{"id":66137,"date":"2004-11-20T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-11-20T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/11\/20\/comment-john-wayne-a-remporte-la-victoire-en-irak-et-en-afghanistan-aussi-au-fait-on-ne-vous-lavait-pas-dit\/"},"modified":"2004-11-20T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-11-20T00:00:00","slug":"comment-john-wayne-a-remporte-la-victoire-en-irak-et-en-afghanistan-aussi-au-fait-on-ne-vous-lavait-pas-dit","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/11\/20\/comment-john-wayne-a-remporte-la-victoire-en-irak-et-en-afghanistan-aussi-au-fait-on-ne-vous-lavait-pas-dit\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>Comment John Wayne a remport\u00e9 la victoire en Irak (et en Afghanistan aussi, \u2014 au fait, on ne vous l&rsquo;avait pas dit\u2026)<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Comment John Wayne a remport\u00e9 la victoire en Irak (et en Afghanistan aussi,  au fait, on ne vous l&rsquo;avais pas dit)<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t20 novembre 2004  Grotesque, tout le monde est grotesque dans cette affaire, laquelle est par ailleurs sanglante (centaines, milliers de morts irakiens, qu&rsquo;on s&#8217;empresse de classer dans la cat\u00e9gorie <em>insurgents<\/em>) mais qui cela (son caract\u00e8re sanglant) int\u00e9resse-t-il vraiment tant qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;Irakiens ? Ce g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des Marines (Lt. Gen. John Sattler, commandant le 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, qui a repris ( !) Falloujah) est aussi grotesque que John Wayne l&rsquo;\u00e9tait en parlant de la guerre (il l&rsquo;avait jou\u00e9e \u00e0 Hollywood mais s&rsquo;\u00e9tait bien gard\u00e9 de la faire) ; les journalistes sont grotesques, qui retranscrivent ces propos sans l&rsquo;ombre d&rsquo;une appr\u00e9ciation critique ; grotesques encore, ceux qui lisent cela sans pouffer d&rsquo;un rire inquiet devant tant de stupidit\u00e9 d\u00e9ploy\u00e9e par ceux qui conduisent et utilisent tant de force brutale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDonc, voici comment cela se passe (au passage, dans <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washtimes.com\/national\/20041119-124401-8720r.htm\" class=\"gen\">cet article du Washington Times<\/a> qui fait la une du journal vendredi, on apprend que la guerre est \u00e9galement finie, victorieuse, en Afghanistan, ce qui <a href=\"http:\/\/news.independent.co.uk\/world\/asia\/story.jsp?story=584408\" class=\"gen\">satisfera grandement les trafiquants de drogue<\/a>) : <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>The top Marine officer in Iraq declared yesterday that victory in the battle of Fallujah has broken the back of the Iraqi insurgency, while another commander in the war on terror said Osama bin Laden is all but cut off from his terrorist operatives.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The twin statements declare success on the two main war fronts  Iraq and Afghanistan  where the U.S. military is fighting a deadly insurgency and trying to create lasting democracies.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Lt. Gen. John Sattler, who commands the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq, told Pentagon reporters that 11 days after invading Fallujah, the one-time insurgent stronghold is secure, but not yet safe. His ground troops were carrying out a search-and-clear phase, he said.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Based on intelligence that shows Fallujah was an enemy command center, Gen. Sattler asserted, We feel right now that we have &#8230; broken the back of the insurgency, and we have taken away this safe haven.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Master terrorist Abu Musab Zarqawi is thought to have used Fallujah as his base for recruiting and deploying suicide bombers in what the military calls vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs).<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Gen. Sattler said the insurgency, in losing Fallujah, has lost your location and your means for command and control, you lose your lieutenants, which we have taken out of the Zarqawi network over the course of the last almost three months on a very precise basis. &#8230; And you also lose the turf where you&rsquo;re operating, the town that you feel comfortable moving about in, where you know your way about. Now you&rsquo;re scattered.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>He added, I believe, I personally believe, across the country, this is going to make it very hard for them to operate. And I&rsquo;m hoping that we&rsquo;ll continue to breathe down their neck.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn reste sans voix et pratiquement sans stylo (heureusement, il reste le traitement de texte) devant ces d\u00e9clarations, lesquelles sont si grotesques qu&rsquo;on en viendrait \u00e0 soup\u00e7onner une ironie au second degr\u00e9 qui nous aurait \u00e9chapp\u00e9. Un coup d&rsquo;il au g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Sattler ne nous laisse aucun doute (pas d&rsquo;ironie). Son visage n&rsquo;a m\u00eame pas en commun avec l&rsquo;inspirateur de la victoire la physionomie m\u00e2le et burin\u00e9e de Wayne. Sattler fait plut\u00f4t petit notaire de province, \u00e0 qui l&rsquo;ironie est tout \u00e0 fait \u00e9trang\u00e8re.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn a donc plut\u00f4t affaire \u00e0 un robot d\u00e9guis\u00e9 en notaire. Le Washington <em>Times<\/em>, qui soutient tout extr\u00e9miste, <em>neocon<\/em>, \u00e9vang\u00e9liste, etc passant \u00e0 port\u00e9e de plume, a fait des d\u00e9clarations du notaire, une manchette triomphale (on a oubli\u00e9 dans cette manchette la mention de la victoire en Afghanistan,  <em>too bad<\/em>)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVaguement conscient du ridicule de l&rsquo;application de cette consigne triomphaliste par son secr\u00e9taire de r\u00e9daction appliquant les consignes du r\u00e9v\u00e9rend Moon (propri\u00e9taire du Washington <em>Times<\/em>), le journaliste Rowan Scarborough, qui n&rsquo;est pas toujours syst\u00e9matiquement propagandiste, a jug\u00e9 prudent de glisser ce b\u00e9mol :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Some Pentagon officials say privately that they do not share Gen. Sattler&rsquo;s optimism.