{"id":66062,"date":"2004-08-22T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-08-22T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/08\/22\/du-chaos-a-la-grande-peur-pour-survivre\/"},"modified":"2004-08-22T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-08-22T00:00:00","slug":"du-chaos-a-la-grande-peur-pour-survivre","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/08\/22\/du-chaos-a-la-grande-peur-pour-survivre\/","title":{"rendered":"Du chaos \u00e0 la Grande Peur pour survivre<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Du chaos \u00e0 la Grande Peur pour survivre<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t22 ao\u00fbt 2004 Un livre a fait grand bruit \u00e0 Washington ces derni\u00e8res semaines : Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror<\/em>. Il \u00e9tait pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 sous la signature d’un anonyme, par ailleurs identifi\u00e9 comme un officier de la CIA. La publication \u00e9tait sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent puisque Anonymus<\/em> \u00e9tait toujours en service actif dans la CIA. Le livre vient d’\u00eatre publi\u00e9 \u00e0 Londres alors que le nom de l’auteur commen\u00e7ait \u00e0 \u00eatre rendu public, notamment dans le Guardian du 20 ao\u00fbt<\/a> o\u00f9 Mike Scheuer (c’est le nom d’Anonymous<\/em>) donne sa derni\u00e8re interview d’anonyme avant de devoir se soumettre \u00e0 une proc\u00e9dure nouvelle impos\u00e9e par l’Agence \u00e0 cause de la publicit\u00e9 donn\u00e9e \u00e0 son nom. Dans tous les cas, ces derni\u00e8res circonstances rendent la publication de son livre encore plus exceptionnelle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAnonymous<\/em>\/Scheuer donne une vision extraordinairement critique de la gestion des affaires anti-terroristes par les deux administrations successives, Clinton et (surtout) GW Bush. Il montre que Ben Laden aurait pu ais\u00e9ment \u00eatre arr\u00eat\u00e9, l’attaque du 11 septembre emp\u00each\u00e9e, etc. Il montre les faiblesses et les contradictions de l’attaque contre l’Irak et condamne de fa\u00e7on particuli\u00e8rement s\u00e9v\u00e8re la guerre contre l’Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab There are a lot of angry spies at Langley, and one of the angriest is Mike Scheuer, a senior intelligence officer who led the Bin Laden station for four years. While some of his colleagues have vented their frustrations through leaks, Scheuer has done what no serving American intelligence official has ever done published a book-length attack on the establishment.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb His book, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, is a fire-breathing denunciation of US counter-terrorism policy. In it, Scheuer addresses the missed opportunities of the Clinton era, but he reserves his most withering attack for the Bush administration’s war in Iraq. He describes the invasion as an avaricious, premeditated, unprovoked war against a foe who posed no immediate threat but whose defeat did offer economic advantage. He even goes so far as to call on America’s generals to resign rather than execute orders that they know […] will produce more, not less, danger to their nation\u00a0\u00bb. Bin Laden, he believes, is not a lonely maverick, but draws support from much of the Islamic world, which resents the US not for what it is, but for what it does supporting Israel almost uncritically, propping up corrupt regimes in the Arab world, garrisoning troops on the Saudi peninsula near Islam’s most holy sites to safeguard access to cheap oil.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb America ought to do what’s in America’s interests, and those interests are not served by being dependent on oil in the Middle East and by giving an open hand to the Israelis, Scheuer argues. If we’re less open-handed to Israel over time we can cut down Bin Laden’s ability to grow. Right now he has unlimited potential for growing. What makes these comments the more challenging to the Bush administration is that they come from a self-described conservative and instinctive Republican voter.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb It seems extraordinary that Scheuer’s bosses allowed him to publish his book at all. They had already permitted him one book, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, written anonymously, but that was a more analytical work on Bin Laden and al-Qaida. Imperial Hubris is altogether different: a bitter polemic against orthodoxy and the powers that be.