{"id":65936,"date":"2004-04-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-04-15T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/04\/15\/comment-fonctionne-le-cabinet-de-guerre-us-une-administration-eclatee-et-chacun-pour-soi-avec-wolfowitz-president\/"},"modified":"2004-04-15T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-04-15T00:00:00","slug":"comment-fonctionne-le-cabinet-de-guerre-us-une-administration-eclatee-et-chacun-pour-soi-avec-wolfowitz-president","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/04\/15\/comment-fonctionne-le-cabinet-de-guerre-us-une-administration-eclatee-et-chacun-pour-soi-avec-wolfowitz-president\/","title":{"rendered":"Comment fonctionne le cabinet de guerre US: une administration \u00e9clat\u00e9e et chacun pour soi, avec \u201cWolfowitz pr\u00e9sident\u201d<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Comment fonctionne le cabinet de guerre US: une administration \u00e9clat\u00e9e et chacun pour soi, avec Wolfowitz pr\u00e9sident<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCe texte publi\u00e9 par TomPaine.com<\/a>, est bas\u00e9 sur une interview du colonel Gr\u00f6ss, conseiller militaire du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Garner, premier (et \u00e9ph\u00e9m\u00e8re) repr\u00e9sentant US en Irak. Il permet d’avoir une vision d\u00e9taill\u00e9e du fonctionnement de l’administration am\u00e9ricaine en place, essentiellement pendant la p\u00e9riode qui suivit la victoire en Irak, en avril 2003. Il n’y a pas r\u00e9ellement de surprise, mais des confirmations diverses, assorties de d\u00e9tails et de pr\u00e9cisions du plus grand int\u00e9r\u00eat.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous en d\u00e9taillons quelques-unes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Cette administration pr\u00e9sente une image compl\u00e8tement \u00e9clat\u00e9e. On a ici confirmation de pr\u00e9cisions donn\u00e9es d\u00e9j\u00e0 par Richard Clarke, le coordinateur central de la lutte anti-terroriste qui accuse aujourd’hui l’administration. Le commentaire qui r\u00e9sume ce constat est donn\u00e9 explicitement dans le texte, par une autre source : \u00ab The interagency process is dead, said Ehsan Ahrari, an independent strategic analyst based in Alexandria, Virginia, who follows military affairs.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La premi\u00e8re cons\u00e9quence de cette situation est la fin du syst\u00e8me de d\u00e9cision des Etats-Unis (decision-making<\/em>), jusqu’alors inspir\u00e9 du principe checks and balances<\/em>, et qui implique une consultation crois\u00e9e des agences concern\u00e9es pour aboutir \u00e0 une d\u00e9cision dont la responsabilit\u00e9 est ainsi partag\u00e9e. Dans le syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricain, qui n’est pas appuy\u00e9 sur la tradition d’un \u00c9tat r\u00e9galien permettant d’instituer un int\u00e9r\u00eat et une responsabilit\u00e9 sup\u00e9rieurs, ce processus contenait cette faiblesse en limitant les intrusions des groupes d’int\u00e9r\u00eat de groupes priv\u00e9s ou de personnes. Dans le syst\u00e8me GW, cette tradition bureaucratique est morte et le pouvoir est offert au plus habile, au plus entreprenant, au plus d\u00e9cid\u00e9, etc. (Il est caract\u00e9ristique que, dans les personnalit\u00e9s cit\u00e9es comme repoussant l’ancien syst\u00e8me au profit d’une compl\u00e8te libert\u00e9 d’action qui engendre cette situation de d\u00e9sordre, on retrouve Powell et Armitage [le texte mentionne : \u00ab Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Armitage, Powell and more recently Rice <\/em> \u00bb]. Il ne s’agit donc pas des extr\u00e9mistes contre les mod\u00e9r\u00e9s, puisque Powell et Armitage sont dans le clan mod\u00e9r\u00e9. Il s’agit d’une v\u00e9ritable culture, acquise \u00e0 l’\u00e9poque Reagan, de refus d’utilisation des structures bureaucratiques du gouvernement.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le r\u00e9sultat est effectivement qu’on retrouve aux postes de d\u00e9cision des hommes qui ne repr\u00e9sentent pas n\u00e9cessairement les plus grandes forces, les int\u00e9r\u00eats les plus \u00e9vidents, encore moins les grandes tendances politiques existant dans le gouvernement. L’habilet\u00e9, le sens strat\u00e9gique des positions-cl\u00e9s dans les structures de direction, voire des circonstances anodines, le jeu des influences conduisent \u00e0 voir des hommes \u00e9merger d’une fa\u00e7on finalement inattendue lorsqu’on consid\u00e8re les forces en pr\u00e9sence. Ainsi de Wolfowitz, qui b\u00e9n\u00e9ficie de diverses circonstances favorables, y compris du d\u00e9sint\u00e9r\u00eat de Rumsfeld (malgr\u00e9 l’apparence) pour les questions de grande strat\u00e9gie au profit de la gestion des r\u00e9formes du Pentagone. R\u00e9sultat : une sorte de pr\u00e9sident Wolfowitz pour des questions comme la guerre en Irak. (\u00ab Wolfowitz is the most dangerous guy in America right now<\/em> \u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

