{"id":66164,"date":"2004-12-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-12-19T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/12\/19\/le-jsf-dans-la-tourmente-de-la-qdr-2005-un-avenir-totalement-incertain\/"},"modified":"2004-12-19T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-12-19T00:00:00","slug":"le-jsf-dans-la-tourmente-de-la-qdr-2005-un-avenir-totalement-incertain","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/12\/19\/le-jsf-dans-la-tourmente-de-la-qdr-2005-un-avenir-totalement-incertain\/","title":{"rendered":"Le JSF dans la tourmente de la QDR 2005 : un avenir totalement incertain<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le JSF dans la tourmente de la QDR 2005 : un avenir totalement incertain<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t19 d\u00e9cembre 2004 Certains points particuliers des perspectives radicales envisag\u00e9es par ailleurs pour le Pentagone<\/a> concernent les Europ\u00e9ens. Le cas essentiel, on le devine ais\u00e9ment, concerne le JSF\/F-35, ce programme dans lequel plusieurs pays europ\u00e9ens sont engag\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes deux passages de l’article du Boston Globe<\/a> qui concernent pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment les avions tactiques de l’USAF, et le JSF par cons\u00e9quent, sont les suivants :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The Navy and Air Force, facing their own financial pressures amid burgeoning federal budget deficits, are considering deep weapons cuts. The sea service is talking about cutting its fleet of aircraft carriers by a quarter, from 12 to nine, according to a Navy official who was briefed on internal planning for the review. Meanwhile, the Air Force is grappling with ways to slash its planned purchases of more than 2,500 fighter planes by up to a third, according to two accounts of a preliminary briefing.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The Air Force, meanwhile, has recommended cutting back its purchases of the F-35 from 1,100 to 800 over the next six years, Pentagon officials said, and is considering greater cuts in the coming years.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLe programme JSF a d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 retard\u00e9 ; il va l’\u00eatre plus encore et son co\u00fbt unitaire va augmenter autant \u00e0 cause de ces nouveaux d\u00e9lais qu’\u00e0 cause de la r\u00e9duction de la commande nationale. Dans ce contexte, l’engagement des pays europ\u00e9ens concern\u00e9s dans le programme JSF va se confirmer comme une erreur strat\u00e9gique fondamentale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa pr\u00e9cision mentionn\u00e9e ci-dessus, sur le JSF (\u00ab The Air Force, meanwhile, has recommended cutting back its purchases of the F-35 from 1,100 to 800 over the next six years, Pentagon officials said, and is considering greater cuts in the coming years<\/em> \u00bb) reste assez approximative par rapport aux 1.800 JSF que l’USAF voulait primitivement acqu\u00e9rir. Apr\u00e8s l’annonce de r\u00e9ductions ces deux derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es et les nouvelles perspectives qu’ouvrent les r\u00e9visions en cours qui seront rendues officielles avec la QDR, il semblerait qu’il serait plus logique d’envisager un plafond de 800 JSF pour l’USAF, en tout (et non sur une portion de temps comme l’annonce l’article). Mais m\u00eame ce chiffre nous appara\u00eet outrancier dans le contexte actuel des capacit\u00e9s budg\u00e9taires et des n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s op\u00e9rationnelles qui, toutes les deux, militent compl\u00e8tement contre le JSF. Notre hypoth\u00e8se serait, pour l’USAF, pour une flotte finale de 400-500 unit\u00e9s, tandis qu’une portion des F-16 en service serait modernis\u00e9e et prolong\u00e9e. La modernisation des F-16 permettrait par ailleurs, soit d’\u00e9taler, soit de retarder l’acquisition des JSF\/USAF. Le fait fondamental d\u00e9termin\u00e9 par la catastrophe irakienne est qu’\u00e9videmment plus aucune priorit\u00e9 au Pentagone ne s’attache au JSF. (On savait depuis longtemps que le programme JSF est manipul\u00e9<\/a>. Mais cette disparition acc\u00e9l\u00e9r\u00e9e de son caract\u00e8re prioritaire, qui va appara\u00eetre avec QDR 2005, est une nouveaut\u00e9 fondamentale.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(Pour ce qui concerne la priorit\u00e9, on ne dira pas la m\u00eame chose du F-22, dont certaines versions \u00e0 grandes capacit\u00e9s de p\u00e9n\u00e9tration, comme le FA-22 ou l’\u00e9ventuel FB-22, sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es comme pouvant jouer un r\u00f4le dans la guerre contre la terreur. Le F\/A-22 se confirme de cette fa\u00e7on comme un concurrent du JSF<\/a>, notamment pour la programmation et le budget USAF.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa question du maintien des F-16 par modernisation va d\u00e9sormais jouer un r\u00f4le de plus en plus important. L’USAF y est largement pr\u00e9par\u00e9e. Par exemple, on pouvait lire dans le num\u00e9ro de septembre 2004 de Air Force Magazine<\/a>, alors qu’il n’\u00e9tait pas encore question des bouleversements possibles de QDR 2005 : <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The Air Force has launched service life extension programs (SLEPs) that will add stiffeners and structural components to keep the current generation of aircraft in fighting trim until replacement aircraft arrive. The F-16 fleet, for instance, is receiving the Falcon STAR upgrade to strengthen spars and control surfaces. Upgrading the entire fleet will take eight years.