{"id":66162,"date":"2004-12-18T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-12-18T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/12\/18\/les-generaux-us-jouent-au-football-avec-la-realite\/"},"modified":"2004-12-18T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-12-18T00:00:00","slug":"les-generaux-us-jouent-au-football-avec-la-realite","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/12\/18\/les-generaux-us-jouent-au-football-avec-la-realite\/","title":{"rendered":"Les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US jouent au football avec la r\u00e9alit\u00e9"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US jouent au football avec la r\u00e9alit\u00e9<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t18 d\u00e9cembre 2004  Il est vrai que la lecture de ce que dit le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Casey (baptis\u00e9 pompeusement chef de la coalition) apr\u00e8s avoir lu <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=1302&#038;PHPSESSID=97f23ac49d15260009f8861b6c025dcd\" class=\"gen\">les nouvelles d&rsquo;avant-hier<\/a>, o\u00f9 le Lieutenant G\u00e9n\u00e9ral Lance Smith, adjoint du commandant en chef de US Central Command, nous annon\u00e7ait l&rsquo;am\u00e9lioration radicale des capacit\u00e9s de la r\u00e9sistance irakienne,  voil\u00e0 qui a de quoi nous arr\u00eater. D&rsquo;o\u00f9 notre question : Les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US nous prennent-ils pour des d\u00e9biles ?  mais aussi notre r\u00e9ponse : Non, ils continuent leur petite gu\u00e9guerre de gestion de la perception cousue de mensonges, de montages, de tricheries \u00e9hont\u00e9es (laquelle gu\u00e9guerre d\u00e9termine leur avancement et la mesure de leur influence au sein du syst\u00e8me politico-militaire de Washington).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMais d&rsquo;abord : que dit Casey ? En gros, il dit que la r\u00e9sistance en Irak est une illusion de puissance et que, contrairement \u00e0 ce qu&rsquo;on croit et ce qu&rsquo;on dit, tout va bien, de mieux en mieux, etc. (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.defenselink.mil\/news\/Dec2004\/n12162004_2004121619.html\" class=\"gen\">Bombs Create Illusion of Powerful Insurgency, Commander Says<\/a>, diffus\u00e9 par le canal officiel American Forces Press Service.) La derni\u00e8re en date parmi les explications relations publiques \u00e9tant que l&rsquo;explosion d&rsquo;une voiture pi\u00e9g\u00e9e sur la route Bagdad-a\u00e9roport serait plut\u00f4t une preuve de faiblesse que de puissance : cela fait du bruit, des d\u00e9g\u00e2ts et des morts, mais ne prouve pas qu&rsquo;on est puissant, bien au contraire. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <strong><em>Bombs Create Illusion of Powerful Insurgency, Commander Says<\/em><\/strong> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<em>By John D. Banusiewicz, American Forces Press Service, 16 December 2004<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Car bombs and other attacks are creating an illusion that the insurgency his forces are fighting is powerful, the general in charge of coalition forces in Iraq said at a Pentagon news conference today. Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., commander of Multinational Force Iraq, said the enemy is not 10 feet tall.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>They don&rsquo;t have to do much, he said. A car bomb a day in Baghdad or on the airport road sends a symbol that the insurgency is very powerful, when in actuality I don&rsquo;t believe that they are. It&rsquo;s a classic technique of the urban insurgent. They are trying to provoke us to do something that will make us look like we&rsquo;re overreacting to them.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The ongoing work toward defeating the car-bomb threat and other insurgent tactics continues, Casey said. But he noted the enemy adjusts to changes in coalition tactics.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em> We will get to a point where the airport road is secure and our people and the people in the embassy are protected against car bombs, he said. But as with any battle, it&rsquo;s an action-reaction-counteraction cycle that we go through with the enemy and the enemy does to us.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Iraq plans to elect a national assembly Jan. 30 that will draft a new constitution for the country, and general elections are planned around the end of next year. Casey expressed optimism that the elections will take place, and gave reporters his view of what winning the war means.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>My view of winning is that we are broadly on track to accomplishing our objectives, which is a constitutionally elected government that is representative of all the Iraqi people and with Iraqi security forces that are capable of maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror, the general said. And I believe we will get there by the end of December &rsquo;05, and I believe we are on track to get there by December of &rsquo;05.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>He acknowledged that elements trying to derail Iraq&rsquo;s progress toward democracy will fight us every step of the way, and that the path would continue to be difficult. But he repeated he believes credible elections will be able to take place, noting that today in 14 of the country&rsquo;s 18 provinces, the security situation already is adequate for that to happen.