{"id":66011,"date":"2004-06-27T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-06-27T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/06\/27\/un-cas-decole-comment-les-americains-ont-fabrique-un-leader-irakien-anti-americain\/"},"modified":"2004-06-27T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-06-27T00:00:00","slug":"un-cas-decole-comment-les-americains-ont-fabrique-un-leader-irakien-anti-americain","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/06\/27\/un-cas-decole-comment-les-americains-ont-fabrique-un-leader-irakien-anti-americain\/","title":{"rendered":"Un cas d’\u00e9cole : comment les Am\u00e9ricains ont fabriqu\u00e9 un leader irakien anti-am\u00e9ricain<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un cas d’\u00e9cole : comment les Am\u00e9ricains ont fabriqu\u00e9 un leader irakien anti-am\u00e9ricain<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t28 juin 2004 Ce texte du groupe PINR (Power and Interest News Report), de Erich Marquardt, nous appara\u00eet particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressant dans la mesure o\u00f9 il d\u00e9taille avec minutie et pr\u00e9cision la fa\u00e7on dont la puissance et l’influence de Moqtada Al-Sadr ont grandi en quelques mois en Irak, jusqu’\u00e0 faire du jeune chef religieux un leader important de l’opposition officielle aux Anglo-Saxons et \u00e0 l’\u00e9quipe irakienne mise en place par les Anglo-Saxons, alors que cette opposition a d\u00e9marr\u00e9 avec une insurrection radicale arm\u00e9e qui aurait d\u00fb normalement le marginaliser.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe destin de Sadr, et la fa\u00e7on dont les Am\u00e9ricains l’ont suscit\u00e9 et favoris\u00e9, repr\u00e9sentent un cas d’\u00e9cole du d\u00e9sastre am\u00e9ricain en Irak. D’une fa\u00e7on syst\u00e9matique, toutes les actions am\u00e9ricaines tendent \u00e0 renforcer les forces qu’elles sont cens\u00e9es r\u00e9duire. La puissance am\u00e9ricaine, si sup\u00e9rieure \u00e0 tout ce qui peut lui \u00eatre oppos\u00e9, semble conduite, d\u00e8s qu’elle entre en action, \u00e0 donner \u00e0 ses adversaires des moyens et des moyens, non seulement pour la combattre, mais, finalement, pour s’affirmer avantageusement face \u00e0 elle. C’est un processus \u00e0 la fois extraordinaire et fascinant, qui se retrouve en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral dans la plupart des autres manifestations de la puissance am\u00e9ricaine. Le destin de Sadr est une mesure de la terrible faiblesse cach\u00e9e de la puissance US, peut-\u00eatre une faiblesse mortelle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Al-Sadr’s Success a Product of Washington’s Policies<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Erich Marquardt, PUNR, June 23, 2004<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFrom the early days of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, insurgents launched<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tguerrilla-style attacks against U.S.-led forces. In these first weeks of the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tinsurgency, the Iraqi population offered marginal support to the guerrilla<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmovement, since it was new and unknown. As the occupation wore on, the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tinsurgents gained more support due to the popular anger held by much of Iraq’s<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpopulation over the instability brought by U.S.-led forces. Nevertheless, the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tinsurgency still lacked a central unifying figure for disenfranchised and<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmarginalized Iraqis to gravitate towards. This vacuum has now been partially<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tfilled by the young Shi’a leader, Moqtada al-Sadr.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAl-Sadr, who is said to be about 31 years old, is the son of respected Shi’a<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tcleric Mohamed Sadeq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tParty in 1999 due to his outspoken criticism of its policies. The rest of<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tal-Sadr’s family — including his two older brothers and a well-known uncle —<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\twere also murdered by Ba’ath Party operatives.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDespite his family connections, al-Sadr never quite had the popularity or<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\trespect required to make him an important leader. His power resonated from his<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tprivate militia known as the Mehdi Army. Shortly after the invasion, al-Sadr and<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\this militia recognized the power vacuum that had been created and quickly went<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tinto action by supplying food and essential supplies to Iraqis suffering the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\thardships of war.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut it was his public, charismatic and outspoken defiance of the U.S.-led<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\toccupation that earned him the most support. Up until al-Sadr’s blunt criticism<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tof U.S. policies, none of Iraq’s other prominent leaders would risk speaking out<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tagainst Washington. Fearing that such action would cause the U.S. to silence<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthem, or marginalize them from power, these leaders remained relatively neutral,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tdeciding that the best way to achieve their interests was through cooperation<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tand sacrifice with Washington.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAl-Sadr, on the other hand, dismissed such concern with a wave of his hand,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tcalling his militia into action and engaging in open warfare with U.S.-led<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tforces. His outspoken rhetoric can be summed up in a statement released on his<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\twebsite after he launched his uprising: \u00a0\u00bbIf our patience is exhausted, we will<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tturn into powerful volcanoes of anger that will not leave any of the infidel<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\toccupier’s soldiers safe.\u00a0\u00bb The size and dedication of al-Sadr’s militia caught<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tU.S. military leaders off-guard, and al-Sadr managed to bring an unacceptable<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tlevel of casualties to U.S.