{"id":66147,"date":"2004-12-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-12-03T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/12\/03\/en-irak-le-piege-se-referme-i-lamericanisation-de-la-guerre\/"},"modified":"2004-12-03T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-12-03T00:00:00","slug":"en-irak-le-piege-se-referme-i-lamericanisation-de-la-guerre","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/12\/03\/en-irak-le-piege-se-referme-i-lamericanisation-de-la-guerre\/","title":{"rendered":"En Irak, le pi\u00e8ge se referme (I): l’am\u00e9ricanisation de la guerre<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

En Irak, le pi\u00e8ge se referme (I): l’am\u00e9ricanisation de la guerre<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t3 d\u00e9cembre 2004 La d\u00e9cision, annonc\u00e9e le 1er d\u00e9cembre, que les forces en Irak vont \u00eatre augment\u00e9es (de 138.000 hommes \u00e0 150.000) repr\u00e9sente une r\u00e9elle d\u00e9faite politique pour les Am\u00e9ricains. (L’administration GW est incapable de la moindre pr\u00e9vision, comme elle l’a montr\u00e9 \u00e0 plusieurs reprises. Elle avait n\u00e9anmoins un plan implicite en Irak, jamais d\u00e9taill\u00e9 ni annonc\u00e9 officiellement comme une politique officielle mais simplement pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 au travers diverses d\u00e9clarations parcellaires et fuites officieuses. Ce plan implicite revient \u00e0 l’id\u00e9e qu’il fallait transf\u00e9rer le plus vite possible aux Irakiens les op\u00e9rations militaires, en m\u00eame temps que le pouvoir politique.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t[A noter qu’il s’agit en bonne partie d’une fausse d\u00e9cision d’augmentation du volume des forces. L’essentiel de l’augmentation sera obtenu en accentuant la m\u00e9thode de la prolongation de d\u00e9ploiement des forces en Irak. Les difficult\u00e9s inh\u00e9rentes au syst\u00e8me seront accentu\u00e9es (fatigue, tension, etc).] <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette d\u00e9cision d’accroissement des forces signifie un engagement am\u00e9ricain renforc\u00e9 mais aussi une intensification de la guerre, c’est-\u00e0-dire une am\u00e9ricanisation de la guerre. On peut alors avancer cette pr\u00e9vision : l’Irak devient de plus en plus le Vietnam, revu en version postmoderne par les conditions g\u00e9n\u00e9rales ; c’est-\u00e0-dire un Vietnam politiquement bien plus grave, qui se terminera dans des conditions bien pires, qui secoueront le r\u00e9gime washingtonien jusque dans ses tr\u00e9fonds.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThomas E. Ricks, dans le Washington Post du 2 d\u00e9cembre<\/a> pr\u00e9sente et explique cette d\u00e9cision selon, effectivement, l’id\u00e9e d’am\u00e9ricanisation de la guerre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The increase in troop strength, which had been hinted at by senior U.S. military officials for weeks, is driven primarily by the need to tamp down the Iraqi insurgency as the elections set for the end of January draw near. The purpose is mainly to provide security for the elections, but it’s also to keep up the pressure on the insurgency, Army Brig. Gen. David Rodriguez, deputy director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a Pentagon briefing.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Other military experts, however, said the escalation reflects the more intense nature of the war after the U.S.-led assault on the rebellious Sunni city of Fallujah, west of Baghdad.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The ferocity with which the war is being waged by both sides is escalating, said Jeffrey White, a former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst who is now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. It is not just that the number of incidents are increasing. The war looks to be changing in character.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Retired Army Col. Ralph Hallenbeck, who worked in Iraq with the U.S. occupation authority last year, said he is worried that the move represents a setback for the basic U.S. strategy of placing a greater burden on Iraqi security forces to control the country and deal with the insurgency. I fear that it signals a re-Americanization . . . of our strategy in Iraq, he said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Adding troops at this point is the opposite of what senior Pentagon officials expected when the war began in March 2003.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Before the invasion, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz dismissed an estimate by Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, that several hundred thousand troops would be needed to occupy Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government. \u00a0\u00bbI am reasonably certain that they will greet us as liberators, Wolfowitz told a congressional committee, and that will help us to keep requirements down.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The original war plan, which was based on that assumption, called for a series of quick reductions in troop levels in 2003, to perhaps 50,000 by the end of that year. A revision of that plan, devised 12 months ago, called for steady reductions this year.