The War Room<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Steven Rosenfeld, TomPaine.com, 1st April, 2004<\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Bush administration planned for the invasion of Iraq, but not for its post-war occupation. That assertion has been repeated so often by the president’s critics that it has become a political clich\u00e9. But it is not correct. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThere was plenty of planning for the post-war occupation at senior levels throughout government, says Col. Tom Gross, who was chief planner for Lt. General Jay M. Garner, director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, and then-chief of staff for Ambassador Paul Bremer, Coalition Provisional Authority administrator. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbThere was a plan,\u00a0\u00bb said Gross, who is retiring from the military. \u00a0\u00bbThe administration chose not to accept it. Their plan was to put [Iraqi exile] Ahmed Chalabi in charge and run with it.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIndeed, as former Clinton and Bush administration anti-terrorism czar Richard A. Clarke’s recent testimony to the 9\/11 commission revealed, the top staffers at the National Security Council and at the departments of State and Defense do almost nothing but plan, strategize, evaluate contingencies and sometimes get orders to act. But what people who were riveted by Richard Clarke’s testimony may not realize is that the most powerful figures in the Bush administrationfrom its earliest daysdispensed with the interagency planning process prior White Houses used to evaluate threats, make decisions to go to war, and plan and carry out those actions. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbThe interagency process is dead,\u00a0\u00bb said Ehsan Ahrari, an independent strategic analyst based in Alexandria, Virginia, who follows military affairs. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tRichard Clarke’s testimony to the 9\/11 commission described what happened to the interagency process as it concerned fighting terrorism prior to the 2001 attack. According to Clarke’s now well-known testimony, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice downgraded the role and reach of Clarke and his staff. Under Rice and unlike the Clinton administration, the anti-terrorism czar said he could no longer aggressively coordinate government agencies and implement the nation’s anti-terror policies. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis breakdown in the interagency process can also be seen in the contrast between how prior administrations and the Bush administration prepared for war. Just how the Bush White House broke with past precedent is explained in exquisite detail in a new book by James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet.’ Mann is a senior writer in residence at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies and former longtime correspondent for the Los Angeles Times. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAccording to Mann, the president’s war cabinetVice President Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Ricedidn’t want to cede any decision-making powers to senior State Department or Pentagon officials. What becomes apparent in Mann’s book is that not since Henry Kissinger was both national security adviser and secretary of state for Richard Nixon have presidential advisers held and exercised so much war-making power. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCol. Gross said he saw the impact of that concentration of power while in Iraq as a top aide to General Garner and Ambassador Bremer. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbWhen Jay Garner and I were there, they made decisions out of the Pentagon that made no sense whatsoever,\u00a0\u00bb Gross said. \u00a0\u00bbWe’d provide guidance to the OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense). They’d blow it off… Most of my perspective is the political stuff. What sticks in my mind is a cavalier approach to the whole thing.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGross said there were detailed plans and assumptionsfrom both the State Department and the military’s Central Commandabout what would be needed to transition from a post-war occupation to a self-rule. He said that at a meeting with Garner, Wolfowitz was told it would take 36 months to put a viable Iraqi government together and that a sizeable American military force of more than 100,000 troops would be needed for five, maybe 10 years. When Garner’s office told Rumsfeld that they were ready to write a detailed political-military plan based on those estimates, Gross said \u00a0\u00bbRumsfeld said no.