{"id":65931,"date":"2004-04-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-04-11T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/04\/11\/un-message-dirak\/"},"modified":"2004-04-11T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-04-11T00:00:00","slug":"un-message-dirak","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/04\/11\/un-message-dirak\/","title":{"rendered":"Un message d’Irak<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un message d’Irak<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

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\t11 avril 2004 Nous publions ce document qui nous para\u00eet particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressant, en le renvoyant au lien initial du site qui l’a publi\u00e9, Defense & National Interest,<\/a> qui a d\u00e9j\u00e0 montr\u00e9 son int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00e0 diverses reprises. Le document nous para\u00eet tr\u00e8s r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur de la situation en Irak, notamment en le pla\u00e7ant en perspective, avec les possibilit\u00e9s de d\u00e9veloppement dans les semaines qui viennent. (Il est assez rare aujourd’hui que des commentateurs se risquent \u00e0 des pr\u00e9visions sur les prolongements de la situation actuelle.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl s’agit d’un message \u00e9lectronique parvenu au site D&NI, \u00e9manant d’une personne employ\u00e9e dans une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de gardiennage en Irak, avec une carri\u00e8re dans le renseignement et la lutte anti-terroriste. Les conditions pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es autour de ce message ne donnent aucune garantie d’authenticit\u00e9 mais la coh\u00e9rence du texte, la pertinence des remarques nous engagent \u00e0 le consid\u00e9rer comme une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence int\u00e9ressante et s\u00e9rieuse. (De toutes les fa\u00e7ons, les sources officielles et autres des grands m\u00e9dias, sources dites s\u00e9rieuses, dont on devrait attendre qu’elles donnent toute la garantie d’authenticit\u00e9 possible, se sont montr\u00e9es si manipul\u00e9es, si fausses, si d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9ment trompeuses, que notre correspondant anonyme ne peut en aucune fa\u00e7on l’\u00eatre plus. C’est d\u00e9j\u00e0 un signe tr\u00e8s encourageant et on peut lui faire une confiance plus grande qu’au porte-parole du Pentagone.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSignalons, pour ce qui concerne la prospective de la situation, que notre interlocuteur anonyme pr\u00e9voit notamment :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Une relative accalmie dans les jours, voire dans la semaine qui suit, mais bien une accalmie, nullement la fin du mouvement de r\u00e9volte. Cette accalmie doit permettre \u00e0 chacun de reprendre des forces. (Le cessez-le-feu \u00e0 Fallujah<\/a> semble devoir \u00eatre un signe puissant de cette accalmie.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Il y aura ensuite une nouvelle explosion, avec des gu\u00e9rilleros ayant beaucoup appris des r\u00e9cents combats. (\u00ab [Y]ou can be pretty sure the second wave of violence is going to come and it will be equally, if not more, dramatic<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• L’auteur du message \u00e9lectronique est extr\u00eamement pessimiste. Pour lui, la comparaison avec le Viet-n\u00e2m ne tient pas, car la situation en Irak devrait \u00eatre beaucoup plus difficile pour les Am\u00e9ricains. L’avenir lui para\u00eet tr\u00e8s sombre : \u00ab I refer you to Israel’s humiliating defeat in Southern Lebanon by Hezbollah’s armed resistance for a reference to our potential future.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe message \u00e9tait accompagn\u00e9 de la Contextual Note<\/em> suivante, sign\u00e9e Chuck Spinney : \u00ab The following email message was forwarded to me by a friend. It is from a man who spent a career in US military intelligence specializing in counter-terrorism and is now in Iraq working as a contractor providing security for companies and NGOs. I do not know the author of this email and can not vouch for its accuracy, but it is worth studying and filing for future reference.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

E-mail from Iraq<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tThe fighting two nights ago was loud and widespread throughout the northern and northwestern parts of Baghdad … areas such as Yarmouk and Sadr City had almost continuous gunfights and rocket attacks.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhen we heard US forces using the main gun on M-1 tanks at 1 AM we knew it was serious insurgency at hand.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe night is no longer the refuge and domain of the Americans. I have to tell you although the wide open areas of Iraq give a false sense of security. Even though much of this is unseen to most people the situation has gone from bad to really bad to unbelievably bad! Westerners are getting hit everywhere.