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Casey said the safe haven that terrorists and insurgents lost when Fallujah returned to legitimate authority is an important factor, and problems in Mosul don&rsquo;t equate to a new safe haven being formed.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>For me, a safe haven is a place where insurgents and terrorists can go and plan, and build improvised explosive devices, and bring in recruits and receive them in, give them training, link them up with operations, stage for operations, rehearse operations, with impunity, he said, noting that those havens had existed in Fallujah, Samarra and Najaf.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>They don&rsquo;t have that any more, he continued. So they&rsquo;ve lost the ability to operate any place with impunity. So what&rsquo;s going on in Mosul, in my view, is not a safe haven. It&rsquo;s an area where insurgents have gone and have had some success against the local security forces. Now our folks, operating with additional Iraqi security forces, have restored the status quo. But I will tell you more work needs to be done there to improve the security situation prior to elections, and it will be done.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Casey said the level of violence in Iraq has dropped dramatically since the terrorists and insurgents were routed in Fallujah. Violence now is at about the same level it was around the time sovereignty passed to the interim Iraqi government in late June, he added.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Though insurgents and terrorists continue their efforts, they are not necessarily operating effectively against coalition forces, Casey said. In fact, when we look back, the numbers of attacks don&rsquo;t necessarily produce a very high volume of casualties. In fact, a lot of the attacks are in fact ineffective against coalition forces. They are, frankly, more successful against civilians and, in some cases, against Iraqi security forces.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The four-star general outlined what has been done and will be done to take Iraq to the next milestone represented by the Jan. 30 election.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>I think you know a few weeks ago I asked for some additional forces before the election period, he said to reporters. We felt we needed to keep up the momentum, to keep the pressure on the insurgents that moved away from Fallujah after the Fallujah operation took place. And those forces are going to help us both keep the pressure on them and then get a more secure environment prior to the elections.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Another part of the equation is that more Iraqi security forces  the Iraqi army, police officers and police commandos  are graduating from training, the general pointed out. So there will be a concerted effort across Iraq, particularly in the greater Baghdad area and the Mosul area and in the Al Anbar province, all the way up to Jan. 30, he said.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong><em>[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit,  Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<h3>Appr\u00e9ciations critiques des propos du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Casey<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCe texte est un monument de rh\u00e9torique propagandiste et les propos du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Casey m\u00e9ritent quelques remarques.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Casey est, comme on le lit, assur\u00e9 et tr\u00e8s exp\u00e9ditif sur ces gens qui font beaucoup de bruit mais qui ne repr\u00e9sentent pas une v\u00e9ritable puissance. C&rsquo;est m\u00eame avec un r\u00e9el m\u00e9pris et une condescendance compl\u00e8te pour les pouilleux d&rsquo;en face que Casey d\u00e9veloppe son propos. D&rsquo;accord, mais on aimerait qu&rsquo;il d\u00e9veloppe son appr\u00e9ciation : que dit-il des 19 terroristes qui, <em>in illo tempore<\/em>, le 11 septembre 2001, ont balanc\u00e9 trois avions sur divers b\u00e2timents \u00e0 New York et \u00e0 Washington ? Ces pouilleux ne repr\u00e9sentaient \u00e9videmment pas une puissance bien consid\u00e9rable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull;  Bref, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Casey n&rsquo;a strictement rien compris \u00e0 la d\u00e9finition de la guerre asym\u00e9trique, ou guerre de la quatri\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration. Pas d&rsquo;\u00e9tonnement, tout cela ne fait que confirmer ce qu&rsquo;on sait de la fra\u00eecheur d&rsquo;esprit des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; \u00c9gale incompr\u00e9hension des termes m\u00eames d&rsquo;une r\u00e9sistance et d&rsquo;une gu\u00e9rilla. L&rsquo;important \u00e0 observer est qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;y a, dans une guerre de gu\u00e9rilla ou guerre asym\u00e9trique, ni front ni sanctuaire,  c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire aucun lieu strat\u00e9gique o\u00f9 un ennemi \u00e9quip\u00e9 de forces puissantes puisse frapper. L&rsquo;id\u00e9e de