{"id":65928,"date":"2004-04-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-04-09T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/04\/09\/la-guerre-plus-que-jamais-avec-notre-arme-supreme-du-virtualisme\/"},"modified":"2004-04-09T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-04-09T00:00:00","slug":"la-guerre-plus-que-jamais-avec-notre-arme-supreme-du-virtualisme","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/04\/09\/la-guerre-plus-que-jamais-avec-notre-arme-supreme-du-virtualisme\/","title":{"rendered":"La guerre, plus que jamais avec notre arme supr\u00eame du virtualisme<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

La guerre, plus que jamais avec notre arme supr\u00eame du virtualisme<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t9 avril 2004 Plus que jamais, le gouvernement en place \u00e0 Washington s’appuie pour faire face aux \u00e9v\u00e9nements de guerre en Irak sur son arme secr\u00e8te, \u00e0 la fois son attitude d’instinct, sa drogue, le domaine o\u00f9 il excelle et celui qui lui a donn\u00e9 sa puissance : le virtualisme. Il s’agit bien entendu de ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne qu’on peut d\u00e9crire par l’acte de repousser la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 et d’affirmer, \u00e0 c\u00f4t\u00e9 d’elle, une autre r\u00e9alit\u00e9, qui sera aliment\u00e9e par toutes les d\u00e9marches publicitaires, de relations publiques et de communications, et les technologies de communication \u00e0 mesure.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous ne pouvons tenir cela pour un simple exercice de mensonge universel, qui impliquerait que Washington a conscience de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de la situation ; notre conviction est, en effet, que ces hommes croient en bonne partie \u00e0 ce qu’ils disent. En d’autres mots, GW n’est pas Nixon<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn doit attribuer \u00e0 la poursuite de cette politique du virtualisme radical la position prise depuis trois ou quatre jours par la Maison-Blanche, et relay\u00e9e par Rumsfeld et d’autres, une position selon laquelle les \u00e9v\u00e9nements en Irak sont de peu d’importance. (Selon Rumsfeld, \u00ab the fighting in Iraq was just the work of thugs, gangs and terrorists and not a popular uprising<\/em> ; le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Myers, pr\u00e9sident du Joint Chief of Staff : \u00ab It’s not a Shiite uprising. Sadr has a very small following.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais Washington est \u00e9galement un champ de bataille, o\u00f9 la f\u00e9rocit\u00e9 ne le c\u00e8de en rien au th\u00e9\u00e2tre irakien. C’est pourquoi, tr\u00e8s rapidement, des pr\u00e9cisions anonymes sont apparues, pour d\u00e9noncer les conceptions expos\u00e9es par la politique officielle. Ces pr\u00e9cisions viennent, notamment, d’analystes de la CIA. Il ne serait pas \u00e9tonnant (quand on conna\u00eet la position antagoniste de la CIA et de la Maison-Blanche\/le Pentagone) qu’il y ait une consigne officieuse mais venue du plus haut niveau, au sein de l’Agence, pour diss\u00e9miner cette sorte d’interpr\u00e9tation. Un article significatif du New York Times du 8 avril<\/a> expose \u00e0 la fois la m\u00e9thode, et l’information sur la situation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab United States forces are confronting a broad-based Shiite uprising that goes well beyond supporters of one militant Islamic cleric who has been the focus of American counterinsurgency efforts, United States intelligence officials said Wednesday.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb That assertion contradicts repeated statements by the Bush administration and American officials in Iraq. On Wednesday, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that they did not believe the United States was facing a broad-based Shiite insurgency.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Administration officials have portrayed Moktada al-Sadr, a rebel Shiite cleric who is wanted by American forces, as the catalyst of the rising violence within the Shiite community of Iraq.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But intelligence officials now say that there is evidence that the insurgency goes beyond Mr. Sadr and his militia, and that a much larger number of Shiites have turned against the American-led occupation of Iraq, even if they are not all actively aiding the uprising.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Autres acteurs de la com\u00e9die virtualiste: les militaires am\u00e9ricains<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes militaires am\u00e9ricains, bien qu’ils soient victimes de cette politique virtualiste dont l’aventure irakienne est l’enfant principal (bien peu de militaires voulaient cette aventure), sont aussi de formidables consommateurs de virtualisme. L’essentiel de leurs op\u00e9rations dans cette guerre est totalement interpr\u00e9t\u00e9 par des conceptions virtualistes. Les militaires am\u00e9ricains ont conduit une guerre qui n’existait pas (celle d’il y a un an, apr\u00e8s avoir achet\u00e9 leurs adversaires<\/a>), ils l’ont gagn\u00e9e naturellement, et, depuis un an, ils tentent d’\u00e9carter la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 qui veut reprendre sa place. Les \u00e9v\u00e9nements de ces jours derniers tendent \u00e0 montrer qu’ils n’y ont pas r\u00e9ussi.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tRory McCarthy nous montre, avec un exemple significatif<\/a>, cet \u00e9trange ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne du fonctionnement du syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricain, c\u00f4t\u00e9 militaire, compl\u00e8tement hors des r\u00e9alit\u00e9s du monde qu’il pr\u00e9tend r\u00e9genter.