{"id":65972,"date":"2004-05-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-05-17T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/05\/17\/dans-le-desarroi-vers-ou-se-retourner-sinon-vers-soi-meme-et-ses-valeurs-traditionnelles\/"},"modified":"2004-05-17T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-05-17T00:00:00","slug":"dans-le-desarroi-vers-ou-se-retourner-sinon-vers-soi-meme-et-ses-valeurs-traditionnelles","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/05\/17\/dans-le-desarroi-vers-ou-se-retourner-sinon-vers-soi-meme-et-ses-valeurs-traditionnelles\/","title":{"rendered":"Dans le d\u00e9sarroi, vers o\u00f9 se retourner sinon vers soi-m\u00eame et ses valeurs traditionnelles?<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Dans le d\u00e9sarroi, vers o\u00f9 se retourner sinon vers soi-m\u00eame et ses valeurs traditionnelles ?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t17 mai 2004 Il n’est en effet question que de d\u00e9sarroi, aujourd’hui, aux Etats-Unis. Le d\u00e9sarroi des faucons, d’abord<\/a>, ces durs qui ont soutenu, port\u00e9, encens\u00e9 l’effort vers la guerre et l’effort de guerre lui-m\u00eame. D\u00e9sarroi et amertume d\u00e9sormais, col\u00e8re et tristesse<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSeuls quelques derniers fid\u00e8les continuent \u00e0 y croire et \u00e0 plaider la cause comme si rien ne s’\u00e9tait pass\u00e9 : le Wall Street Journal<\/em>, William Safire, Charles Krauthammer, l’in\u00e9narrable Rush Limbaugh, le roi du talk-show<\/em> qui trouve que les 35 ann\u00e9es de s\u00e9vices de Saddam devraient largement faire fermer les yeux sur les activit\u00e9s US en la mati\u00e8re. Par comparaison au reste, tout cela est du menu fretin, y compris le WSJ qui, \u00e0 lui seul, ne peut d\u00e9placer les montagnes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe reste, c’est effectivement la communaut\u00e9 des faucons secou\u00e9e jusque dans ses tr\u00e9fonds. Ci-apr\u00e8s, quelques paragraphes exposant les tourments de quelques-uns d’entre eux, restant pourtant plus ou moins guerriers, mais plus tout \u00e0 fait vraiment, bref, infiniment tourment\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab But many hawks across the political spectrum are having public second thoughts. The National Review has dismissed the Wilsonian ideal of implanting democracy in Iraq, and has recommended settling for an orderly society with a non-dictatorial government. David Brooks, a New York Times columnist, wrote that America entered Iraq with a childish fantasy and is now a shellshocked hegemon. Journalists like Robert Novak, Max Boot and Thomas Friedman have encouraged Mr. Rumsfeld to resign.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Robert Kagan and William Kristol, two influential hawks at the neoconservative Weekly Standard, warned in last week’s issue of the widespread bipartisan view that the war is already lost or on the verge of being lost. They called for moving up the election in Iraq to Sept. 30 to hasten the transition and distract attention from American mistakes.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb There’s a fair amount of conservative despair, which I respect, Mr. Kristol, the magazine’s editor, said in an interview. My sentiments are closer to anger than to angst. My anger is at the administration for having made many more mistakes than it needed to have made. But we still have to win and we still can win.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Andrew Sullivan, the conservative blogger, has questioned whether it was foolish to trust the Bush administration to wage the war competently. After the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, Mr. Sullivan posted such pained thoughts questioning the moral justification for the war that he was inundated with e-mail messages telling him to buck up.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Now I’m being bashed for going wobbly, Mr. Sullivan said. I’m still in favor of this war and still desperately want it to succeed, but when the case we made for war is undermined by events, we have to acknowledge that and explain why the case for war still stands. Sometimes politicians have to stick to scripts regardless of the facts, but a writer has an obligation to be more honest.