{"id":66004,"date":"2004-06-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-06-15T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/06\/15\/le-dilemme-strategique-des-usa-sa-faiblesse-militaire\/"},"modified":"2004-06-15T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-06-15T00:00:00","slug":"le-dilemme-strategique-des-usa-sa-faiblesse-militaire","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/06\/15\/le-dilemme-strategique-des-usa-sa-faiblesse-militaire\/","title":{"rendered":"Le dilemme strat\u00e9gique des USA : sa faiblesse militaire\u2026<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le dilemme strat\u00e9gique des USA : sa faiblesse militaire<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t15 juin 2004 L’un des aspects les plus importants de l’aventure irakienne des USA, c’est la mise en \u00e9vidence des faiblesses de la puissance militaire US. Peu d’experts auraient pu oser faire une telle analyse avant l’Irak. Aujourd’hui, cette analyse est, comme on dit chez ces m\u00eames experts, incontournable. Les Am\u00e9ricains ont pris ce risque insens\u00e9 d’exposer des faiblesses profondes de leur puissance militaire sur laquelle ils appuient toute leur pr\u00e9tention h\u00e9g\u00e9monique ; mais s’ils ont pris ce risque alors qu’il est si peu dans la nature am\u00e9ricaine de prendre des risques contrairement aux fables \u00e0 ce propos, c’est simplement parce qu’ils ignoraient qu’il y avait risque. Encore plus que leurs admirateurs inconditionnels de par le monde et les s\u00e9minaires d’experts, les Am\u00e9ricains ont cru \u00e0 leur puissance absolue, une puissance au-dessus et au-del\u00e0 des normes communes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEt ils y croient, nous voulons dire : ils continuent \u00e0 y croire . C’est l\u00e0 que se trouve la principale difficult\u00e9 de ce que propose le Dr. Weinstein dans son texte publi\u00e9 ce jour par le groupe d’analyse PINR, ou Power and Interest News Report<\/a>, et que nous reproduisons ci-dessous. Le texte de Weinstein est particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressant, d’abord parce que c’est un des premiers aux USA qui s’attaque directement \u00e0 ce probl\u00e8me qui est aussi un tabou, et qui est exprim\u00e9 par cette phrase : \u00ab The most severe consequence of America’s failed adventure in Iraq is its exposure of American military limitations and vulnerabilities.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWeinstein envisage ce que pourront faire les Am\u00e9ricains pour rem\u00e9dier \u00e0 ces faiblesses, tant sur le plan militaire directement, tant sur le plan diplomatique indirectement. Des choix douloureux devront \u00eatre faits. Pour notre part, comme nous l’avons sugg\u00e9r\u00e9 plus haut, nous n’\u00e9cartons pas l’hypoth\u00e8se d’un establishment<\/em> militaire refusant d’accepter la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 des faiblesses militaires US, refusant d’y rem\u00e9dier, s’ent\u00eatant dans le d\u00e9veloppement de la formule en place, etc, cela avec des d\u00e9chirements internes tr\u00e8s forts \u00e0 cause de l’existence de franges r\u00e9formistes de plus en plus exasp\u00e9r\u00e9es, et \u00e0 cause de l’existence de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 irakienne. Les observations de Weinstein sont rationnellement justes et fond\u00e9es, il est moins s\u00fbr qu’elles soient reprises \u00e0 Washington o\u00f9 l’apparente rationalit\u00e9 cache bien des attitudes d\u00e9raisonnables.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe vrai probl\u00e8me des militaires US est bien qu’ils ne sont pas tomb\u00e9s dans le travers classique de se pr\u00e9parer pour la derni\u00e8re guerre mais qu’ils ont invent\u00e9 un nouveau travers, tr\u00e8s high tech<\/em> et tr\u00e8s am\u00e9ricaniste : se pr\u00e9parer pour la guerre qu’ils voudraient et aimeraient faire. Comme le montre l’Irak, cette guerre n’a rien \u00e0 voir avec la r\u00e9alit\u00e9. Le dilemme strat\u00e9gique sera donc entre la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 et le virtualisme (continuer \u00e0 affirmer que la guerre irakienne n’est pas la bonne, que les USA doivent pr\u00e9parer leur guerre). Connaissant Washington, on se permettra de ne pas donner cher de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Rebuild or Retreat: America’s Strategic Dilemma<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, June 15, 2004, PINR<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe most severe consequence of America’s failed adventure in Iraq is its exposure of American military limitations and vulnerabilities.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe failures of the intervention are manifold. Some of them can be chalked up to<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpoor planning and excessive optimism both fueled by utopian neo-conservative<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tideology but others have revealed structural weaknesses.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJust to name a few of the latter: reliance on private contractors to perform key missions at inflated prices, flawed intelligence, overuse of reserve troops, redeployment of troops from South Korea and extensions of the duration of combat duty. All of the foregoing point to the same root problem: the United States military is underforced for any major project of nation building in absolute numbers and, more importantly, in the distribution of specialties.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe occupation has revealed that America lacks the capacity to neutralize insurgent movements, run prisons effectively, procure actionable intelligence and conduct successful public relations. Most importantly, it has proven unable to provide the basic function of government: personal security in the forms of public safety and basic services.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe world now knows that there will not be another pre-emptive war launched by the United States in the near or medium term. Not only is America tied down in Iraq, but it showed that it is ill-equipped and ill-prepared for nation building in the weakest member of the axis of evil the one that had been beaten down by economic sanctions and that harbored an anti-regime population, except for the Ba’athists and their tribal connections. American defense intellectuals and security leadership are aware of the reassessment of American power that is<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\toccurring globally, and the dilemma that it poses for American strategic policy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe hard choice that now faces the United States is whether to rebuild its military power so that it can undertake not only wars, but their aftermaths; or to retreat into a more defensive posture, opening the way to multi-polarism. Each option has its costs and its benefits. Which one is chosen will depend on the decisions of the security leadership in the United States and its ability to persuade or frighten the American public to accept its policies.