{"id":66085,"date":"2004-09-20T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-09-20T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/09\/20\/lue-une-strategie-de-rupture-avec-lamerique\/"},"modified":"2004-09-20T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-09-20T00:00:00","slug":"lue-une-strategie-de-rupture-avec-lamerique","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/09\/20\/lue-une-strategie-de-rupture-avec-lamerique\/","title":{"rendered":"L’UE : une strat\u00e9gie de rupture avec l’Am\u00e9rique<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’UE : une strat\u00e9gie de rupture avec l’Am\u00e9rique<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t20 septembre 2004 Les autorit\u00e9s de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l’Union Europ\u00e9enne, ainsi que les ministres des pays de l’UE, ont re\u00e7u un rapport pressant ces pays de modifier leur strat\u00e9gie. L’hebdomadaire Defense News publie le texte ci-dessous<\/a>, (texte du 17 septembre, diffus\u00e9 par l’AFP) qui pr\u00e9sente le rapport en question. Le point remarquable, d’ailleurs mis en \u00e9vidence dans le texte, est la d\u00e9marcation tr\u00e8s nette qui est faite avec les conceptions am\u00e9ricaines.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Europe Urged To Rethink Security Strategy<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Europe should rethink its entire approach to security, focusing more on protecting people rather than defending countries in the post 9\/11 world, according to a new EU-commissioned report. The report, presented to EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana this week, proposes the creation of a new, 15,000-strong force comprising both soldiers and civilian experts, which could be deployed both in Europe and beyond.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Its authors want the EU to give a tighter focus to its European Security Strategy, a landmark document drawn up in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks. And they take issue with U.S. thinking in key areas. (U.S. national security advisor) Condoleezza Rice is wrong, said co-author General Klaus Reinhardt, former commander in Kosovo. It is the business of the military to escort children to school, if that makes people in conflict situations more secure. But we also need professional civilians like policemen, human rights monitors and aid workers to make human security interventions successful, added Reinhardt, one of the report’s co-authors.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The European Security Strategy, adopted by EU leaders last year defined five key global threats, including terrorism, failed states, weapons of mass destruction and organized crime. But the new 30-page report, entitled A Human Security Doctrine for Europe and providing food for thought at a meeting of EU defense ministers in the Netherlands, urges the EU to focus more on protecting individuals.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Missions should be aimed at protecting individuals through law-enforcement with the occasional use of force, rather than at defeating enemies or just separating warring parties, the authors said. The report’s most concrete proposal is for a Human Security Response Force, initially comprising some 5,000 civilian staff such as police, aid workers and lawyers, along with 10,000 military personnel.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The force would come under the command of the EU’s future foreign minister a new post which Solana will in theory take up in the next few years, assuming a first-ever EU constitution is ratified. Solana was presented with the report at a conference in Barcelona on Sept. 16, a day before arriving for two days of informal talks with Europe’s defense chiefs in the Dutch coastal resort of Noordwijk.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCe rapport confirme une tendance technique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui se d\u00e9veloppe au sein de la branche militaire de l’Union europ\u00e9enne : la perception que les op\u00e9rations \u00e0 conduire dans le nouvel environnement strat\u00e9gique impliquent autant l’appel \u00e0 des effectifs civils d’urgence (police, gendarmerie, services m\u00e9dicaux, l\u00e9gislatifs, de protection civile, etc) qu’\u00e0 des effectifs militaires. C’est un domaine o\u00f9 l’UE est particuli\u00e8rement \u00e0 l’aise, contrairement \u00e0 l’OTAN, parce qu’elle dispose d’une infrastructure et d’une culture civile tr\u00e8s d\u00e9velopp\u00e9es. Il semble bien que cette tendance soit d\u00e9sormais irr\u00e9sistible, d’autant qu’elle est amplement confirm\u00e9e a contrario<\/em> par les \u00e9v\u00e9nements en cours, en Afghanistan et surtout en Irak. Le choix d’interventions tout-militaire conduit \u00e9videmment \u00e0 des catastrophes incontr\u00f4lables.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBien \u00e9videmment, il s’agit d’un d\u00e9marcage radical des conceptions am\u00e9ricaines, exclusivement militaires. D’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0, une critique s\u00e9rieuse de ces conceptions am\u00e9ricaines est en cours, comme le montre ce texte de Timothy Garton-Ash, comment\u00e9 par ailleurs (Analyse, 9 septembre 2004<\/a>) sur ce site :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The contemporary [Bush’] analysis is as bad as the history. Again and again, the war on terror Wot, in Washington shorthand is compared to the second world war or the cold war<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t() <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But it isn’t, and it won’t. \u00a0\u00bbUtterly destroy him,\u00a0\u00bb cries Karl Rove. But who is he? Osama bin Laden? A Palestinian suicide bomber? An Iranian mullah? The unknown terrorist? The whole point of this new kind of struggle is that there is no single clearly identifiable leader or regime, no Hitler or Soviet Union, who can be thus destroyed. (Obviously, capturing Osama bin Laden, if he’s still alive, would certainly help.) And if we accept, as we should, that we face a serious array of new threats, among which Islamist terrorism plays an important part, what is the role of military force in reducing the threat? Much less than in earlier wars. If military force was 80% responsible for the west’s victory in the second world war, and perhaps through the impact on the Soviet Union of the arms race 30% responsible for the west’s victory in the cold war (and even that figure may be too high), it will only be 10% or perhaps 15% responsible for winning this one.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCette \u00e9volution technique est d’une importance strat\u00e9gique et politique consid\u00e9rable dans la mesure o\u00f9 elle d\u00e9tache irr\u00e9sistiblement les conceptions strat\u00e9giques et politiques europ\u00e9ennes des conceptions am\u00e9ricaines. Il s’agit d’une rupture strat\u00e9gique en train de s’op\u00e9rer, qui renvoie \u00e0 la rupture observ\u00e9e chaque jour dans la perception du monde, entre Am\u00e9ricains et Europ\u00e9ens. La rupture transatlantique, qui remplace le dialogue transatlantique, est en train de s’observer dans les d\u00e9cisions, forc\u00e9es par les faits. Elle rencontre une position g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Europ\u00e9ens, particuli\u00e8rement dans les petits pays g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement pro-am\u00e9ricains, qui, dans ce cas, d\u00e9veloppent naturellement une perception oppos\u00e9e \u00e0 celle des Am\u00e9ricains. A c\u00f4t\u00e9 de sa rh\u00e9torique apaisante, l’Europe est en train de s’\u00e9loigner de l’Am\u00e9rique jusqu’\u00e0 \u00e9voluer vers des positions qui risquent d’\u00eatre antagonistes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’UE : une strat\u00e9gie de rupture avec l’Am\u00e9rique 20 septembre 2004 Les autorit\u00e9s de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l’Union Europ\u00e9enne, ainsi que les ministres des pays de l’UE, ont re\u00e7u un rapport pressant ces pays de modifier leur strat\u00e9gie. L’hebdomadaire Defense News publie le texte ci-dessous, (texte du 17 septembre, diffus\u00e9 par l’AFP) qui pr\u00e9sente le rapport… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4350,3777],"class_list":["post-66085","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-civil","tag-solana"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66085","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66085"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66085\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66085"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66085"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66085"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}