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab It was the middle of November last year when Major-general Chuck’ Swannack announced that security was improving so quickly in the once-troubled town of Ramadi that Americans could soon withdraw and leave a city at peace.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb For several days the US military used F-16s, Apache helicopters and AC-130 gunships to pound targets across the Sunni areas north and northwest of Baghdad. They believed that Operation Iron Hammer, as it was called, had subdued the resistance.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb I believe our joint patrols with the police between now and January 1 will allow us to move to a second stage in regards to security in Ramadi where American forces step back, said the general, a vast, rugged man who commands the 82nd All American’ Airborne Division.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The troops never did leave. Last month the All Americans were replaced by the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, who promised a more considered, cautious approach but that elusive peace has never materialised. On Tuesday 12 marines were killed near the governor’s palace in Ramadi in a seven-hour firefight. Some of the fiercest gun battles since the war a year ago were being fought last night on the streets of Ramadi and 30 miles further east in Falluja, another of the Sunni towns that have shaped the resistance to America’s occupation.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

La situation en Irak \u00e9valu\u00e9e gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 des sondages occidentalis\u00e9s (sans doute pour faire plus propre)<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoulez-vous un autre aspect du virtualisme en action, ou comment les Am\u00e9ricains se sont pr\u00e9par\u00e9s de fa\u00e7on magistrale \u00e0 ne rien voir venir, \u00e0 n’y rien comprendre, et \u00e0 r\u00e9agir parfaitement \u00e0 des situations qui n’existent pas ? Alors, lisez ce commentaire de Brendan O’Neill, de Spiked.com<\/a>, qui ne manque pas cette occasion de rappeler qu’il a fait para\u00eetre une \u00e9tude excellente (notamment dans le Guardian<\/a>), d\u00e9taillant les d\u00e9formations et les inflexions compl\u00e8tement virtualistes des sondages occidentaux effectu\u00e9s en Irak, sur le moral des Irakiens, qui ne l’ont jamais eu aussi bon, jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 aussi heureux vous dit-on (\u00ab Iraq has never had it so good<\/em> \u00bb, de Mark Steyn, dans le Spectator du 27 mars<\/a>). Leur insurrection est le feu d’artifice de leur compl\u00e8te satisfaction de leur am\u00e9ricanisation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuelques paragraphes du subtil O’Neill, qui nous d\u00e9crit simplement ce monde plong\u00e9 dans les contradictions du virtualisme et des psychologies pathog\u00e8nes qui le nourrissent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab If the coalition’s intervention gave rise to the current instability, its panicky response to the violence has made things worse. Cautious coalition leaders tend to view Iraq through doom-tinted spectacles, where every protest or act of violence is a warning sign of a coming civil war or national uprising. Presently, Bush officials are seeking to play down the extent of the problem in Iraq. But it was they who first described al-Sadr’s movement as ‘the greatest threat to democracy’. Democrat senators, watching the violence of the past three days, described Iraq as a ‘Vietnam-style quagmire’; ‘Iraq is George Bush’s Vietnam’, declared Ted Kennedy earlier this week. The media have taken their cue from these doom-laden predictions of disaster; on 6 April, both the UK Guardian and Independent led with the frontpage headline: ‘On the brink of anarchy.’<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Postwar Iraq is certainly looking anarchic, and the reported American bombing of a mosque in Fallujah today is likely to inflame tensions. But the talk of ‘another Vietnam’, and potential civil war and bloodshed after the coalition nominally hands power to an interim government on 30 June, is a consequence of a culture of fear and loathing that grips America and Britain as much as it is of the recent violence in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Indeed, the coalition’s nervous approach to Iraq, its attempt to pre-empt anything that smacks of an ‘uprising’, did much to provoke the current instability. Coalition officials claim that al-Sadr and his Mehdi army (to the extent that it is an army) are behind much of the violence, especially in the south and in parts of Baghdad. Yet al-Sadr was, until recently, a ‘minor cleric’, in the words of the Los Angeles Times; estimates of the number of armed supporters he has vary from 1000 to 10,000. The majority of Shia clerics, including those being courted by the coalition, want nothing to do with al-Sadr.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Watching recent events in Iraq, it is hard to be optimistic. Iraqis seem to have the worst of both worlds invaders who destabilised their country, and American stooges and publicity-seeking mullahs to fill the vacuum.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Bien entendu, la presse US est de la partie: align\u00e9e sur les consignes du Parti<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tEnfin, l’in\u00e9vitable cerise de l’\u00e9norme pi\u00e8ce mont\u00e9e virtualiste : la vertueuse presse am\u00e9ricaine. Ce canon de l’objectivit\u00e9 occidentale s’av\u00e8re, une fois de plus, compl\u00e8tement align\u00e9 sur les consignes du Parti, le Pentagone en l’occurrence. Les esprits critiques sont d\u00e9j\u00e0 au travail et nous livrent les premiers r\u00e9sultats de leurs enqu\u00eates. Le 7 avril, Danny Schechter, de MediaChannel.org, nous donne une excellente \u00e9tude sur le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne<\/a>, la fa\u00e7on dont les m\u00e9dias am\u00e9ricains ont interpr\u00e9t\u00e9 faussement les \u00e9v\u00e9nements, contribuant \u00e0 renforcer l’irr\u00e9alit\u00e9 du tableau, ou la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 virtualiste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette histoire n’est pas originale mais, au moins, elle est r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice. Elle d\u00e9crit l’un des aspects de l’auto-d\u00e9sinformation o\u00f9 l’Am\u00e9rique est plong\u00e9e, comme par syst\u00e8me.