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>They said this week that the countrywide insurgency has shown itself to be an adaptable band of dedicated killers that likely will be able to recruit new members and sustain some level of violence for years, not just months.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Although Fallujah is considered secure in military terms, it is not cleared of insurgents, even though the Marines estimate that they along with Army soldiers and Iraqi security forces killed about 1,200 enemy fighters. Gen. Sattler said the coalition is now searching buildings among Fallujah&rsquo;s bombed-out rubble to make sure each is cleared of terrorists.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa question pos\u00e9e par cette sorte de texte est de savoir qui est le plus ridicule dans l&rsquo;exploitation des stupidit\u00e9s canardesques les plus grotesques  : le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de Marine au visage de notaire, les journalistes accr\u00e9dit\u00e9s au Pentagone, le Washington <em>Times<\/em> ? Le probl\u00e8me est g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, aussi bien au Marine Corps que dans la presse am\u00e9ricaine<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLaissons ces stupidit\u00e9s d\u00e9risoires et passons rapidement au s\u00e9rieux des choses. La destruction de Falloujah conforte un peu plus les Am\u00e9ricains dans leur strat\u00e9gie du d\u00e9sastre en Irak : frapper, frapper et encore frapper, avec toute leur aveugle puissance de feu, machine \u00e0 faire des morts et \u00e0 alimenter les rangs de la r\u00e9bellion qu&rsquo;il faudra bien appeler un jour r\u00e9sistance ; machine qui broie des innocents autant que la r\u00e9putation de l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique outre-mer.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;excellent commentateur William S. Lind, un des meilleurs commentateurs de l&rsquo;absurde guerre men\u00e9e en Irak, <a href=\" http:\/\/antiwar.com\/lind\/?articleid=3577\" class=\"gen\">nous a d\u00e9j\u00e0 dit<\/a> ce qu&rsquo;il faut penser de cette utilisation de la puissance de feu,  qu&rsquo;il nomme dans ce cas <em>lethality<\/em> (capacit\u00e9 de d\u00e9truire et de tuer) et capacit\u00e9 de <em>Force Protection<\/em>. (Consultez <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lewrockwell.com\/lind\/lind-arch.html\" class=\"gen\">les archives de Lind, sur LewRockwell.com<\/a> : il est rassurant de d\u00e9couvrir que le journalisme d&rsquo;analyse am\u00e9ricain peut <strong>aussi<\/strong> nous donner cela.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>We already have vast advantages over our Fourth Generation opponents in both lethality and protection, yet we&rsquo;re losing. That suggests there is rather more to Fourth Generation war than lethality and protection. Indeed, we have so much of both of those qualities that they may work against us more than for us. Recently, the lethality of U.S. Army attack helicopters was turned on a crowd of young men and boys gathered around a burning Bradley, with catastrophic results for our image among Iraqis. And our Force Protection already seals us off from the people we are supposed to be helping, turning us into an alien and threatening presence. At the mental and moral levels of war, we may need less lethality and protection rather than more.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette fa\u00e7on absurde de faire la guerre est par ailleurs d\u00e9crypt\u00e9e par un autre grand expert, Martin Van Clevde, de l&rsquo;universit\u00e9 de J\u00e9rusalem. Van Clevde explique <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lewrockwell.com\/orig5\/crevald1.html<D\" class=\"gen\">pourquoi l&rsquo;Irak est in\u00e9luctablement promis \u00e0 se terminer comme le Vietnam<\/a>, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire par une d\u00e9faite am\u00e9ricaine (et non pas un maintien du <em>statu quo<\/em>, un protectorat plus ou moins stable, etc,  non, une d\u00e9faite purement et simplement, et l&rsquo;image qu&#8217;emploie Van Clevde est bien celle de l&rsquo;\u00e9vacuation honteuse et dans la panique absolue de Sa\u00efgon par les Am\u00e9ricains, au printemps 1975). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>In other words, he who fights against the weak  and the rag-tag Iraqi militias are very weak indeed  and loses, loses. He who fights against the weak and wins also loses. To kill an opponent who is much weaker than yourself is unnecessary and therefore cruel; to let that opponent kill you is unnecessary and therefore foolish. As Vietnam and countless other cases prove, no armed force however rich, however powerful, however, advanced, and however well motivated is immune to this dilemma. The end result is always disintegration and defeat; if U.S troops in Iraq have not yet started fragging their officers, the suicide rate among them is already exceptionally high. That is why the present adventure will almost certainly end as the previous one did. Namely, with the last US troops fleeing the country while hanging on to their helicopters&rsquo; skids<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Comment John Wayne a remport\u00e9 la victoire en Irak (et en Afghanistan aussi, au fait, on ne vous l&rsquo;avais pas dit) 20 novembre 2004 Grotesque, tout le monde est grotesque dans cette affaire, laquelle est par ailleurs sanglante (centaines, milliers de morts irakiens, qu&rsquo;on s&#8217;empresse de classer dans la cat\u00e9gorie insurgents) mais qui cela (son&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66137","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66137","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66137"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66137\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66137"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66137"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66137"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}