-led forces, raising domestic alarm back in the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUnited States.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAl-Sadr’s intransigence continued, and the failure of Washington to<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tappropriately isolate him among the Iraqi population made it difficult to stunt<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\this growing power. His bold actions spoke to the popular anger held by many<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIraqis over the failure of the U.S. to stabilize Iraq. After his April uprising,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tal-Sadr’s popularity quickly surged, making it unwise for U.S. forces to<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\teliminate him from the power equation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIndeed, now al-Sadr represents a whole movement, and he has the sympathy of a<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tlarge swath of the Iraqi population. For example, in May the Coalition<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tProvisional Authority conducted a poll of Iraqis’ attitudes toward al-Sadr. They<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tfound that 81 percent of those surveyed looked more favorably upon al-Sadr after<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\this uprising than they did before.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis has made him politically untouchable, which explains why the U.S. has been<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tnegotiating with him rather than assassinating or arresting him. Furthermore,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe failure of other prominent Shi’a leaders, such as Grand Ayatollah Ali<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tal-Sistani, to condemn al-Sadr has also worked to his advantage.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNow, after earning the necessary amount of popularity to turn him into a major<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tactor in Iraqi politics, al-Sadr has said he will call his militia home and<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tinstead join the political process. \u00a0\u00bbEach of the individuals of the Mehdi Army,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe loyalists who made sacrifices … should return to their governorates to do<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ttheir duty,\u00a0\u00bb ordered a statement released by al-Sadr.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt is likely that al-Sadr’s decision to enter the Iraqi political process will<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tbear fruit since he is presently one of the most popular figures in Iraq.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBecause of this, Washington has been forced to sit on its hands for the moment<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tand accept his political gestures even though he is still technically wanted on<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmurder charges. Indeed, Washington earlier vowed to \u00a0\u00bbcapture or kill\u00a0\u00bb al-Sadr,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tbut his popularity has forced the Bush administration to modify its threats, now<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tsaying that al-Sadr’s fate will be decided by the new interim government.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAl-Sadr’s success at turning himself into a force that must be contended with<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\thas brought impressive results. He now has instant credibility in Iraqi<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpolitics, which can be seen by the open invitation delivered to him to attend<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe July political conference to select a national council that will advise<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIraq’s interim government.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFuad Maasum, the chairman of the committee in charge of organizing the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tconference, assured, \u00a0\u00bbMoqtada al-Sadr has begun to transform his militia into a<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpolitical organization, which is considered a positive step and his movement has<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\troots in the country.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHow far national leaders have been willing to go to accommodate al-Sadr is<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tevident in the fact that they are already ignoring a decree just passed in<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBaghdad. The anti-militia decree prevents individuals from entering the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpolitical process unless they have been out of their militia for three years.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAl-Sadr, who does not fit this profile, is being invited anyway, simply because<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tnot inviting him would keep him marginalized, which would lead him to continue<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\this violent resistance against U.S.-led forces.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTherefore, ironically, al-Sadr is a threat to Washington’s goals in Iraq, yet<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\this power was indirectly delivered to him by that same force he is fighting<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tagainst. Washington’s attempts to marginalize and eliminate al-Sadr have taken<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ttoo long, and any future action toward this end seriously risks turning him into<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ta martyr that could ignite a powder keg of popular Shi’a resistance against<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tU.S.-led forces.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un cas d’\u00e9cole : comment les Am\u00e9ricains ont fabriqu\u00e9 un leader irakien anti-am\u00e9ricain 28 juin 2004 Ce texte du groupe PINR (Power and Interest News Report), de Erich Marquardt, nous appara\u00eet particuli\u00e8rement int\u00e9ressant dans la mesure o\u00f9 il d\u00e9taille avec minutie et pr\u00e9cision la fa\u00e7on dont la puissance et l’influence de Moqtada Al-Sadr ont grandi… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66011","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66011","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66011"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66011\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66011"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66011"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66011"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}