{"id":66160,"date":"2004-12-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-12-16T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/12\/16\/en-irak-une-marche-vers-la-defaite-et-labime\/"},"modified":"2004-12-16T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-12-16T00:00:00","slug":"en-irak-une-marche-vers-la-defaite-et-labime","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/12\/16\/en-irak-une-marche-vers-la-defaite-et-labime\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>En Irak, une marche vers la d\u00e9faite et l&rsquo;ab\u00eeme<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">En Irak, une marche vers la d\u00e9faite et l&rsquo;ab\u00eeme<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t16 d\u00e9cembre 2004  Il y a toujours une lutte serr\u00e9e dans la gestion de la perception, comme disent les sp\u00e9cialistes d&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui de la communication, pour faire passer au second rang de l&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat des commentateurs et de leurs lecteurs la guerre en Irak. L&rsquo;enjeu est de taille : il s&rsquo;agit, par ce biais, de faciliter la r\u00e9conciliation euro-am\u00e9ricaine,  assez curieusement, comme s&rsquo;il y avait eu brouille. Pourquoi cette r\u00e9conciliation ? Parce qu&rsquo;on ne sait pas quoi faire d&rsquo;autre. Aujourd&rsquo;hui, la r\u00e9flexion de 99,5% des fonctionnaires europ\u00e9ens est limit\u00e9e \u00e0 l&rsquo;incantation permanente, avec encens chez certains, pour qu&rsquo;on retrouve les temps heureux de l&rsquo;entente transatlantique. La m\u00e9diocrit\u00e9 extraordinaire de la pens\u00e9e et du propos est \u00e0 mesure inverse de l&rsquo;importance des moyens de communication pour accr\u00e9diter une politique qui n&rsquo;a aucune chance d&rsquo;\u00eatre n\u00e9goci\u00e9e de quelque fa\u00e7on que ce soit, et qui ne se fera pas, simplement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t[Cette r\u00e9conciliation est attendue pour le voyage de GW Bush \u00e0 Bruxelles en f\u00e9vrier 2005. Des \u00e9missaires officieux de Washington sont partout en route pour annoncer la Bonne Nouvelle, comme Simon Serfaty [du CSIS de Georgetown University] qui se trouvait \u00e0 Bruxelles la semaine derni\u00e8re. (Serfaty, par sa mod\u00e9ration, est un \u00e9missaire favori vers les Europ\u00e9ens mod\u00e9r\u00e9s et anti-GW, qui peuvent ainsi croire \u00e0 la survie d&rsquo;une bonne Am\u00e9rique.) Cette r\u00e9conciliation  consistera en ceci : GW arrivant \u00e0 Bruxelles, ouvrant les bras et disant Oublions le pass\u00e9. Cela signifiera, pour les Europ\u00e9ens, s&rsquo;aligner sur Washington sans conditions mais d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on plus discr\u00e8te que ce qu&rsquo;on avait exig\u00e9 auparavant. La manuvre n&rsquo;a aucune chance d&rsquo;aboutir parce que les Europ\u00e9ens sont trop faibles pour exercer une telle pression sur leur politique, vers une vassalisation encore plus grande,  il faut tout de m\u00eame de la force pour d\u00e9choir davantage, comme le montre la litt\u00e9rature du vice et du p\u00e9ch\u00e9. De toutes les fa\u00e7ons, la situation en Irak, en aggravation acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e comme on le constate ici, ne le permettra pas. L&rsquo;Irak va nous exploser \u00e0 la figure avant notre tentative de r\u00e9conciliation.] <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEn effet, la guerre subsiste, malgr\u00e9 les pressions des services de communication et les escapades de Serfaty. Son \u00e9volution est consternante, son aggravation abyssale. Les derni\u00e8res \u00e9valuations sont particuli\u00e8rement inqui\u00e9tantes, avec des \u00e9valuations de source officielle am\u00e9ricaine montrant <a href=\"http:\/\/english.aljazeera.net\/NR\/exeres\/EABC42D9-9728-476A-988E-29C37FDFD98F.htm\" class=\"gen\">une am\u00e9lioration sensible de l&rsquo;organisation et de l&rsquo;action de la r\u00e9sistance<\/a>. Un signe significatif \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard est ceci, qui marque une perte de contr\u00f4le extr\u00eamement inqui\u00e9tante de la situation : \u00ab <em>The commander of the US Air Force announced on Tuesday that the military in Iraq had begun using C-130 military cargo aircraft to ferry some food and equipment high above dangerous roadways in order to relieve pressure on ground convoys.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOn insiste sur ce fait : cette \u00e9volution inqui\u00e9tante est admise par les militaires am\u00e9ricains ; elle est explicit\u00e9e par eux. (Encore ne s&rsquo;attarde-t-on pas trop ici sur <a href=\"http:\/\/csmonitor.com\/2004\/1216\/p01s01-usmi.html\" class=\"gen\">la situation interne des forces am\u00e9ricaines.<\/a>)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Air Force Lieutenant General Lance Smith, deputy chief of US Central Command, said on Wednesday that a bold, innovative insurgency is becoming more effective against US supply lines in Iraq and explosive attacks have slowed military operations there.