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb By tailoring SLEPs, the Air Force can put off the day when the iron that we bought in the ’80s reaches the end of its service life, Hoffman said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Some present day fightersmultirole F-15Es and small lots of F-16swere purchased fairly late in the last fighter buying cycle, so they will last well into the future. F-16s bought in the 1990s, for instance, should reach 2025 without too much difficulty.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tD’autres pr\u00e9cisions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 donn\u00e9es r\u00e9cemment sur cette question de la modernisation des F-16. Elles confirment la logique qu’on expose ici, de la capacit\u00e9 des F-16, avec des programmes de modernisation s\u00e9rieux, de rester en service pendant au moins vingt ans encore, et ainsi de repousser d’autant la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d’int\u00e9grer de nouveaux avions de combat (le JSF) en nombre significatif.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans les extraits que nous donnons ci-dessous d’une note interne r\u00e9alis\u00e9e \u00e0 partir de sources de l’USAF, on voit que le lien est clairement fait avec la fortune de l’op\u00e9ration de modernisation de l’USAF (principalement le d\u00e9veloppement satisfaisant ou non, et les acquisitions correspondantes, de F-35). Ces remarques sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es dans la logique d’une volont\u00e9 affirm\u00e9e de l’USAF \u00ab to keep its fleet of F-16 multirole fighter aircraft as a potent force to 2020 and perhaps beyond<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab While the focus is on the USAF’s efforts to integrate the F\/A-22 into its inventory later this decade and procure the Joint Strike Fighter, the service continues to invest heavily in its existing fleet of F-16 fighter aircraft.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb What is surprising to most folks is the significant amount of investment that the USAF is still making in the F-16, said Colonel Scott Jansson, director of the F-16 system programme office within the Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. We are probably spending on average $600 million to $700 million a year to keep the fleet modern and survivable.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The air force is adamant that it does not want to buy additional F-16 aircraft. Right now I have seen no signals that the air force is going to buy any more F-16s, said Col Jansson, noting the service’s commitment to the Joint Strike Fighter as the F-16 replacement. However, he and other air force officials have said the air force retains contingency plans out of due diligence to buy additional F-16s if F-35 plans go awry.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Any prudent planner would be silly not to have, if not a back-up plan, then at least a notion of how to proceed if something does go wrong, General Hal Hornburg, then commander of the Air Combat Command, told reporters in September. The secretary of the air force and the chief of staff of the air force and I have agreed that having a back-up plan is a prudent thing to do, but we have not put one dollar against that plan. We just notionally know that if something untoward happens with our modernisation . . . then we are going to have to quickly shift to doing something else.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tDu c\u00f4t\u00e9 de l’U.S. Navy et du Corps des Marines, il y aura \u00e9galement des r\u00e9ductions substantielles. En tout, et \u00e0 condition que le programme survive \u00e0 ces remous, au lieu des 2.800 JSF am\u00e9ricains annonc\u00e9s au d\u00e9part, il serait plus raisonnable de tabler sur un programme JSF national (US, tous services confondus) de 800-1.000 exemplaires au plus, d’ici 2020-2025. (Encore ne tient-on pas compte des am\u00e9liorations et programmes nouveaux affirm\u00e9s comme sup\u00e9rieurs au JSF, qui seront propos\u00e9s en concurrence d’ici le d\u00e9veloppement complet du programme ; on pense par exemple \u00e0 une version sans pilote\/UCAV du JSF.) En raison de toutes ces contraintes, et tout accident de d\u00e9veloppement mis \u00e0 part, il faut pr\u00e9voir que le prix du JSF augmentera consid\u00e9rablement et devra \u00eatre envisag\u00e9 largement au-del\u00e0 des $100 millions l’exemplaire. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le JSF dans la tourmente de la QDR 2005 : un avenir totalement incertain 19 d\u00e9cembre 2004 Certains points particuliers des perspectives radicales envisag\u00e9es par ailleurs pour le Pentagone concernent les Europ\u00e9ens. Le cas essentiel, on le devine ais\u00e9ment, concerne le JSF\/F-35, ce programme dans lequel plusieurs pays europ\u00e9ens sont engag\u00e9s. Les deux passages de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[1015],"class_list":["post-66164","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-f-16"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66164","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66164"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66164\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66164"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66164"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66164"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}