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tDans ce d\u00e9sarroi g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, on peut tout de m\u00eame distinguer l’amorce d’un mouvement, \u00e9galement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. Il est bien illustr\u00e9 par l’\u00e9volution de George F. Will, l’un des plus redoutables va-t-en-guerre, qui, aujourd’hui, laisse \u00e9clater son amertume et sa col\u00e8re. Il sugg\u00e8re \u00e0 l’administration d’absorber \u00ab une bonne dose de conservatisme sans le pr\u00e9fixe n\u00e9o<\/em> \u00bb. La m\u00eame id\u00e9e, dite diff\u00e9remment, est exprim\u00e9e par Tucker Carlson, de l’\u00e9mission Crossfire de CNN : \u00ab I supported the war and now I feel foolish. I’m just struck by how many people like me who were instinctively distrustful of government forgot to be humble in our expectations. The idea that the federal government can quickly transform the Middle East seems odd to me for a conservative. A basic tenet of conservatism is that it’s much easier to destroy things than to create them much easier, and more fun, too.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn voit l’\u00e9volution de la pens\u00e9e, qui correspond antinomiquement \u00e0 celle des n\u00e9o-conservateurs lorsqu’ils disent qu’ils sont pr\u00eats \u00e0 se rapprocher des lib\u00e9raux interventionnistes (au centre-gauche de l’\u00e9chiquier politique). Les conservateurs qui ont soutenu la guerre retrouvent aujourd’hui l’instinct fondamental du conservatisme am\u00e9ricain, qui est le refus des aventures ext\u00e9rieures, la prudence face \u00e0 l’interventionnisme, la m\u00e9fiance du gouvernement central, etc. Ce que Will et Carlson recommandent \u00e0 l’administration, c’est de se rapprocher des th\u00e8ses d’un Patrick J. Buchanan ou d’un Justin Raimundo. (Le paradoxe est qu’ils devraient avoir Rumsfeld \u00e0 leurs c\u00f4t\u00e9s, Rumsfeld comme nationaliste, qui n’est th\u00e9oriquement partisan de l’intervention en Irak qu’\u00e0 condition qu’on s’en sorte au plus vite<\/a>. Mais on sait aujourd’hui la position de Rumsfeld, prisonnier de la guerre qu’il a conduite, et de la fa\u00e7on dont il l’a conduite.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais allons plus loin. Cette \u00e9volution-l\u00e0, dans une p\u00e9riode de profond revers, ressemble \u00e0 autre chose, de bien plus vaste : un red\u00e9ploiement vers ce qui pourrait \u00eatre une tentative de retour vers l’isolationnisme ; dans tous les cas un sentiment qui n’est plus tr\u00e8s loin d’une tentation de n\u00e9o-isolationnisme. Cette id\u00e9e nous para\u00eet certainement moins absurde, ou obsol\u00e8te, que nombre de commentateurs lib\u00e9raux, inform\u00e9s et europ\u00e9ens, pourraient le croire, et l’\u00e9crire pour en convaincre leurs lecteurs. (L’isolationnisme, il faut le r\u00e9p\u00e9ter sans cesse, n’est pas l’enfermement sur soi et la rupture avec le reste. C’est le refus des engagements politiques, la m\u00e9fiance psychologique de l’ext\u00e9rieur, l’attention port\u00e9e \u00e0 ses seuls int\u00e9r\u00eats, etc ; les liens qui rapportent, commerciaux et autres, subsistent \u00e9videmment.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuant \u00e0 la situation actuelle, nous sommes compl\u00e8tement d’accord avec l’analyse tr\u00e8s riche qu’en donne William Pfaff dans son dernier commentaire pour l’Observer<\/a>. Ce que nous d\u00e9crit Pfaff, c’est ce que nous qualifierions (nous l’avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 fait) d’isolationnisme offensif, qui nous para\u00eet \u00eatre dans le cas des Am\u00e9ricains, une qualification bien plus juste et expressive que la notion d’unilat\u00e9ralisme, dont l’ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 devrait \u00eatre \u00e9vidente aux yeux de tous, et d’ailleurs, notion employ\u00e9e \u00e0 cause de cette ambigu\u00eft\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuelques mots de Pfaff :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab A new America was said to have emerged, but it would be better to say an old one found new empowerment. It was recently described by former US ambassador to France Felix Rohatyn as more radical and more committed than ever to the need for unchallenged military dominance. It is more individualistic than Europe, more religious, conservative and patriotic … [These factors] will influence everything America does from now on, both in its foreign and its domestic policies.