{"id":66014,"date":"2004-06-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-06-29T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/06\/29\/rip-regime-change\/"},"modified":"2004-06-29T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-06-29T00:00:00","slug":"rip-regime-change","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/06\/29\/rip-regime-change\/","title":{"rendered":"RIP, \u201cregime change\u201d\u2026<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

RIP, regime change<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t29 juin 2004 Michael A. Weinstein est un analyste \u00e0 suivre. On a d\u00e9j\u00e0 lu un de ces textes, o\u00f9 Weinstein est l’un des rares \u00e0 analyser le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne capital de la mise en \u00e9vidence des tr\u00e8s graves faiblesses des forces US<\/a> durant la guerre et l’apr\u00e8s-guerre en Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWeinstein a l’immense avantage, pour un historien et un analyste am\u00e9ricain, d’appeler en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral un chat un chat, de ne pas se payer de mots, d’identifier pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment ce que sont les USA et ce qu’est leur politique. Nous publions un autre texte de lui, publi\u00e9 d’abord par le groupe PINR<\/a>, sur la question de la strat\u00e9gie du changement de r\u00e9gime. On m\u00e9ditera, comme un exemple assez remarquable, combien de choses inhabituelles et vraies, et inhabituelles parce que vraies, Weinstein nous dit sur l’Am\u00e9rique depuis 1945, en un seul paragraphe comme celui-ci, par rapport au langage sucr\u00e9 et plein d’une mielleuse morale de notre conformisme courant, :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Since the end of World War II, the strategic aim of the United States has been<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tto be the military guarantor of the capitalist market system, gaining thereby the economic benefits that follow from performing the role of protector. Both the Cold War and decolonization forestalled the possibility of conquest, so the operative policy became regime change wherever the United States judged that its basic interest was threatened.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCette fois, Weinstein propose une r\u00e9flexion sur la question strat\u00e9gique du regime change<\/em>, qui repr\u00e9sente le but affich\u00e9 de la nouvelle strat\u00e9gie US d\u00e9cid\u00e9e en 2002. Pour Weinstein, l’\u00e9chec irakien repr\u00e9sente l’\u00e9chec de cette strat\u00e9gie, mais un \u00e9chec infiniment plus grave que celui d’une strat\u00e9gie vieille de deux ans et con\u00e7ue dans la fi\u00e8vre d’une atmosph\u00e8re post-9\/11, dans la mesure o\u00f9 la strat\u00e9gie du regime change<\/em> est en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 la strat\u00e9gie non-dite des Etats-Unis depuis 1945, et dite clairement depuis 2002 (merci, GW).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe paragraphe cit\u00e9 ci-dessus l’indique bien d’ailleurs, tout comme il a le m\u00e9rite de bien \u00e9claircir le r\u00f4le des USA, comme \u00ab military guarantor of the capitalist market system<\/em> \u00bb, \u00e9galement depuis 1945. Cela r\u00e9duit \u00e0 ses justes proportions toutes les j\u00e9r\u00e9miades qui suivirent 9\/11 sur une \u00e9poque nouvelle, sur le choc des civilisations, la guerre contre la terreur et le reste. (Cela nous confirme dans notre conviction que 9\/11 n’a d’importance, mais fondamentale, \u00e9norme celle-l\u00e0, et m\u00eame r\u00e9volutionnaire jusqu’aux fondements, que dans le seul domaine de la psychologie US.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous sommes moins partisans de l’analyse plus g\u00e9opolitique que fait Weinstein dans la deuxi\u00e8me partie de son texte, justement parce qu’elle n’est que g\u00e9opolitique et ne tient gu\u00e8re compte de la situation et de l’\u00e9volution psychologiques des USA, pour nous le facteur essentiel. Mais ce sont l\u00e0 des divergences de forme, des divergences de choix sur les sujets \u00e0 \u00e9tudier. Weinstein est un analyste int\u00e9ressant \u00e0 suivre parce qu’il n’a pas l’esprit encombr\u00e9 par la rh\u00e9torique virtualiste dans les jugements qu’il porte sur les choses.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Containment or Concession: The Eclipse of Regime Change<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, PINR, June 28, 2004<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUnder the pervasive uncertainty about whether the general pattern of world<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpolitics will mark a restoration of multilateralism with American leadership or<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ta drift toward multi-polarism, strategic options present themselves to the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUnited States. Those options define the alternative goals for American foreign<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tand security policy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMaking the American decisional position the major determinant of the pattern of<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tworld politics does not imply a preference for American power. It is simply<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\trecognition that the present global balance of power remains heavily weighted in<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tfavor of the United States, in the sense that other powers are primarily<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tresponsive to American behavior rather than autonomous initiators. The only<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\texceptions are the Islamic revolutionary movements that cross-cut state power<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpolitics and are chronically disadvantaged by their failure to possess or be<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tprotected by a state apparatus.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSince the end of World War II, the strategic aim of the United States has been<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tto be the military guarantor of the capitalist market system, gaining thereby<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe economic benefits that follow from performing the role of protector. Both<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe Cold War and decolonization forestalled the possibility of conquest, so the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\toperative policy became regime change wherever the United States judged that its<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tbasic interest was threatened.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe utopia of American security policy is a world of \u00a0\u00bbmarket democracies\u00a0\u00bb with<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tstable representative institutions, open to trade and investment, and policed by<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe United States. Short of that ultimate goal, any regime that plays ball with<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe market system and does not threaten other states within that system has been<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tacceptable. In the worst case, there has been tolerance of dictatorships that<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\toppress segments of their populations and engage in wholesale corruption — a<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tprescription for long-term instability.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Regime Change<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlthough the term \u00a0\u00bbregime change\u00a0\u00bb has only become current in the past decade<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\twith the rise of neo-conservative influence in American policymaking, the policy<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthat bears its name has been operative for more than fifty years. One need only<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthink of Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Grenada, Panama and Kosovo to grasp the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tconsistency of that policy. Regime change will continue to be the desired<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\toutcome of American strategy, as long as the United States remains the major<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmilitary power in the world. Whatever ideological differences that they might<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\thave, American security elites are united in the understanding that America’s<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpower advantage does not result from its economic strength or its cultural<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tappeal, but from its credibility as a protector of the market system. Wealth and<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbsoft power\u00a0\u00bb are important, but they are not decisive.