9nements : la d\u00e9gradation qui semble in\u00e9luctable et parfois vertigineuse de la situation en Irak et les attentats de Madrid avec leurs suites politiques.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn lira ce texte \u00e9galement avec \u00e0 l’esprit que les analyses de PINR, bien qu’ind\u00e9pendantes, n’ont pas l’habitude de mettre excessivement en accusation la politique et les m\u00e9thodes am\u00e9ricaines. Ce dont nous parlons ici est de l’expression d’un courant de pens\u00e9e extr\u00eamement pessimiste, non plus dans le commentaire d’opinion mais dans l’analyse volontairement objective des experts.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe texte nous dit implicitement qu’il est bien possible que la riposte am\u00e9ricaine \u00e0 l’attaque du 11 septembre soit une colossale erreur, colossale \u00e0 la mesure de la puissance affich\u00e9e et affirm\u00e9e de l’Am\u00e9rique, mais puissance confront\u00e9e d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s impr\u00e9vues et singuli\u00e8rement d\u00e9stabilisantes pour elle-m\u00eame. De fa\u00e7on concr\u00e8te, le texte donne comme repr\u00e9sentation de cette colossale erreur le fait d’avoir transform\u00e9 une riposte \u00e0 une attaque terroriste en ce qui ressemble d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 une guerre contre l’Islam. A notre sens, le plus int\u00e9ressant \u00e0 observer est bien la couleur extr\u00eamement pessimiste de cette interpr\u00e9tation, qui semble t\u00e9moigner de l’\u00e9volution radicale d’un \u00e9tat d’esprit chez les analystes am\u00e9ricains.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Stirring the Hornet’s Nest of Muslim Fanaticism\u00a0\u00bb<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Erich Marquardt on April 05, 2004, PINR<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMore and more analysts are coming to accept that the United States’ current foreign policy may be invigorating a whole movement of Muslim religious fanatics bent on retaliatory action. Since the primary recipients of U.S. military strikes have been Muslims, many Muslims throughout the world have begun to equate the U.S.’ \u00a0\u00bbwar on terrorism\u00a0\u00bb with a \u00a0\u00bbwar on Islam.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUntil September 11, the United States never truly felt the impact of such a broad religious retaliatory movement launched under the notion of defending Islam. With one of the first major retaliations to U.S. foreign policy leading to the destruction of the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon, the die was cast for a future clash and the U.S. responded in traditional, albeit a not very effective, manner.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Afghanistan<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tAfter the September 11 attacks, most analysts agreed that the perpetrators of the violence might have only been a small group of radicals centered around al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, operating out of Afghanistan. A calculated U.S. response would have been to find out exactly who was responsible for the attacks and then to carefully eliminate the guilty parties, disturbing the state of world affairs as little as possible. This type of reaction would likely have preserved the global status quo and would not have allowed the United States to<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCapitalize on, or to suffer from, the change in world order caused by the September 11 attacks.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tInstead, in a drastic foreign policy shift, the U.S. bombed and invaded the entire country of Afghanistan; rather than interfering with the lives of only a handful of people in order to destroy bin Laden’s political apparatus, the Bush administration’s invasion affected millions, killing some thousands of innocent Afghans, deaths that became a media spectacle, especially in the Muslim world. The invasion of Afghanistan also caused much interference in Pakistan and Central Asia, areas where positive opinions of the United States have dropped down to dismal levels.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Iraq<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tFollowing the invasion of Afghanistan, the Bush administration utilized its newly found foreign policy leverage acquired from the American people due to the September 11 attacks — in an effort to achieve certain foreign policy goals such as removing the leadership of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and increasing the U.S.’ presence in the Middle East. Successfully securing a mandate at home by castigating Saddam as a collaborator with bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network in addition to exaggerating the threat of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction programs — the Bush administration forcefully removed the Ba’athist leadership<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tin Iraq and proceeded to set up a new government in Baghdad more beholden to U.S. interests.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIf the invasion had gone as planned, the backlash against the United States would have been limited. But the aftermath of the U.S. invasion shows that the Bush administration has already put the stick too far into the hornet’s nest of religious fervor. Attacks against primarily U.S. troops are still raging in Iraq. While it is possible that foreign fighters are responsible for some attacks, it is clear that much of Iraq’s own population is engaging in guerrilla warfare against U.S. troops. Indeed, one side effect of the U.S. invasion of Iraq was to spark Iraqi nationalism and therefore resistance to the U.S. occupation and Washington’s control of the country.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Other Bold U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tAs these two conflicts rage on, the Bush administration also executed other bold foreign policy actions, such as using an unmanned aircraft to assassinate suspected militants in the third party country of Yemen, an event that was a broad violation of international law.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDespite these actions, the administration has restrained itself in other areas. It has yet to move the war in Afghanistan to Pakistan, a situation that would be sure to inflame the Muslim world to the breaking point and would probably lead to the ouster of President Pervez Musharraf. This inability has frustrated American military leaders since many militants in Afghanistan flee across the Pakistani border to seek refuge away from U.S. troops while they plan new<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tattacks. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe administration has also concentrated its military involvement in the Middle East in Iraq, and has not meddled with Iraq’s border states such as Iran and Syria. However, this may be more due to Washington’s present lack of resources and eroding political support at home rather than independent foreign policy restraint.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Were the September 11 Attacks Only a Taste of What’s to Come?<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tNevertheless, despite the restraint shown in certain states and regions, the Bush administration may have already created enough animosity to ensure that terrorist attacks against U.S. interests will intensify rather than subside. The fact that Washington lashed out so magnificently following the September 11 attacks proves that the United States can be injured, and this reality has been fueling rhetoric from various Muslim leaders who have been encouraging their supporters to strike out against U.S. interests wherever they may be.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAs of now, these attacks have remained localized, only taking place in the countries that the United States is involved in. Yet, judging by the recent train attacks in Madrid, there are enough Muslim militants across the world who are capable of bringing war and destruction directly to U.S. interests, whether at home or abroad.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La menace du terrorisme et le pessimisme des analystes am\u00e9ricains 5 avril 2004 On retiendra avec int\u00e9r\u00eat ce texte de Eric Marquardt, du groupe PINR (The Power and Interest News Report) parce qu’il est particuli\u00e8rement \u00e9clairant sur la r\u00e9flexion en cours dans certains milieux d’analystes am\u00e9ricains \u00e0 la suite de deux \u00e9v\u00e9nements : la d\u00e9gradation… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65923","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65923","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65923"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65923\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65923"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65923"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65923"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}