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSecurity companies escorting CPA, themselves and other Westerners are now on the menu for all the armed resistance groups. There was a report of a massive ambush by one security firm that tried to drive in from Amman. Reports have 25-40 gunmen opening up on them. They lost all of their vehicles and had to be given a mercy lift by a passing Iraqi minivan. Several other firms lost western security personnel killed this week in drive-by ambushes and even a siege by the Sadr Militia.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSeveral NGOs, security firms and military bases were literally under siege for days in Kut, Nasiriyah and Baghdad.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe boldness and sophistication of the attacks is staggering and it is clear that every one of the resistance fighters and Islamic militiamen have taken heart at the ease of inflicting damage on the Westerners. The abductions of the Japanese hostages is a sign that we have entered a new phase of bad as abduction requires a permissive environment for the hostage taker.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tI refer to this entire mess as the second Intifada of Iraq. The first Intifida was last August in Fallujah when US soldiers killed 15-17 Iraqis and Fallujah fell into revolt. Vehicles are being hit where they are easiest to find and the security firms who are here to protect the Westerners are taking casualties because the US Army and Marines are literally stretched thin throughout the country and quite over their own capacity to stop the violence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe resistance’s combat operational center of mass is and will continue moving from known mass resistance organizations (such as uniformed Badr Brigade) to small leaderless or autonomous teams or supporters who are now deciding to do what they please to the first target available. Those targets are easy … Westerners. Any and all. This burst of energy won’t last long though.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tI suspect we will have a cool down period in the next few days or within a week, but it will be simply to \u00a0\u00bbre-arm and re-fuel for re-strike and re-venge.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA true sustained explosion of violence has yet to be coordinated by the myriad of resistance teams, but as the independent or semi-centralized resistance groups form, choose leadership, and communicate at the internet cafes, you can be pretty sure the second wave of violence is going to come and it will be equally, if not more, dramatic. This time it won’t be men in black uniforms, they have learned that lesson in Najaf … They will shift to urban terrorism and un-uniformed attacks. God forbid if Sadr is killed or captured … then we have an entire second front that won’t give up until we leave.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGeneral Kimmet is wrong if he thinks that he will destroy the Badr brigade or Sadr Army as a military organization because there isn’t really one … he will disperse them into small, highly armed teams of friends and … voila! Al Qaeda-Iraq or Hezbollah-Iraq will be born in numbers we will not be able to control.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSince the ICDC [the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps] seem to have run off and joined the opposition in Nasiriyah, it may reflect the true loyalties of the new Iraqi army and Police. No one is going to cross their family, tribe or religious community for the Americans.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe correct answer is to back off, leave Sadr alone and start to throw lots of money into jobs projects and utilities for the south before this summer’s electricity and gas shortages … will that work? Probably not. But we have just antagonized the core of the Shiite resistance and putting them to work is better than letting them fight us 24\/7.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGeneral Sanchez is right about one thing … this is not Vietnam … Oh no, its not that easy. I refer you to Israel’s humiliating defeat in Southern Lebanon by Hezbollah’s armed resistance for a reference to our potential future.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un message d’Irak 11 avril 2004 Nous publions ce document qui nous para\u00eet particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressant, en le renvoyant au lien initial du site qui l’a publi\u00e9, Defense & National Interest, qui a d\u00e9j\u00e0 montr\u00e9 son int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00e0 diverses reprises. Le document nous para\u00eet tr\u00e8s r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur de la situation en Irak, notamment en le pla\u00e7ant en… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65931","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65931","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65931"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65931\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65931"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65931"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65931"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}