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt is most likely that either a Kerry or a Bush administration will try to restore a multilateral foreign and military policy in which the United States is the dominant partner, making the move to rebuild American military power to meet the demands of future nation building efforts the most probable choice of the security leadership. If so, the military will have to be expanded in size, and investment will have to be made in labor-intensive skilled specialties such as intelligence, policing and civil affairs. The problem is getting the personnel and paying for the expansion.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe stark reality that the United States and its population will have to make sacrifices if America is to regain its power will probably play a very small role in the 2004 presidential campaigns, but will only be brought forward after the next administration takes office. The means to restoring American power are simply politically unacceptable in an election year.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe need to expand the number of troops brings to the forefront the possibility of activating the draft. Current proposals for a draft for example, Congressman Charles Rangel’s would not allow college deferments and would place women in the pool. The upper-middle class, including its Republican members, would resist a draft that would include its children, and social conservatives would resist a draft that would include women. Yet there would be<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tequal resistance from the working class, economically disadvantaged minorities and the left, if those provisions were dropped.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThere is also a high likelihood of the appearance of a broad anti-draft movement on campuses if a conscription policy is pursued. Other issues concern whether a draft would install universal national service or would conscript a relatively small portion of the entire pool. In the first case, public resistance would be formidable; in the second case, an element of arbitrariness and sense of injustice would create chronic social resentment.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAttempts to expand the military without a draft would require attracting recruits particularly those capable of learning needed specialties through higher pay scales and easier enlistment terms, increasing the cost of expansion. In any scenario, rebuilding for nation building capability will be expensive. Private contracting will be no solution; its use in Iraq was predicated on a quick victory and a short aftermath. Will the wealthier portion of the American public that has benefited from lower tax rates be willing to surrender its<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tadvantages in order to fund military rebuilding? Will powerful interest groups and broad sectors of the public seeking to expand medical benefits be willing to see Medicare downsized? Will major financial interests sit by while deficits mount? What about competing budgetary demands for homeland security and squeezed social services?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn addition to the probable domestic resistance against any serious rebuilding program, the United States will not be able to count on early cooperation from other powers if it makes the effort. Traditional allies will be tentative as they assess the level of American commitment, and they will have to be responsive to their own publics, which are at best distrustful of American aims. More independent powers like Russia, China and India will be tempted to be<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tobstructionist. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAfter the November election, policymakers will confront the hard choice between pushing for measures that demand sacrifices from the public or retracting the potential projection of American power. If the decision is made to try to rebuild, the ensuing domestic conflict will deepen existing divisions in American society and create new ones, further impairing American power, at least in the short run, by weakening popular consensus on foreign policy. If the decision is made not to try to rebuild, America will not retreat entirely to its<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tfortress, but will quietly concede its influence to regional powers, intensifying the drift toward multi-polarism.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNeo-conservative strategic doctrine has stressed threats from hostile or potentially hostile nation states. Internationalist strategic doctrine has stressed threats from failed states and the transnational Islamist revolutionary movements. In both cases, the assumption has been made that America and its allies simply had to mobilize and redirect present resources properly against the threats.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNow the situation has changed. Advocates of both paradigms are faced with the same requirement to fight for rebuilding in order to fulfill their strategic designs. Look for the crunch to come after November. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le dilemme strat\u00e9gique des USA : sa faiblesse militaire 15 juin 2004 L’un des aspects les plus importants de l’aventure irakienne des USA, c’est la mise en \u00e9vidence des faiblesses de la puissance militaire US. Peu d’experts auraient pu oser faire une telle analyse avant l’Irak. Aujourd’hui, cette analyse est, comme on dit chez ces… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66004","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66004","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66004"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66004\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66004"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66004"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66004"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}