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab For the most part, the US media, even while reporting on the deterioration of the situation in Iraq, continues to mimic the government’s desired media message. That view puts all the blame for the violence largely onto the actions of Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who has been described as an unrepresentative, mentally unbalanced mullah bent on violence. He is depicted as a hot head, an outlaw and a terrorist. This demonization rarely has been backed up with documentation or detailed analysis.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Behind the details of the various fire fights and clashes, behind the coverage of a US missile that struck a mosque or even the barbaric images of American military contractors or mercenaries killed and hung on a bridge is a context that most of our media has missed.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Most US media has not had access to the battlefield. There was only one embedded reporter, Tony Perry from The Los Angeles Times, present in Falluja. Some network reporters have acknowledged that it is not safe to leave their offices. Reports on Iraq are now coming out of Pentagon press offices.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Rahul Mahajan, author of several books on Iraq, says: We’re being told a convenient and self-serving [story about] a few barbaric isolated extremists’ from the Saddamist stronghold’ of Falluja who killed four contractors. The truth is rather different, Mahajan told me. \u00a0\u00bbFalluja, although heavily Sunni Arab, was hardly in Saddam’s pocket. Its imams got into trouble for refusing to obey his orders to praise him personally during prayers. According to the author, Falluja became a hotbed of resistance on April 28, 2003, when U.S. troops opened fire on a group of 100 to 200 peaceful protesters. Fifteen protesters were killed.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Post-scriptum: non, finalement la cerise sur le g\u00e2teau va \u00e0 la coalition<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est juste, la vraie cerise sur la pi\u00e8ce mont\u00e9e doit aller \u00e0 la coalition. Cette entreprise stup\u00e9fiante d’achats, dollars sonnants et tr\u00e9buchants, des alliances pour les USA, pour faire nombre, devient franchement comique, si ce n’\u00e9tait la trag\u00e9die de la situation face aux \u00e9v\u00e9nements qui s’aggravent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes uns et les autres s’expliquent donc. Ils ne sont pas l\u00e0 en mission de guerre, ils ne partiront pas mais il ne faut surtout pas les voir comme des ennemis. Ici et l\u00e0, on n\u00e9gocie des accords locaux avec les insurg\u00e9s. Les autorit\u00e9s de tel et tel coalis\u00e9s annoncent qu’il n’y aura pas de renforcement, qu’il n’y aura pas de remplacement lorsque les troupes reviendront, etc. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe Guardian nous fait un rapport s\u00e9rieux<\/a> de ces sympathiques \u00e9v\u00e9nements, sans trop s’attarder sur le caract\u00e8re absolument hollywoodien de cette coalition lorsqu’elle fut constitu\u00e9e, \u00e0 coups de subventions, de promesses d’aide, de dons, etc. On pourra se rappeler de ces circonstances en revenant sur un texte de l’\u00e9poque<\/a>, sur la fa\u00e7on dont les Am\u00e9ricains rassembl\u00e8rent cette coalition, organis\u00e8rent les p\u00e9titions, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The Shia uprising is exposing the fragility of the US-led coalition in Iraq and putting a strain on the smaller partners. While the 110,000-strong US force and the 8,700-strong British force are geared for combat, many of the other countries joined the coalition in expectation of peacekeeping and reconstruction.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb To the dismay of US central command, Japanese and South Korea forces have retreated to their compounds after coming under fire while Ukrainian and Kazakh forces have been driven out of the town of Kut by Shia fighters. The US military is considering whether it needs to re-deploy 25,000 expected reinforcements from its sector around Baghdad to the south to bolster the coalition forces. The Pentagon has already shored up its troop levels to deal with the deepening chaos by halting the rotation of some 25,000 soldiers due to go home after a year in the war zone.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La guerre, plus que jamais avec notre arme supr\u00eame du virtualisme 9 avril 2004 Plus que jamais, le gouvernement en place \u00e0 Washington s’appuie pour faire face aux \u00e9v\u00e9nements de guerre en Irak sur son arme secr\u00e8te, \u00e0 la fois son attitude d’instinct, sa drogue, le domaine o\u00f9 il excelle et celui qui lui a… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[868,4256,3662,3753,569,4257,610],"class_list":["post-65928","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-bush","tag-chiite","tag-desinformation","tag-oneill","tag-rumsfeld","tag-sunnite","tag-virtualisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65928","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65928"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65928\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65928"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65928"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65928"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}