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe notion of regime change is elastic. At one extreme, it involves the outright<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tremoval and replacement of the policy leadership (government) of the target<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tstate, along with its administrative apparatus. This polar case applies to<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tquasi-totalitarian regimes, such as Ba’athist Iraq, in which the ruling party<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\thas staffed the apparatus with its partisans. Comprehensive regime change<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tinvolves military occupation of the target state, refashioning its constitution<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tand administration, and making sure the new personnel are favorable to the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmarket system and American security aims. It can be understood as nation<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\trebuilding.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAt the opposite pole from comprehensive regime change is influencing the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tgovernment of the target state to alter its policies so that they fall into<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tconformity with the American strategic design. During the diplomatic prelude to<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOperation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush at one point said that if Saddam Hussein<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tdisarmed voluntarily, his regime would have changed and a military intervention<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\twould not be necessary. As much of a stretch as Bush’s statement might seem, it<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tis analytically sound. The purpose of regime change is not the replacement of<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpolitical and military forms (democratization), or even of personnel, but<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ttransformation of policy to suit American interests. If that result is effected<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tby the target state’s government, it is no longer an adversary.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBetween the extremes of root-and-branch overhaul and persuasive instigation of<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpolicy change are all of the other means of effecting policy change from<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmeasures to remove governments by military action, through diplomatic and<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\teconomic sanctions, to support of proxies or opposition movements. All of those<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ttactics have been used, often in combination or successively, by the United<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tStates since World War II, and they are all still on the table, depending for<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ttheir employment on America’s capacity to exercise power.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe American experience of nation rebuilding in Iraq has shown that the United<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tStates is ill-equipped to undertake comprehensive regime change successfully in<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ta former quasi-totalitarian state. Although Iraq is still a \u00a0\u00bbwork in progress,\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tit now appears unlikely that it will become a stable market democracy in the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tnear to medium term. The limits of American power revealed by the Iraq<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\texperience have effectively removed comprehensive regime change from the table<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tfor the present and have impaired the effectiveness of more modest measures. The<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUnited States would still prefer regime change in states such as Iran and North<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tKorea, but it will probably have to settle for less.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Containment<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tShort of regime change, the most plausible apparent option is containment, which<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\thas also played a significant role in American security policy since World War<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tII. Containment — keeping the target state within bounds so that it does not<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\texpand its military capability and threaten other regimes — is a fall-back<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tposition that cedes to regime change when a more favorable configuration of<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpower develops. For example, the containment strategy against the Soviet Union<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\twas supplemented by support of anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which hastened<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe collapse of the Soviet system.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe most important consequence of the Iraq intervention for American power is<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe release of tendencies toward multi-polarism on the part of great powers like<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tChina, Russia and to a lesser extent the Franco-German combine. The second<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tglobal consequence is the increased difficulty of containing states and<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmovements that fall outside the order of globalization — specifically, the two<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tother members of the \u00a0\u00bbAxis of Evil\u00a0\u00bb — Iran and North Korea — and the stateless<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmovement of Islamic revolution.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tContainment of a target state is relatively easy when the United States has<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\toverwhelming military superiority and international support, as was the case<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tafter the Gulf War, despite the progressive tattering of the sanctions regime.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt becomes much more difficult when those two conditions are not present and the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ttarget state moves to expand its military power and\/or to mix in the affairs of<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tits neighbors. Such is the case for Iran and North Korea at present. When target<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tstates seek to change the balance of power in their favor, the United States is<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tfaced with the choice of trying to repel the moves or to make concessions that<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\terode containment.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Iran<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tIran is currently the greatest test of American security policy. The recent<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tface-off between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which Iran<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\twas able to avoid having its nuclear program become an issue for the United<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNations Security Council, indicates concession by the United States rather than<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\teffective containment. Iran has announced that it deserves a place in the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbnuclear club,\u00a0\u00bb and its path appears to be open at the moment.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn addition, Iran has close relations with the Shi’a factions in Iraq and is<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpreparing to exert as much influence as possible over post-occupation Iraqi<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpolitics. Whether Iran will try to gain a sphere of influence over an autonomous<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tShi’a mini-state, encourage dissidence in the Shi’a areas of a unified<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tfederalist Iraq, or collaborate with a Shi’a dominated Iraqi state, will depend<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ton how Iraqi politics gel.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhat is clear is that Iran is flexing its muscles. Part of the rationale for<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpre-emptive war in the American National Security Strategy of 2002 was to<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tdiminish the threats from other \u00a0\u00bbrogue states.\u00a0\u00bb The result of the first<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tapplication of that policy seems to have been the reverse of what was intended.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