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe most powerful figures in the Bush administration dispensed with the interagency planning process prior White Houses used to evaluate threats, make decisions to go to war, and plan and carry out those actions. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Gross said he told Garner that they needed a political adviser, and a top State Department official was brought over to Iraq. From 2001 to 2003, this official ran a special project that worked with Iraqis to envision how a post-Saddam Iraq could be built. \u00a0\u00bbThere were thousands of documents, with Iraqis doing it, not Americans,\u00a0\u00bb Gross said. \u00a0\u00bbWe told Garner we needed a political adviser, so he came over. He lasted 12 hours. Rumsfeld fired him.\u00a0\u00bb Gross said he then asked Wolfowitz to \u00a0\u00bblet us have the documents. Wolfowitz wouldn’t let us touch one document from the Department of State.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFormer senior CIA, NSC and State Department officials contacted said they’d all heard this account. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbI think I know why\u00a0\u00bb Rusmfeld and Wolfowitz acted this way, said Tom Maertens, former National Security Council director for nuclear non-proliferation for both the Clinton and Bush White Houses. \u00a0\u00bbThey apparently thought that Chalabi had some sort of popular following in Iraq. They flew in Chalabi with his cronies and they thought that was the new Iraqi government.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAs Mann’s book makes abundantly clear, the Bush war cabinetCheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Armitage, Powell and more recently Ricehave a decades-long history of distrusting both career diplomats and Pentagon generals who do not believe in American supremacy on the global stage or are reluctant to forcefully use American military power. Thus, the Bush White House purposefully unplugged the so-called interagency process, which in effect had been a system of shared responsibilitiesand checks and balancesin the way America used its military power around the world. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGross said Rumsfeld has now given his deputy, Wolfowitz, the job of dealing with Iraq. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt’s interesting,\u00a0\u00bb he said. \u00a0\u00bbMy take is there is now a huge rift between Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld. What I think is Rumsfeld’s agenda is military transformation. Iraq is a sideshow. What he has done is turned the Iraq keys over to Wolfowitz…\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNot since Henry Kissinger was both national security adviser and secretary of state for Richard Nixon have presidential advisers held and exercised so much war-making power. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t According to Mann’s book, the deputy secretary of defense has been focused on, if not obsessed with, Iraq since the mid-’70s. Then, he served in the Pentagon during the Carter administration and predicted that America’s oil supply from Saudi Arabia and Iraq could be endangered by an aggressive Iraq under Saddam Hussein. After the Persian Gulf War in 1991, when he was outside government, Wolfowitz wrote numerous papers and articles urging that the U.S. military return to Iraq and oust Saddam Hussein. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbWolfowitz is the most dangerous guy in America right now,\u00a0\u00bb Gross said. \u00a0\u00bbHe doesn’t listen. The interagency process is broken. The bad thing is nobody will call him out. Condi doesn’t say anything about it. Cheney is not going to do anything about it. And Rumsfeld is doing military transformation.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Comment fonctionne le cabinet de guerre US: une administration \u00e9clat\u00e9e et chacun pour soi, avec Wolfowitz pr\u00e9sident Ce texte publi\u00e9 par TomPaine.com, est bas\u00e9 sur une interview du colonel Gr\u00f6ss, conseiller militaire du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Garner, premier (et \u00e9ph\u00e9m\u00e8re) repr\u00e9sentant US en Irak. Il permet d’avoir une vision d\u00e9taill\u00e9e du fonctionnement de l’administration am\u00e9ricaine en place,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65936","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notes-de-lectures"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65936","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65936"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65936\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65936"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65936"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65936"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}