{"id":66115,"date":"2004-11-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-11-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/11\/02\/ce-qui-attend-lelu-du-2-novembre-2004\/"},"modified":"2004-11-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-11-02T00:00:00","slug":"ce-qui-attend-lelu-du-2-novembre-2004","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/11\/02\/ce-qui-attend-lelu-du-2-novembre-2004\/","title":{"rendered":"Ce qui attend l’\u00e9lu du 2 novembre 2004<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Ce qui attend l’\u00e9lu du 2 novembre 2004<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t2 novembre 2004 L’importance de l’\u00e9lection am\u00e9ricaine du 2 novembre 2004 est aujourd’hui l’objet d’un consensus mondial. C’est un gain sans aucun doute de la globalisation que la plupart des citoyens inform\u00e9s du monde et la plupart de leurs dirigeants, Etats-Unis compris, consid\u00e8rent l’\u00e9lection am\u00e9ricaine comme historique. Nous avons au moins un consensus mondial dans un monde dont, pour cette occasion, les Etats-Unis font compl\u00e8tement partie. The Independent d’aujourd’hui<\/a> n’h\u00e9site pas \u00e0 titrer sur ce qui est d\u00e9sormais un clich\u00e9 : \u00ab A day that will decide the fate of the world<\/em> \u00bb. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous aurions tendance \u00e0 \u00eatre beaucoup plus mesur\u00e9s, \u00e0 voir dans ces jugements beaucoup d’\u00e9motion li\u00e9e au symbolisme du jour, \u00e0 la rh\u00e9torique sur la d\u00e9mocratie et l’acte du citoyen et ainsi de suite. Le pr\u00e9sident \u00e9lu aujourd’hui, qu’il soit nouveau ou r\u00e9\u00e9lu, ne disposera que d’un choix limit\u00e9 quant \u00e0 l’orientation de sa politique, encore, bien s\u00fbr, s’il y a effectivement d\u00e9cision, puisqu’on sait combien est consid\u00e9r\u00e9e l’hypoth\u00e8se du blocage juridique avec une contestation des r\u00e9sultats<\/a>, pouvant conduire \u00e0 un blocage constitutionnel<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’\u00e9lu d’aujourd’hui trouvera en effet une situation nationale et internationale extr\u00eamement instable, avec des forces d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 en mouvement, une m\u00e9canique puissante qu’il est difficile, voire impossible de r\u00e9orienter. Le choc du choix d’aujourd’hui sera surtout psychologique, faisant croire que rien ne peut changer ou que tout peut changer dans la politique US, il n’est question, comme l’on voit, que de croyance. Ce choc psychologique a sans aucun doute son importance mais il sera vite nuanc\u00e9 par les \u00e9v\u00e9nements qui viendront confirmer combien l’homme le plus puissant du monde est \u00e9galement li\u00e9 \u00e0 des forces et \u00e0 des contraintes qui n’autorisent l’exercice de sa puissance que dans des voies extr\u00eamement \u00e9troites.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn peut en attendant sugg\u00e9rer deux textes qui permettent d’avoir une id\u00e9e de la situation qui attend l’\u00e9lu d’aujourd’hui, et des difficult\u00e9s, par cons\u00e9quent, qu’il devra affronter. Jamais, cela aussi, et surtout, est historique la situation dans ces deux domaines n’est apparue aussi instable et incertaine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Un texte du site WSWS.org<\/a> pr\u00e9sente les perspectives essentiellement int\u00e9rieures. WSWS.org est le site de la section US de la Ive Internationale (trotskiste), qui pr\u00e9sente un candidat du SEP (Socialist Equality Party). On conna\u00eet WSWS.org et l’on sait que ses analyses ne sont pas trop encombr\u00e9es de la rh\u00e9torique marxiste, et sont en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral bien inform\u00e9es. La perspective de WSWS.org semble souvent tr\u00e8s pessimiste mais ce pessimisme s’av\u00e8re souvent justifi\u00e9. Dans ce texte, WSWS.org met bien en \u00e9vidence le caract\u00e8re central du scrutin : la tension intense, la bipolarisation sont beaucoup plus le fait des votants que des candidats, qui sont assez proches l’un de l’autre sur les principaux probl\u00e8mes. Le signe \u00e9vident de cela est qu’un nombre important des \u00e9lecteurs du candidat d\u00e9mocrate le sont pour simplement s’opposer au candidat r\u00e9publicain.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The press is filled with commentaries noting the acute polarization in the presidential vote: the huge numbers attending rallies on both sides, the doubling of turnout in early and absentee voting, the dramatic increase in voter registration, the obvious intensity of popular feeling against Bush and his policies. There is an undercurrent of concern about the potential for individual eruptions of violence or even wider civil strife, particularly in response to the Republican Party’s unprecedented efforts to suppress voter turnout in minority working class areas.