{"id":65963,"date":"2004-05-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-05-09T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/05\/09\/pour-larmee-us-lirak-nest-pas-un-bourbier-cest-une-bombe-sur-le-point-dexploser\/"},"modified":"2004-05-09T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-05-09T00:00:00","slug":"pour-larmee-us-lirak-nest-pas-un-bourbier-cest-une-bombe-sur-le-point-dexploser","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/05\/09\/pour-larmee-us-lirak-nest-pas-un-bourbier-cest-une-bombe-sur-le-point-dexploser\/","title":{"rendered":"Pour l’arm\u00e9e US, l’Irak n’est pas un bourbier, c’est une bombe sur le point d’exploser<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Pour l’arm\u00e9e US, l’Irak n’est pas un bourbier, c’est une bombe sur le point d’exploser<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t9 mai 2004 C’est un ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nal article que celui que publie le Washington Post d’aujourd’hui<\/a>, sur la situation \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur des forces arm\u00e9es et du Pentagone, \u00e0 propos de la question : va-t-on ou non gagner cette guerre ? (Titre : \u00ab Dissension Grows In Senior Ranks On War Strategy U.S. May Be Winning Battles in Iraq But Losing the War, Some Officers Say.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t D’abord, sur le fait lui-m\u00eame : il y a bien un an et 9 jours, le 1er mai 2003, que le pr\u00e9sident des Etats-Unis a d\u00e9clar\u00e9 la victoire, en grande pompe, \u00e0 bord du porte-avions Abraham-Lincoln<\/em> ? Alors, de quoi discute-t-on aujourd’hui au Pentagone et parmi les officiers g\u00e9n\u00e9raux, et de quelle guerre s’agit-il ? L’acte virtualiste que constituait la victoire annonc\u00e9e le 1er mai, on constate aujourd’hui combien c’en \u00e9tait un, affaiblit consid\u00e9rablement les d\u00e9fenses psychologiques face \u00e0 l’interpr\u00e9tation de la situation actuelle comme \u00e9tant une marche vers la d\u00e9faite. Au plus l’interpr\u00e9tation du 1er mai 2003 appara\u00eet outranci\u00e8re par rapport \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, au plus le contraste que forme la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 avec elle invite au pessimisme. D\u00e9sormais, nombre de g\u00e9n\u00e9raux am\u00e9ricains d\u00e9battent, non de la possibilit\u00e9 de la d\u00e9faite mais des modalit\u00e9s de la d\u00e9faite<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(Jusqu’\u00e0 l’observation du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Abuzaid, commandant en chef du th\u00e9\u00e2tre, donnant officiellement comme r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la question sur la victoire strat\u00e9gique qu’il y a des opportunit\u00e9s d’une telle victoire \u00ab The top U.S. commander in the war also said he strongly disagrees with the view that the United States is heading toward defeat in Iraq. We are not losing, militarily, Army Gen. John Abizaid said in an interview Friday. He said that the U.S. military is winning tactically. But he stopped short of being as positive about the overall trend. Rather, he said, strategically, I think there are opportunities.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuelques extraits des r\u00e9flexions d’officiers sup\u00e9rieurs :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Army Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, who spent much of the year in western Iraq, said he believes that at the tactical level at which fighting occurs, the U.S. military is still winning. But when asked whether he believes the United States is losing, he said, I think strategically, we are.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Army Col. Paul Hughes, who last year was the first director of strategic planning for the U.S. occupation authority in Baghdad, said he agrees with that view and noted that a pattern of winning battles while losing a war characterized the U.S. failure in Vietnam. Unless we ensure that we have coherency in our policy, we will lose strategically, he said in an interview Friday.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb I lost my brother in Vietnam, added Hughes, a veteran Army strategist who is involved in formulating Iraq policy. I promised myself, when I came on active duty, that I would do everything in my power to prevent that [sort of strategic loss] from happening again. Here I am, 30 years later, thinking we will win every fight and lose the war, because we don’t understand the war we’re in.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCorollaire de cette situation o\u00f9 la d\u00e9faite est non seulement devenue une option, mais appara\u00eet d\u00e9j\u00e0 comme l’option principale et sera bient\u00f4t, demain, la seule option raisonnable, un vent de r\u00e9volte contre la direction civile, dont on a vu de s\u00e9rieux signes avant-coureurs<\/a>. Jamais dans l’histoire du Pentagone, depuis que celui-ci est organis\u00e9 en minist\u00e8re de la d\u00e9fense (1947), on a constat\u00e9 une fronde aussi forte contre la direction civile. M\u00eame lors de la guerre du Viet-n\u00e2m, o\u00f9 les rapports entre McNamara et les chefs militaires \u00e9taient tr\u00e8s tendus, la tension n’\u00e9tait pas si forte. Elle prend aujourd’hui des formes personnelles tr\u00e8s brutales (Wolfowitz disant au reporter du Post<\/em> qui lui parle de ces g\u00e9n\u00e9raux contestataires : \u00ab Asked about such antagonism, Wolfowitz said, I wish they’d have the whatever it takes to come tell me to my face.