Falloujah-sanctuaire, ce sont les Am\u00e9ricains qui l&rsquo;ont invent\u00e9e, pour pouvoir attaquer Falloujah et, une fois la ville prise, affirmer que c&rsquo;en est fini de la gu\u00e9rilla. (M\u00eame si ce n&rsquo;est pas le cas, qu&rsquo;importe. L&rsquo;essentiel est bien de faire \u00e9tat d&rsquo;une victoire dans une d\u00e9claration reprise sur l&rsquo;instant un peu partout et qui convainc quelques milieux dont l&rsquo;influence est importante, par exemple pour que <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=1303\" class=\"gen\">Hollywood s&#8217;empare du sujet<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t&bull; Il y a d&rsquo;\u00e9tranges renversements de situation dans le jugement de Casey, si l&rsquo;on se r\u00e9f\u00e8re non seulement \u00e0 d&rsquo;autres \u00e9valuations, mais \u00e0 des faits av\u00e9r\u00e9s. Par exemple, lorsqu&rsquo;il remarque que, \u00e0 la suite de la victoire de Falloujah, les r\u00e9sistants \u00ab <em>lost the ability to operate any place with impunity<\/em> \u00bb. Cette remarque ne concerne-t-elle pas les forces de la coalition, dont on sait ceci depuis <a href=\"http:\/\/english.aljazeera.net\/NR\/exeres\/EABC42D9-9728-476A-988E-29C37FDFD98F.htm\" class=\"gen\">le 16 d\u00e9cembre<\/a> : \u00ab <em>The commander of the US Air Force announced on Tuesday that the military in Iraq had begun using C-130 military cargo aircraft to ferry some food and equipment high above dangerous roadways in order to relieve pressure on ground convoys<\/em> \u00bb ?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEt ainsi de suite<\/p>\n<h3>Affrontement entre l&rsquo;U.S. Army et l&rsquo;USAF<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEn effet, comme nous le rappelons, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=1302\" class=\"gen\">on a vu hier<\/a> un avis diam\u00e9tralement oppos\u00e9 \u00e0 celui du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Casey, et qui vient d&rsquo;une autre source insoup\u00e7onnable (le Lieutenant G\u00e9n\u00e9ral Lance Smith, adjoint du commandant en chef de US Central Command). Cette contradiction n&rsquo;est pas, selon nous, sans rapport de cause \u00e0 effet.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl est temps maintenant d&rsquo;abandonner notre appr\u00e9ciation au premier degr\u00e9, comme s&rsquo;il fallait prendre s\u00e9rieusement tous ces affrontements sur la situation en Irak. Ce n&rsquo;est pas le sujet.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;important est ceci : d&rsquo;une part, Lance Smith est de l&rsquo;USAF tandis que Casey est de l&rsquo;U.S. Army. (Accessoirement, ceci renforce la pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente remarque : si Smith est \u00e0 un poste ayant hi\u00e9rarchiquement une autorit\u00e9 sur Casey, il est d&rsquo;un grade inf\u00e9rieur  trois \u00e9toiles contre quatre.) Il nous appara\u00eet \u00e9vident que Casey a jug\u00e9 les d\u00e9clarations de Smith comme politiquement dommageables et bureaucratiquement insupportables pour lui, donc pour l&rsquo;U.S. Army, et cela venant d&rsquo;un concurrent redoutable, bien plus redoutable que les r\u00e9sistants irakiens,  l&rsquo;USAF. Il a r\u00e9agi en faisant un rapport de la situation qui contredit point par point celui de Smith. C&rsquo;est la r\u00e9ponse de l&rsquo;U.S. Army \u00e0 l&rsquo;U.S. Air Force.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPar cons\u00e9quent : non, les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US ne nous prennent pas pour des d\u00e9biles, en jouant avec la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 comme avec un ballon. Ils poursuivent leur bagarre interne. Quant \u00e0 la v\u00e9rit\u00e9, nous nous en tiendrons \u00e0 celle de Smith, qui a le m\u00e9rite de l&rsquo;ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9, d&rsquo;\u00eatre renforc\u00e9e par des faits \u00e9tablis et de recouper une myriade de t\u00e9moignages pour nous au-dessus de tout soup\u00e7on.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA noter que le pouvoir civil (GW, Rumsfeld et compagnie) n&rsquo;interf\u00e8re pas dans ces querelles \u00e9tal\u00e9es publiquement. Il n&rsquo;y peut rien, montrant ainsi sa faiblesse chronique. Au reste, il s&rsquo;en fout. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux US jouent au football avec la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 18 d\u00e9cembre 2004 Il est vrai que la lecture de ce que dit le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Casey (baptis\u00e9 pompeusement chef de la coalition) apr\u00e8s avoir lu les nouvelles d&rsquo;avant-hier, o\u00f9 le Lieutenant G\u00e9n\u00e9ral Lance Smith, adjoint du commandant en chef de US Central Command, nous annon\u00e7ait l&rsquo;am\u00e9lioration&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3289,4188,857,2671,41],"class_list":["post-66162","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-army","tag-casey","tag-irak","tag-us","tag-usaf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66162","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66162"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66162\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66162"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66162"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66162"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}