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Scheuer was given the green light only on condition that he stuck to a set of ground rules: he would continue to write as Anonymous, he would not reveal his job or employer, and he would refer only to information that is already open source ie in the public domain. Inevitably, however, given the controversy surrounding the book, his identity has been leaked (first by a liberal weekly, the Boston Phoenix, then this week by the New York Times). Even now, he sticks closely to his employers’ guidelines, refusing formally to confirm his identity, while describing his employers vaguely as the intelligence community. (It is for this reason that he is not permitted by the CIA to be photographed except in silhouette.) Having initially been allowed to give media interviews to promote his book, Scheuer was told earlier this month that he has to ask permission for every interview and to submit an outline of what he is going to say. So far, no interviews have been granted under the new guidelines.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLe livre de Anonymous<\/em>\/Scheuer est passionnant \u00e9galement parce qu’il confirme de fa\u00e7on \u00e9clatante plusieurs caract\u00e9ristiques de la situation du syst\u00e8me washingtonien et am\u00e9ricaniste, d’une fa\u00e7on qu’on peut juger compl\u00e8tement irr\u00e9futable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• L’absence d\u00e9sormais \u00e9vidente et consentie de discipline \u00e0 l’\u00e9gard d’une \u00e9ventuelle loyaut\u00e9 au gouvernement, c’est-\u00e0-dire au syst\u00e8me, c’est-\u00e0-dire \u00e0 l’am\u00e9ricanisme. Quelle que soit l’\u00e9ventuelle noblesse des sentiments de Anonymous<\/em>\/Scheuer, le fait est qu’il est intervenu d’une fa\u00e7on structur\u00e9e, publique, et bient\u00f4t officielle, avec son nom r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9, sans que la hi\u00e9rarchie de l’Agence prenne quelque mesure que ce soit. C’est comme si la CIA avait publi\u00e9 Anonymous<\/em>\/Scheuer, c’est-\u00e0-dire prenait \u00e0 son compte tout ce qu’il a dit. (Le nouveau directeur de la CIA, Goss, nomination sans vergogne d’un homme du clan Cheney, va tenter de changer cela au profit du clan dont il d\u00e9pend. On lui souhaite bonne chance, car la CIA est, aujourd’hui, quasiment en \u00e9tat d’insurrection.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• L’incapacit\u00e9 de l’administration centrale de riposter \u00e0 ces insurrections type-CIA. Anonymous<\/em>\/Scheuer a publi\u00e9, a donn\u00e9 des interviews, est devenu public et identifi\u00e9 sans que la moindre mesure ait \u00e9t\u00e9 prise contre lui. L’administration elle-m\u00eame n’a pas r\u00e9agi officiellement. Sans doute Anonymous<\/em>\/Scheuer va-t-il \u00eatre d\u00e9sormais, sous l’administration de Goss, l’objet d’attaques et de pressions s\u00e9v\u00e8res, et encore, ce n’est pas \u00e9vident. De toutes les fa\u00e7ons, les pires choses qu’il pourrait subir serait d’\u00eatre l’objet d’une guerre bureaucratique o\u00f9 lui-m\u00eame trouverait des alli\u00e9s ; en aucun cas, aucune action officielle n’est pr\u00e9vue contre un officier de la CIA qui a pris bien des libert\u00e9s avec les r\u00e8glements implicites du service public et de son devoir de r\u00e9serve. L’explication est simple, il n’y a plus ni r\u00e8gles, ni service public, ni devoir de r\u00e9serve \u00e0 Washington. C’est du chacun pour soi, et chaque agence, chaque d\u00e9partement pour ses int\u00e9r\u00eats contre le reste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Et tout cela, pour rendre publique une critique extraordinairement acerbe du gouvernement et de sa politique : \u00ab But even if the US scores some significant victories against al-Qaida, Scheuer believes the conflict with Islamic extremism will continue to spiral without a fundamental rethink of US priorities in Iraq and a relationship with Israel that drains resources, earns Muslim hatred and serves no vital US national interest. It is a depressingly pessimistic assessment. Ultimately, we only have the choice between war and endless war.