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa grande diff\u00e9rence avec les ann\u00e9es 1965-68 est que l’objet de la r\u00e9volte englobe \u00e9galement la haute direction militaire, notamment le pr\u00e9sident du Joint Chief of Staff [JCS] (le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Myers), per\u00e7u comme totalement acquis \u00e0 Rumsfeld (en 1965-68, le JCS unanime d\u00e9fendait la m\u00eame position contre certains aspects de la strat\u00e9gie de McNamara). Cela implique que les militaires am\u00e9ricains se jugent sans interlocuteur de rang acceptable, aussi bien vis-\u00e0-vis du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense que vis-\u00e0-vis du pr\u00e9sident (le pr\u00e9sident du JCS est traditionnellement le principal conseiller militaire du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense et du pr\u00e9sident, directement par rapport \u00e0 chacun ; le pr\u00e9sident du JCS a un fauteuil de plein droit, correspondant en importance \u00e0 celui du secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense, au National Security Council du pr\u00e9sident). Cela implique encore que des mouvements incontr\u00f4l\u00e9s sont possibles \u00e0 des niveaux subalternes, soit dans la conduite des op\u00e9rations comme cela est d\u00e9j\u00e0 sans doute le cas \u00e0 Falloujah, soit, plus gravement, dans des cas de confrontation entre diff\u00e9rentes autorit\u00e9s. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSur la col\u00e8re des militaires vis-\u00e0-vis de leurs autorit\u00e9s :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Tolerance of the situation in Iraq also appears to be declining within the U.S. military. Especially among career Army officers, an extraordinary anger is building at Rumsfeld and his top advisers.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Like a lot of senior Army guys, I’m quite angry with Rumsfeld and the rest of the Bush administration, <\/em>[a] young general said. He listed two reasons. One is, I think they are going to break the Army. But what really incites him, he said, is, I don’t think they care.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Jeff Smith, a former general counsel of the CIA who has close ties to many senior officers, said, Some of my friends in the military are exceedingly angry. In the Army, he said, It’s pretty bitter. Retired Army Col. Robert Killebrew, a frequent Pentagon consultant, said, The people in the military are mad as hell. He said the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, should be fired. A spokesman for Myers declined to comment. A Special Forces officer aimed higher, saying that Rumsfeld needs to go, as does Wolfowitz.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tSi la situation continue \u00e0 \u00e9voluer dans le sens o\u00f9 on la voit faire actuellement, on peut aller vers des \u00e9v\u00e9nements extr\u00eamement graves de conflits internes, avec des r\u00e9percussions sur le terrain et des r\u00e9percussions \u00e0 Washington. Des signes de m\u00e9contentement ou de d\u00e9sordre apparaissent partout pour confirmer l’analyse pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e ici, et surtout la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 d’un climat extraordinairement d\u00e9l\u00e9t\u00e8re. La question aujourd’hui ouverte, en cas d’une d\u00e9faite, c’est-\u00e0-dire d’un retrait pr\u00e9matur\u00e9 des forces arm\u00e9es, est bien celle de la coh\u00e9sion g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des forces arm\u00e9es am\u00e9ricaines, particuli\u00e8rement de l’U.S. Army.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPour confirmation, voici quelques indications sur le climat actuel au sein de l’administration, des forces arm\u00e9es, jusqu’\u00e0 des indications sur la situation et l’activit\u00e9 du commandement, indications extraites d’ un article du Financial Times du 8 mai<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Insiders describe a lack of direction and a prevailing sense of gloom and desperation in the administration. This gloom has only been intensified by the exposure of torture and sexual abuse of Iraqi prisoners.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Analysts point to an absence of clearcut strategy that has seen repeated personnel changes and policy reversals resulting from continuous battles between the State Department and the Pentagon. The White House national security advisers are blamed for not resolving the interagency battles.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb They [the administration] are flying blind, comments one former official just back from service in Baghdad. They recognise it is a mess. There is no consistency in vision and when they do agree, there is no consistency in implementation.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb We are seeing a devolution of powers in an absence of clear strategy. Local commanders are making local decisions that have profound implications for the rest of the country.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Pour l’arm\u00e9e US, l’Irak n’est pas un bourbier, c’est une bombe sur le point d’exploser 9 mai 2004 C’est un ph\u00e9nom\u00e9nal article que celui que publie le Washington Post d’aujourd’hui, sur la situation \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur des forces arm\u00e9es et du Pentagone, \u00e0 propos de la question : va-t-on ou non gagner cette guerre ? (Titre… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65963","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65963","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65963"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65963\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65963"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65963"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65963"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}