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>They have had a growing understanding that where they can affect us is in the logistics flow. They have gotten more effective in using IEDs, said Smith, referring to improvised explosive devices hidden beside roads.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em> They may use doorbells today to blow these things up. They may use remote controls from toys tomorrow. And as we adapt, they adapt, he added.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Smith said US forces in Iraq now totaled 148,000 troops  up from 138,000 at the start of this month and near the 150,000 planned to protect national elections in January.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>But roadside explosives are hindering military operations and reconstruction nearly two years after the invasion. They cause us to re-route vehicles. They cause us to have to employ tactics&#8230; in avoiding them. And [they] cause us to have to convoy where maybe otherwise we would prefer to move in smaller numbers, Smith said. So it is having an impact.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tDernier \u00e9l\u00e9ment \u00e0 prendre en compte, d&rsquo;ailleurs illustr\u00e9 par les d\u00e9clarations du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Lance Smith (les militaires prenant leur distance de l&rsquo;optimisme officiel pour prendre date lorsqu&rsquo;on fera les comptes) : la d\u00e9sinformation volontaire et la cacophonie internes sont plus fortes que jamais. Plus que jamais, il y a une situation de virtualisme au cur de l&rsquo;administration GW, avec des \u00e9carts, voire des contradictions significatives et volontaires sur l&rsquo;\u00e9valuation de la situation. M\u00eame des parlementaires US s&rsquo;en aper\u00e7oivent, s&rsquo;en inqui\u00e8tent et s&rsquo;en offusquent.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>On Capitol Hill, Senator Evan Bayh of Indiana, a Democrat on the Senate armed services and intelligence committees, said Congress should look into why an assessment of the situation in Iraq by the top CIA official was very different from opinions expressed by the US ambassador in Baghdad, John Negroponte.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em> When you hear dramatically different opinions and assessments by officials of our government about the situation in Iraq in a matter of minutes, that bears further investigation as to why, Bayh said after a visit to Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The New York Times reported last week that the CIA&rsquo;s station chief in Baghdad had painted a bleak picture of Iraq in a classified cable and cautioned that security was likely to deteriorate unless the interim Iraqi government made significant progress in asserting its authority. The ambassador obviously has to try and put a better face on things and with some reason, there are other things going on that do give some reason for hope, said Bayh.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa situation en Irak est une bombe \u00e0 retardement. Son explosion, lorsque la gravit\u00e9 des \u00e9v\u00e9nements m\u00e8nera \u00e0 l&rsquo;un ou l&rsquo;autre revers majeur des Am\u00e9ricains, va constituer un \u00e9v\u00e9nement politique important et tr\u00e8s d\u00e9stabilisant. Plus que jamais, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lewrockwell.com\/lind\/lind48.html\" class=\"gen\">l&rsquo;analyse d&rsquo;un William S. Lind<\/a> sur l&rsquo;issue de la guerre est compl\u00e8tement justifi\u00e9e,  \u00e9tant admis que son hypoth\u00e8se sur un retrait US apr\u00e8s les \u00e9lections de janvier est \u00e9videmment, comme Lind lui-m\u00eame le laisse entendre, de plus en plus improbable, sinon inenvisageable et impossible. Pour GW et Washington, ce sera donc ceci : \u00ab <em>to remain in Iraq until we are driven out in a humiliating defeat.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Between now and January, the Bush administration will have to decide whether or not to take the last dignified exit from Iraq. That is to announce before the Iraqi elections that we will be leaving soon after them. If Bush and his neo-con handlers miss this opportunity, our only choice will be to remain in Iraq until we are driven out in a humiliating defeat.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>En Irak, une marche vers la d\u00e9faite et l&rsquo;ab\u00eeme 16 d\u00e9cembre 2004 Il y a toujours une lutte serr\u00e9e dans la gestion de la perception, comme disent les sp\u00e9cialistes d&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui de la communication, pour faire passer au second rang de l&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat des commentateurs et de leurs lecteurs la guerre en Irak. L&rsquo;enjeu est de taille&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[1012],"class_list":["post-66160","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-lind"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66160","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66160"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66160\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66160"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66160"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66160"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}