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl n’y a pas de r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 donner aux critiques d’Anonymous<\/em>\/Scheuer. Comme chacun peut le d\u00e9couvrir chaque jour, il n’y a aucune politique irakienne , aucune politique contre la terreur, rien qu’une tendance g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, un emprisonnement dans une n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’action sans fin (\u00ab endless war<\/em> \u00bb, selon Anonymous<\/em>\/Scheuer). A contrario<\/em>, Anonymous<\/em>\/Scheuer met bien en \u00e9vidence l’absence de r\u00e9alit\u00e9 structur\u00e9e dans les \u00e9v\u00e9nements actuels, indirectement il d\u00e9monte et confirme l’existence d’un univers virtualiste. Aujourd’hui, \u00e0 bout d’arguments puisqu’ils sont confront\u00e9s aux catastrophiques \u00e9checs de la politique militariste men\u00e9e depuis le 11 septembre 2001, les politiciens du syst\u00e8me en sont r\u00e9duits \u00e0 l’argument ultime : la peur la plus primaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans le Guardian du 16 ao\u00fbt<\/a>, John Harris d\u00e9nonce la rh\u00e9torique qui tient aujourd’hui de politique compl\u00e8tement nihiliste (puisque sans le moindre but sinon de maintenir l’\u00e9tat actuel des choses pour ne pas se trouver confront\u00e9 \u00e0 ses erreurs et \u00e0 ses manipulations diverses des trois derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es) : \u00ab Be afraid, be very afraid, Cold war nostalgists are stoking fear because, to them, life without dread of imminent apocalypse is no life at all.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl s’agit donc, \u00e0 partir d’un discours d’un parlementaire travailliste comme d’autres, Bruce George, de la dialectique nihiliste dans laquelle sont tomb\u00e9s les derniers partisans de la guerre contre la terreur, dialectique nihiliste sans but, sans objectif, sans ambition, suivie simplement par les dirigeants du syst\u00e8me pour durer le plus longtemps possible l\u00e0 o\u00f9 ils sont. C’est dans tous les cas de cette fa\u00e7on qu’on observera, plus tard, ce genre d’agitation, qui n’est certainement pas du Big Brother<\/em> ou du 1984<\/em>, mais de la caricature de Prisunic<\/em> de Big Brother<\/em> et de 1984<\/em>. Il est dans un sens assez fascinant de voir \u00e0 quel niveau les \u00e9lites occidentales sont tomb\u00e9es, derri\u00e8re des dirigeants tels que Blair et Bush, pour pouvoir exister encore dans un semblant de leur fonction. Sans doute croient-ils par instants \u00e0 ce qu’ils disent, pour pouvoir se supporter eux-m\u00eames, et sans doute effraient-ils par instants leurs \u00e9lecteurs, le temps d’un discours ou d’une alerte fabriqu\u00e9e de toutes pi\u00e8ces. Pour le reste, le monde des dirigeants occidentaux, pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment anglo-saxons, est bien plus \u00e0 l’image du chaos que nous d\u00e9crit involontairement, c’est-\u00e0-dire par le simple fait d’exister, de publier et de parler, Anonymous<\/em>\/Scheuer. Un cynique dirait qu’il est temps qu’une attaque terroriste redonne un peu de vigueur \u00e0 tout cela.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuelques observations de John Harris :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Bruce George, the Labour MP and outgoing president of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly, addressed its annual session in Edinburgh last month. Terrorism, inevitably, was on his mind. The cold war was dangerous because one bomb could have finished off Scotland, he said, but it was an unrealistic threat because both sides were intimidated by each other into not using those weapons. You could rely on the Americans and Soviets being rational, but you cannot rely on these super terrorists negotiating or having any legitimate values. Their aim is to control the world, and that is not a negotiating position.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb He seemed to be claiming that all those postwar nuclear nightmares were misplaced, and such trifles as the Cuban missile crisis and President Reagan’s imagined limited nuclear war in Europe had probably been nothing to worry about but now that al-Qaida was here, we had genuine reason to be scared out of our wits. One could even discern a backhanded glee: at last, proper enemies.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb If George was attempting to differentiate between the nuclear fears of yore and alarm about al-Qaida, his words served to imply a strange kind of continuity. Their aim is to control the world in the minds of the more hot-headed cold warriors, wasn’t that exactly what the Soviets were plotting? The speech was another example of this summer’s most fashionable manoeuvre: the rolling-out of age-old archetypes by cold war nostalgists who are convinced that a life without fear of imminent apocalypse is no life at all.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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