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb This political polarization is strangely disproportionate to the stated differences between the candidates. On the war in Iraq, whatever their disputes over its origins, both Bush and Kerry pledge to maintain the US occupation and achieve a military victory over the Iraqi resistance. Both subscribe to the doctrine of unilateral, pre-emptive US attack on any country deemed to be a potential threat, and both single out Iran and North Korea as the likely next targets. Both unreservedly support Israeli military violence against the Palestinian people.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The two candidates have clashed on some areas of domestic social policy, principally abortion, stem cell research and health care, but they agree on the fundamentals: defense of the profit system and the subordination of American society to the interests of giant corporations and the very wealthy. Both are multi-millionaire representatives of the financial aristocracy. Both were educated at Yale, having even been members of the same exclusive society at the elite universitySkull and Bones.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Kerry has identified himself as a capitalist (he is married to the billionaire heiress of the Heinz ketchup fortune) and explicitly rejects wealth redistribution as a goal of social policy. He has made balancing the federal budget his top domestic priority, pledging to scrap his promises of more affordable health care coverage and other social reforms if and when they come into conflict with deficit reduction.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Given the relatively narrow substantive differences between the Democratic and Republican parties, what accounts for the enormous tension over the outcome of the presidential vote?<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t• Le second texte (dans Newsweek, dat\u00e9 du 8 novembre<\/a>) est tr\u00e8s court mais il situe bien, et il mesure bien l’enjeu de l’\u00e9lection pour les relations internationales. Il est du vieil Henry Kissinger et renvoie \u00e0 ce qui fut l’obsession de l’ancien secr\u00e9taire d’\u00c9tat, pour un ordre international stable, \u00e9tabli \u00e0 l’avantage des Etats-Unis, selon les r\u00e8gles du r\u00e9alisme le plus ferme et le plus cynique quand il le faut. Kissinger identifie effectivement ce point fondamental parmi les t\u00e2ches qui attendent l’\u00e9lu du 2 novembre 2004 : \u00ab The newly elected president will have to lead an effort to define and then maintain an international system that reflects the new, revolutionary circumstances.<\/em> \u00bb On accepte ce diagnostic, tout en observant qu’il est peut-\u00eatre paradoxal, voire contradictoire, et dans tous les cas tr\u00e8s symptomatique, de confier au pays qui est le principal responsable du d\u00e9sordre qui a boulevers\u00e9 les relations internationales, la t\u00e2che de remettre en ordre ces relations internationales.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The newly elected president’s task is perhaps most analogous to that inherited by President Truman at the end of the Second World War. In 1945, the Soviet Union was emerging as a threat to the global equilibrium, while the war had left a vacuum in Central Europe. But the Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically definable. Today’s principal threats are abstract and mobile. Terror has no fixed address; it has attacked from Bali to Singapore, Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis, New York and Washington. In the 1940s, the solution to the crisis was straightforward, albeit difficult: to construct a defensive line in the center of Europe and an economic program to close the gap between public expectation and the reality of shortages that threatened domestic stability.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The contemporary security challenge arises from two unprecedented sources: terror caused by acts until recently considered a matter for internal police forces rather than international policy, and scientific advances and proliferation that allow the survival of countries to be threatened by developments entirely within another state’s territory. Truman could take the legitimacy of the international system for granted; the Atlantic alliance rallied America’s West European allies from the Second World War. The newly elected president will have to lead an effort to define and then maintain an international system that reflects the new, revolutionary circumstances.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ce qui attend l’\u00e9lu du 2 novembre 2004 2 novembre 2004 L’importance de l’\u00e9lection am\u00e9ricaine du 2 novembre 2004 est aujourd’hui l’objet d’un consensus mondial. C’est un gain sans aucun doute de la globalisation que la plupart des citoyens inform\u00e9s du monde et la plupart de leurs dirigeants, Etats-Unis compris, consid\u00e8rent l’\u00e9lection am\u00e9ricaine comme historique.… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66115","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66115","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66115"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66115\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66115"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66115"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66115"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}