{"id":65957,"date":"2004-05-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-05-03T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/05\/03\/qui-commande-a-falloujah\/"},"modified":"2004-05-03T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-05-03T00:00:00","slug":"qui-commande-a-falloujah","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/05\/03\/qui-commande-a-falloujah\/","title":{"rendered":"Qui commande \u00e0 Falloujah?<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Qui commande \u00e0 Falloujah?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t3 mai 2004 Oui, la question est int\u00e9ressante : qui commande ici et l\u00e0 ? Pour le cas qui nous occupe : qui commande \u00e0 Falloujah ? La machine militaire US, plac\u00e9e dans une situation qui s’apparente \u00e0 une d\u00e9faite, notamment dans la crise de Falloujah, semble ne plus savoir \u00e0 qui ob\u00e9ir. Ce week-end, le pr\u00e9sident du comit\u00e9 des chefs d’\u00e9tat-major US, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Myers a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 qu’il n’\u00e9tait pas juste de consid\u00e9rer le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Saleh comme commandant de la zone de Falloujah<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette nomination avait \u00e9t\u00e9 annonc\u00e9e trois jours plus t\u00f4t, nomination suivie de l’arriv\u00e9e du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Saleh (une allure tr\u00e8s semblable \u00e0 celle de Saddam) sur les lieux. Saleh a \u00e9t\u00e9 salu\u00e9 comme le lib\u00e9rateur de Falloujah. Depuis, Saleh a annonc\u00e9 qu’il n’entendait pas livrer aux Am\u00e9ricains les insurg\u00e9s de Falloujah<\/a>. Le Guardian<\/em> rapporte ceci : \u00ab As a flood of civilians returned home after four weeks of a ferocious assault on the city by American marines, Major General Jasim Mohammed Saleh said the US had provoked a backlash from ordinary Iraqis. The reasons for the resistance go back to the American provocations, the raids and abolishing the army, which made Iraqis join the resistance, he said.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlors, que se passe-t-il \u00e0 Falloujah ? Nous choisirions l’hypoth\u00e8se du d\u00e9sordre, c’est-\u00e0-dire celle du morcellement du pouvoir am\u00e9ricain, que nous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 prise en compte<\/a>. On peut lire ci-dessous ce commentaire du site www.xymphora.blogspot.com<\/a>, qui nous fait explorer effectivement cette hypoth\u00e8se d’une m\u00e9sentente du c\u00f4t\u00e9 US. Xymphora<\/em> donne cette explication de la situation \u00e0 Falloujah (en date du 2 mai, avant les d\u00e9clarations de Myers d\u00e9niant que le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Saleh soit l’homme des USA \u00e0 Falloujah) :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00abIt represents an incredible loss of control by the Pentagon in Washington over the American military. It is apparent that the American commanders on the ground in Falluja came to the conclusion that whoever was giving the orders in Washington was insane (Dr. Strangelove), and that they were no longer prepared to participate in a massacre that not only would fail in its short-term military goal, but would turn the whole country violently against the Americans (not to mention completely destroying the moral integrity of the American military by forcing soldiers to murder civilians). They negotiated a cease-fire unknown to the Pentagon in Washington and against the express wishes of the civilian neocons in charge of the Pentagon. In fact, Falluja was being micromanaged by the White House itself. No to put too fine a point on it, the cease-fire in Falluja was a mutiny by the American commanders in Falluja (the hero seems to be Marine Lt. Gen. James Conway).<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb This explains why we were simultaneously hearing announcements of a cease-fire in Iraq and vehement denials from the Pentagon in Washington. It also explains why some Americans had stopped the massacre, while others, still under the control of Washington, continued. Paul Wolfowitz (Captain Bligh) said the situation was ‘confusing’, which is a very odd thing for the guy supposedly in charge to say. It was confusing to him because a cease-fire was being negotiated on the ground in Falluja behind Wolfowitz’s back. The central command in Washington has become so bad both incompetent and treasonous that American soldiers in the field have to make their own cease-fires. Perhaps there is hope for the United States yet.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes d\u00e9clarations de Myers ne d\u00e9mentent pas cette th\u00e8se. On peut m\u00eame consid\u00e9rer qu’elles la renforcent : Myers serait venu parler au nom du commandement militaire \u00e0 Washington, pour d\u00e9mentir l’accord pass\u00e9 sur le terrain. On peut m\u00eame avancer l’hypoth\u00e8se que Myers a \u00e9t\u00e9 press\u00e9 d’intervenir dans ce sens par la direction civile du Pentagone (Rumsfeld et Wolfowitz). Dans le m\u00eame ordre d’id\u00e9e, pour poursuivre l’hypoth\u00e8se : pourquoi Rumsfeld n’est-il pas intervenu dimanche, et pourquoi cette t\u00e2che a-t-elle \u00e9t\u00e9 laiss\u00e9e \u00e0 Myers ? Parce que le pouvoir civil a signifi\u00e9 aux chefs militaires \u00e0 Washington que c’\u00e9tait \u00e0 eux \u00e0 se mouiller pour reprendre le contr\u00f4le de leurs forces. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tReste l’inconnue de la Maison-Blanche. Si comme le sugg\u00e8re Xymphora<\/em>, la\t Maison-Blanche joue directement avec le commandement sur place (\u00ab In fact, Falluja was being micromanaged by the White House itself<\/em> \u00bb), l’action de la Maison-Blanche apr\u00e8s les d\u00e9clarations de Myers reste tr\u00e8s difficile \u00e0 pr\u00e9voir. Le Pentagone peut jouer au na\u00eff, pr\u00e9senter l’intervention de Myers comme une d\u00e9marche normale puisque la direction des op\u00e9rations reste effectivement, en th\u00e9orie, confi\u00e9e \u00e0 lui-m\u00eame et au commandement civil. La Maison-Blanche peut laisser faire en continuant \u00e0 agir en sous-main, ou bien d\u00e9cider d’intervenir publiquement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe plus remarquable dans cette crise est qu’il semble d\u00e9sormais y avoir deux crises, avec un lien pour les relier de plus en plus t\u00e9nu.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t Celle qui a lieu sur le terrain, avec les combattants, les arrangements sur place, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0Celle qui a lieu \u00e0 Washington, avec les affrontements entre factions civiles pour le pouvoir et la d\u00e9termination de la politique officielle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans tous les cas, il n’y a rien dans ces hypoth\u00e8ses pour nous \u00e9tonner, tant l’hypoth\u00e8se du d\u00e9sordre et de la rupture du pouvoir US est partout confirm\u00e9e. On la retrouve par exemple dans l’affaire des tortures<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Qui commande \u00e0 Falloujah? 3 mai 2004 Oui, la question est int\u00e9ressante : qui commande ici et l\u00e0 ? Pour le cas qui nous occupe : qui commande \u00e0 Falloujah ? La machine militaire US, plac\u00e9e dans une situation qui s’apparente \u00e0 une d\u00e9faite, notamment dans la crise de Falloujah, semble ne plus savoir \u00e0… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4279,4278,1417,569,1448,4191],"class_list":["post-65957","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-blanche","tag-maison","tag-myers","tag-rumsfeld","tag-wolfowitz","tag-xymphora"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65957","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65957"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65957\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65957"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65957"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65957"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}