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Instead, occupation forces hit their lowest level last winter, bottoming out at about 110,000 in February. Then, in late March, the insurgency intensified and broadened, with heavy fighting in Shiite areas of south-central Iraq for the first time.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Since then, U.S. troop numbers have risen in response to the unexpected strength and growing sophistication of the enemy. Plan A what the U.S. actually did failed, and Plan B — the adaptations since the end of ‘major combat’ hasn’t worked either, so far, said retired Army Col. Raoul Alcala, who has served as an adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, referring to President Bush’s May 1, 2003, announcement that major combat operations had ended in Iraq.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLa d\u00e9cision d’am\u00e9ricanisation de la guerre, au moment o\u00f9 cette guerre appara\u00eet beaucoup moins dans les informations, signifie l’abandon de toutes les possibilit\u00e9s de retrait et de transfert de la responsabilit\u00e9 de la guerre aux Irakiens. Les \u00e9lections vont \u00e9videmment donner une forte repr\u00e9sentation, sinon le gouvernement, aux chiites, et les rapports des nouvelles autorit\u00e9s irakiennes avec le conflit (et les Am\u00e9ricains) vont devenir tr\u00e8s complexes, avec des possibilit\u00e9s d’affrontement, d’extension, de guerre civile, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes Am\u00e9ricains vont se trouver au coeur de cette m\u00eal\u00e9e irakienne, identifi\u00e9s comme la cause et la cible principales. Leur situation politique risque d’\u00eatre pire que celle qu’ils connurent au Vietnam, puisque m\u00eame l’autorit\u00e9 civile qu’ils ont suscit\u00e9e pourrait se retourner contre eux (ce qui ne fut pas le cas avec le gouvernement sud-vietnamien). L’embourbement sera complet et l’on peut envisager des cas o\u00f9 un d\u00e9sengagement d’urgence, dans une situation devenue trop grave pour les forces am\u00e9ricaines, pourrait devenir difficile, voire impossible.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDernier \u00e9l\u00e9ment : la notion de dur\u00e9e. L’id\u00e9e est que l’engagement US pourrait devenir consid\u00e9rablement plus long qu’on ne pr\u00e9voyait, jusqu’\u00e0 10 ans au moins. \u00ab This announcement makes it clear that commanders in Iraq need more troops and that this will be a long and very expensive process for the United States, said Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), a member of the Armed Services Committee who recently returned from a visit to Iraq. Reed, who served in the Army with the 82nd Airborne, also said in an interview that it is becoming increasingly clear that Iraqi forces will not be capable of taking over from U.S. forces for five to 10 years.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNotre appr\u00e9ciation est que cette indication de dur\u00e9e est d\u00e9fendable en th\u00e9orie mais pas du tout en pratique, et que les forces am\u00e9ricaines conna\u00eetront la d\u00e9faite, sous une forme ou une autre, bien avant ces dix ann\u00e9es. Comme le montrent les 20 derniers mois, les choses, en Irak, s’aggravent beaucoup plus vite qu’au Vietnam.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la question implicite de William S. Lind<\/a> est apport\u00e9e. Et la conclusion de ce m\u00eame Lind, en cas de r\u00e9ponse n\u00e9gative, (il donne une autre prospective d’aggravation de la situation en Irak, avec l’id\u00e9e d’une intervention de l’Iran) est \u00e9videmment compl\u00e8tement justifi\u00e9e : la d\u00e9faite am\u00e9ricaine est maintenant assur\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Between now and January, the Bush administration will have to decide whether or not to take the last dignified exit from Iraq. That is to announce before the Iraqi elections that we will be leaving soon after them. If Bush and his neo-con handlers miss this opportunity, our only choice will be to remain in Iraq until we are driven out in a humiliating defeat. Like the kid who knows he has to eat his spinach, we will be better off pretending to choose the inevitable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb What is the chance this will happen? Behind the scenes, a growing number of conservative leaders are working to make it happen. But events are moving the other way<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

En Irak, le pi\u00e8ge se referme (I): l’am\u00e9ricanisation de la guerre 3 d\u00e9cembre 2004 La d\u00e9cision, annonc\u00e9e le 1er d\u00e9cembre, que les forces en Irak vont \u00eatre augment\u00e9es (de 138.000 hommes \u00e0 150.000) repr\u00e9sente une r\u00e9elle d\u00e9faite politique pour les Am\u00e9ricains. (L’administration GW est incapable de la moindre pr\u00e9vision, comme elle l’a montr\u00e9 \u00e0 plusieurs… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66147","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66147","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66147"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66147\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66147"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66147"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66147"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}