{"id":65958,"date":"2004-05-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-05-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/05\/04\/un-nouveau-911-vraiment-cela-ferait-bien-dans-le-paysage\/"},"modified":"2004-05-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-05-04T00:00:00","slug":"un-nouveau-911-vraiment-cela-ferait-bien-dans-le-paysage","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/05\/04\/un-nouveau-911-vraiment-cela-ferait-bien-dans-le-paysage\/","title":{"rendered":"Un nouveau 9\/11? Vraiment, cela ferait bien dans le paysage<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un nouveau 9\/11? Vraiment, cela ferait bien dans le paysage<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t4 mai 2004 Une analyse de ce jour du site WSWS.org<\/a> s’arr\u00eate sur un article de David E. Sanger, dans le New York Times du 2 mai<\/a>, pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 sous le titre : \u00ab Damage Control, Calculating the Politics of Catastrophe<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSanger revient sur un sujet que nous connaissons bien d\u00e9sormais : la possibilit\u00e9 d’une attaque terroriste de grande envergure contre les USA, une sorte de 9\/11-II, avant l’\u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle de novembre. (Voir notamment notre dernier texte, un F&C du 19 avril 2004<\/a>, qui fournit \u00e9galement les liens renvoyant \u00e0 des textes pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents sur ce m\u00eame sujet.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab This public discussion about a possible terror strike, large or small, has become far more than just another yellow alert for the nation to be on its toes at shopping malls, airports and train stations. It has quietly become part of the election-year landscape, put alongside strategists’ calculations about how the unemployment rate, or the Dow, or Iraq might affect a close election.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb It has also led to a kind of macabre game theory, in which security experts and political operatives two classes of people who typically do not interact much in Washington are calculating what the political fallout of an attack might be. The answers depend on what kind of attack, and when it happens. But if thinking about the less-than-unthinkable was an undercurrent before the Madrid bombings, it has become a subject of intense strategizing ever since.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tCe que nous montre Sanger, involontairement car ce n’est pas l\u00e0 son propos, c’est l’\u00e9volution psychologique \u00e0 Washington, chez les experts, faiseurs d’opinion, etc. Peu \u00e0 peu, l’hypoth\u00e8se d’une attaque devient une mati\u00e8re habituelle de la r\u00e9flexion. Elle est trait\u00e9e techniquement, plus que politiquement. Elle est banalis\u00e9e du point de vue de l’appr\u00e9ciation politique qu’on pourrait en avoir. Elle devient une hypoth\u00e8se de campagne, c’est-\u00e0-dire une hypoth\u00e8se \u00e0 propos de laquelle la principale interrogation est son effet sur les sondages, sur les intentions de vote, sur le vote lui-m\u00eame.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est une \u00e9volution \u00e0 la fois extraordinaire et compr\u00e9hensible dans le climat qui pr\u00e9vaut \u00e0 Washington D.C. Elle peut effectivement conduire \u00e0 des initiatives \u00e9tranges, si les circonstances ajoutaient leur pression. (Concernant ces circonstances, on pense aussit\u00f4t \u00e0 la situation en Irak, avec des effets sur les sondages, notamment en d\u00e9faveur de GW Bush.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSanger d\u00e9taille de cette fa\u00e7on cette \u00e9volution psychologique. Lui-m\u00eame ne nous sugg\u00e8re nullement une hypoth\u00e8se dans le sens d’une manipulation, et c’est justement pourquoi son commentaire est pr\u00e9cieux. Ce commentaire, en effet, t\u00e9moigne d’autant plus de cette \u00e9volution psychologique qu’on \u00e9voque ci-dessus qu’il n’y a aucune conscience de celle-ci.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab Mr. Bush’s political aides speaking only on background, because no one dissects terror on the record – argue that the crazier the world gets, the more it plays to the theme of the campaign: Now more than ever, the country needs a president who has proved to be strong on terror. A worsening scene in Iraq, they believe, plays into the same instinct. Perhaps that is pre-disaster spin, but many Democrats say privately that they agree with that theory.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb So far, the signs are contradictory. Mr. Bush’s approval rating seemed to improve a bit even as casualties in Iraq worsened in April. But then a New York Times\/CBS News poll, released last week, suggested that Mr. Bush was finally paying a price among voters who wonder if he has a workable Iraq strategy. They gave him higher marks on fighting terror. But a strike at home could change the numbers instantly.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb People now realize there might be an Al Qaeda election-year strategy, said Richard Norton Smith, a historian who has studied how war affected the re-elections of Lincoln in 1864 and Roosevelt in 1944. Even terrorists take into account the calendar.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb So the timing of any future attack is now the subject of hallway conversations in the Pentagon and the West Wing and at diplomatic dinner parties, where current and former officials mingle. A highly unscientific survey of those conversations revealed a few common strands of logic among Bush and Kerry advisers. Few doubt that an attack would bring the country together behind the president, just as it did after 9\/11.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tL’analyse de WSWS.org<\/a> adopte compl\u00e8tement la th\u00e8se d’une pr\u00e9paration psychologique \u00e0 une attaque terroriste, acceptant implicitement l’ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 de la d\u00e9marche qu’il d\u00e9crit : une attaque terroriste effectivement commise par des terroristes, ou bien une attaque terroriste mont\u00e9e comme une provocation ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans ce cas \u00e9galement, l’\u00e9volution psychologique est en cours. Si cette hypoth\u00e8se d’une provocation a d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9voqu\u00e9e \u00e0 plusieurs reprises, on constate qu’elle l’est de plus en plus automatiquement, d\u00e8s que l’hypoth\u00e8se d’une attaque en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral est abord\u00e9e. Cette hypoth\u00e8se d’une machination de l’administration GW devient banale, presque normale. Comme l’observe par ailleurs WSWS.org, bien entendu les effets de l’enqu\u00eate de la commission sur l’attaque du 11 septembre 2001<\/a> ont \u00e9t\u00e9 consid\u00e9rables pour renforcer cette attitude. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab While Sanger presents the issue purely as one of deep concern in the Bush and Kerry campaigns about the possibility of a nightmarish, unpredictable event that could shift the election one way or another, a much more serious question lies behind the discussion. Coming in the wake of further evidence of the deliberate stand-down of US defenses prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, it must be asked: Will the Bush administration allow or facilitate another massive terror attack to help secure an electoral victory in 2004?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Shortly before Safire’s column appeared <\/em>[in December 2003], General Tommy Franks the former head of the US military’s Central Command who led the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq predicted that another terror attack on the scale of September 11 would result in the abrogation of the Constitution and the beginning of military rule in the US.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb This last possibility not suggested by Sanger is particularly significant given the concerns over the uncertain electoral consequences of another terrorist attack. If such an attack could not be used confidently to manipulate the results of the elections, it could be used as a justification for abrogating the elections altogether.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un nouveau 9\/11? Vraiment, cela ferait bien dans le paysage 4 mai 2004 Une analyse de ce jour du site WSWS.org s’arr\u00eate sur un article de David E. Sanger, dans le New York Times du 2 mai, pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 sous le titre : \u00ab Damage Control, Calculating the Politics of Catastrophe \u00bb Sanger revient sur un… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65958","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65958","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65958"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65958\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65958"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65958"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65958"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}