North Korea<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tNorth Korea is also more favorably positioned than it was before Operation Iraqi<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFreedom. It is still free to pursue its nuclear weapons program and is presently<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tsimply trying to drag out the multilateral negotiations over it as long as it<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tcan, with the help of China. Again, the United States has very little leverage,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\thaving announced that it does not intend to launch a pre-emptive war against<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNorth Korea, which simply reflects political and military realities. Despite<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAmerican assurances that commitment of the United States to South Korea’s<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tdefense will be undiminished, the rebasing of American troops in the south of<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tthe country and the transfer of troops to Iraq can only heighten North Korea’s<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tresolve to pursue its security strategy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSouth Korea’s decision to send 3,000 of its troops to Iraq in the face of<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\twidespread public opposition indicates how seriously South Korea takes the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tprospect of an American concessionary drift. The South Korean government<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tunderstands that North Korea seeks to shift the balance of power on the Korean<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpeninsula decisively, and knows that South Korea needs a protector.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Islamic Revolution<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe third issue of containment faced by the United States concerns the stateless<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIslamic revolutionary movements, which also aim at regime change — the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\treplacement of the governments of states with majority Islamic populations with<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\ttheocratic regimes, ultimately to be subsumed under a revived Caliphate.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMischaracterized as a \u00a0\u00bbwar on terror,\u00a0\u00bb the conflict with Islamic revolution is,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tfor the United States, a struggle of counter-regime change. Military attacks by<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIslamic revolutionaries against the United States and its grand coalition of<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tallies are meant to further the goal of regime change by weakening American<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tresolve to prop up target states.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tContaining Islamic revolutionary movements was difficult enough before the Iraq<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tintervention; it is now even more so. Recent waves of violence against the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tnon-democratic regimes of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan indicated increased<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tinstability in those states, as does the resurgence of the Taliban in<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAfghanistan. The United States does not have the resources to bolster weak<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tregimes in the Islamic world, much less to engineer their democratization. It<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmust rely on whomever will help it contain the revolutionaries, even if in the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tlong run such alliances increase instability. The United States is constrained<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tto condone the dictatorships in Uzbekistan and Sudan, to the point of being<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tunable to act effectively to stop the ethnic cleansing\/genocide in the latter’s<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDarfur region.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHaving allowed a military enemy to grow up in the Islamic world, the United<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tStates cannot easily make concessions in a struggle which is an actual — not a<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpre-emptive — war. Appeasement is a theoretical possibility — and, like most<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tstrategies, has its possible benefits — but it is not a live policy option for<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tdomestic political reasons and, more importantly, because it would shift the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tbalance of power too far to the disadvantage of the globalization project.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGiven their clandestine nature, it is difficult to assess accurately the power<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tof Islamic revolutionary movements. What is clear is that they are still active,<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpossibly growing in strength and present a continuing challenge to a United<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tStates whose nation-state adversaries are emboldened and whose allies are<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tskeptical. The American advantage in the conflict with Islamic revolution is the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tsupport it gains from regimes around the world, on the basis of their own<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tself-interest. That advantage is considerable, but it is diminished by the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpresence of weak and unpopular regimes in the Islamic world, with which the<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUnited States is constrained to cooperate.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tAs the United States adjusts to its loss of power resulting from the Iraq<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tintervention, its security elites will attempt to recover capability for a<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tpolicy of regime change and to hold the lines of containment as that diplomatic<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tand military effort proceeds, with at present uncertain prospects for<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tsuccess. Along the way, Washington will probably find that it has to make some<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tmajor concessions.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.<\/em><\/strong>]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

RIP, regime change 29 juin 2004 Michael A. Weinstein est un analyste \u00e0 suivre. On a d\u00e9j\u00e0 lu un de ces textes, o\u00f9 Weinstein est l’un des rares \u00e0 analyser le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne capital de la mise en \u00e9vidence des tr\u00e8s graves faiblesses des forces US durant la guerre et l’apr\u00e8s-guerre en Irak. Weinstein a l’immense… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66014","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66014","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66014"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66014\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66014"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66014"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66014"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}