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb This is undoubtedly true, but this new America amazingly resembles the isolationist and xenophobic America between 1920 and 1941. What is new is that it has become the most heavily-armed nation on Earth and believes it is, and should remain, number one.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Like pre-1941 America, it includes a strong streak of populist anti-European sentiment. What’s new is that many political intellectuals and political leaders are anti-European too, annoyed by Europe’s pretension to offer a valid alternative to what America considers its manifest destiny, and preoccupied by the threat that the EU might become a serious international rival.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Despite everything some Americans say today about their future being tied to a dynamic new Asia, Europe remains the society against which the US measures itself. Americans know Europe as the society against which the US rebelled and, in the American mind, superseded.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tOn comprend, dans ce contexte, combien il est ais\u00e9 d’envisager que cet isolationnisme offensif se transforme, \u00e0 certaines conditions, en un isolationnisme d\u00e9fensif de type classique. Nous pensons que ce mouvement est d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 en marche. Nous pensons \u00e9galement qu’il n’a aucune chance d’aboutir, parce que les conditions psychologiques de l’Am\u00e9rique ne permettent plus d’accepter le fait m\u00eame de l’isolationnisme (ou sa version moderne, peu importe) comme une politique \u00e9nonc\u00e9e clairement. La faiblesse psychologique de l’Am\u00e9rique est, \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, extraordinaire aujourd’hui, car ce sera \u00e9videmment par faiblesse que l’Am\u00e9rique ne r\u00e9ussira pas \u00e0 redevenir isolationniste, alors que seule cette voie pourrait la sauver. Le choc des \u00e9checs encore \u00e0 venir apr\u00e8s les terribles revers d\u00e9j\u00e0 subis, peut-\u00eatre jusqu’\u00e0 une d\u00e9route g\u00e9n\u00e9rale en Irak, vont constituer un choc psychologique terrifiant pour l’Am\u00e9rique, d’o\u00f9 \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s tout (surtout le pire) peut sortir sauf un n\u00e9o-isolationnisme apais\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPfaff :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The war on terror was founded on an edifice of illusions that virtually no one in the US policy community questioned. That has collapsed. Since they really were illusions about the US itself, the collapse has internal implications.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The country suffered a disruptive and doubt-filled domestic aftermath of the defeat in Vietnam for more than a decade. The war in Iraq was supposed to give the US the triumph it was denied in Vietnam. Instead, it has doubled the defeat. The consequences of this, abroad as well as at home, are unforeseeable.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Dans le d\u00e9sarroi, vers o\u00f9 se retourner sinon vers soi-m\u00eame et ses valeurs traditionnelles ? 17 mai 2004 Il n’est en effet question que de d\u00e9sarroi, aujourd’hui, aux Etats-Unis. Le d\u00e9sarroi des faucons, d’abord, ces durs qui ont soutenu, port\u00e9, encens\u00e9 l’effort vers la guerre et l’effort de guerre lui-m\u00eame. D\u00e9sarroi et amertume d\u00e9sormais, col\u00e8re… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3335,3823,3653,1383,3794,3372,3132,4200],"class_list":["post-65972","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-buchanan","tag-journal","tag-kristol","tag-raimundo","tag-safire","tag-street","tag-wall","tag-will"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65972","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=65972"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65972\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=65972"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=65972"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=65972"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}