{"id":66174,"date":"2004-12-30T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-12-30T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/12\/30\/haro-sur-le-raptor\/"},"modified":"2004-12-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2004-12-30T00:00:00","slug":"haro-sur-le-raptor","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2004\/12\/30\/haro-sur-le-raptor\/","title":{"rendered":"Haro sur le Raptor<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Haro sur le Raptor<\/em><\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t30 d\u00e9cembre 2004 Les grandes manuvres de la QDR 2005 ont commenc\u00e9. Et il appara\u00eet \u00e9vident que l’orientation prise est que ce sera bien une QDR r\u00e9volutionnaire, r\u00e9pondant \u00e0 la situation de crise sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent o\u00f9 se trouvent le Pentagone, les finances publiques et l’arm\u00e9e US en Irak. On sait que le Pentagone est plac\u00e9 devant des n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s de r\u00e9ductions budg\u00e9taires importantes. Apr\u00e8s une appr\u00e9ciation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale<\/a>, on passe aux premi\u00e8res escarmouches. Premi\u00e8re cible: le F\/A-22 Raptor<\/em>. Le New York Times d’hier<\/a> est mis \u00e0 contribution pour lancer le d\u00e9bat.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The Pentagon has told the White House and Congress that it plans sharp cuts in the Air Force’s program for the F\/A-22, the most expensive fighter jet in history, in an effort that budget analysts said was intended to offset mounting deficits and the growing costs of the war in Iraq.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The Pentagon’s decision, which four administration and Congressional officials described on Tuesday and which Congress must still approve, comes as the Bush administration is pressing all agencies to scale back spending requests for the fiscal year 2006 budget, which will be submitted to lawmakers early next year.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The White House is under pressure after the November elections to show progress in trimming federal deficits while ensuring that troops in Iraq and Afghanistan have adequate armored protective equipment. The cost of operations in Iraq alone are hovering around $4.4 billion a month.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb At the moment, the fighter, known as the Raptor, costs about $258 million a plane. That is based on an overall cost of $71.8 billion, and the Air Force’s plans to buy 277 Raptors.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Senior Pentagon and Air Force officials were still discussing details of the cutbacks. One leading industry analyst, Loren Thompson, said the program could be ended after producing about 160 aircraft, possibly saving more than $15 billion over time but significantly raising the cost per plane. The Pentagon has already spent nearly $40 billion to develop the aircraft, which is just now coming into full production, Air Force officials said.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The proposed cut reflects the convergence of severe budgetary pressures imposed by the Iraq war with some longstanding preferences among senior policymakers for less emphasis on conventional weapons programs, said Mr. Thompson, a military analyst at the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit group that advocates limited government.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMais, certes, il semble s’agir de bien plus que de lancer le d\u00e9bat. Il appara\u00eet que le Pentagone, ou, dans tous les cas OSD (Office of Secretary of Defense, la direction civile du Pentagone), veuille montrer qu’il estime le d\u00e9bat d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 tranch\u00e9: le F\/A-22 subira les r\u00e9ductions envisag\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD\u00e8s le d\u00e9part, bien des donn\u00e9es sont contestables. L’exp\u00e9rience pass\u00e9e montre que les r\u00e9ductions de s\u00e9rie pour faire des \u00e9conomies aboutissent aux r\u00e9sultats inverses. Les 277 F\/A-22 \u00e0 $258 millions l’unit\u00e9 aboutiraient, selon les comptes de Loren Thompson pour 160 unit\u00e9s, \u00e0 un co\u00fbt unitaire de $343 millions. A notre sens, c’est une appr\u00e9ciation tr\u00e8s optimiste et nous serions plut\u00f4t en route vers un nouveau B-2 \u00e0 l’\u00e9chelle d’un avion de combat, dans un contexte o\u00f9 le programme F\/A-22 serait totalement hors de contr\u00f4le. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(L’exemple fameux entre tous: le B-2. Parti d’un programme de 132 avions annonc\u00e9 \u00e0 $23 milliards en 1984 [$180 millions l’exemplaire], il aboutit \u00e0 21 avions \u00e0 $44 milliards, et, selon des sources militaires a\u00e9riennes europ\u00e9ennes avec une tr\u00e8s grande exp\u00e9rience du d\u00e9veloppement et de la production des hautes technologies, qui ont effectu\u00e9 des simulations de co\u00fbt, c’est plut\u00f4t vers $80-$120 milliards qu’il faut aller chercher le co\u00fbt r\u00e9el du programme des 21 B-2. L’habituel artifice comptable consistant \u00e0 parler de then-year dollar<\/em> pour arguer que les dollars d’aujourd’hui ont moins de valeur que ceux de 1984 ne convient qu’\u00e0 la th\u00e9orie \u00e9conomique. Au niveau du budget, ce qui compte est la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 du co\u00fbt par rapport au pouvoir d’achat: les $23 milliards des 132 B-2 programm\u00e9s en 1984 prenaient 9% du budget total du DoD de l’ann\u00e9e; les $44 milliards (hypoth\u00e8se tr\u00e8s basse) des 21 B-2 commen\u00e7ant \u00e0 entrer en service en 1998 prenaient 17,6% du budget de 1998. Compte tenu de la diff\u00e9rence en nombre d’avions, on voit que le co\u00fbt du programme a \u00e9t\u00e9 multipli\u00e9 par dix.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTous ces points vont \u00eatre d\u00e9battus, et bien d’autres encore o\u00f9 se m\u00ealeront politique, int\u00e9r\u00eats particuliers, etc. Le Congr\u00e8s va jouer un r\u00f4le essentiel dans ce d\u00e9bat.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The Pentagon’s proposed cuts to the Raptor program require Congressional approval, and by the divided reaction from friends and foes of the aircraft on Tuesday, the brewing fight appeared to foreshadow many contentious debates on Capitol Hill over domestic spending cuts. More than 1,000 subcontractors in 43 states helped build the F\/A-22 and the political constituency to defend it.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Every year, we’ve gone through this fight over the F-22, but we can’t cut below where we are now, Senator Saxby Chambliss, a Georgia Republican on the Armed Services Committee, said in a telephone interview. We’ll fight to keep it where it is.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But a senior Republican aide, speaking on the condition of anonymity because his boss was not available during the holiday recess, responded: While the program does have its supporters, many in the Senate feel that given the current threat situation and the tight budget environment, this is a responsible program in which to cut back. We expect a lively debate on these cuts.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLa r\u00e9action officielle du porte-parole du Pentagone, Eric Ruff, a \u00e9t\u00e9 prudente en l’absence de tout acte officiel (il ne s’agit que d’un article de journal). N\u00e9anmoins, cette r\u00e9action prudente a le m\u00e9rite d’\u00e9largir le cadre g\u00e9n\u00e9ral du d\u00e9bat et de lui donner ses vraies dimensions : \u00ab Mr. Ruff said the Pentagon’s proposals ensured that the F\/A-22 and another aviation priority, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, would remain healthy. He also noted that the Pentagon was about to embark on its quadrennial review of programs to ensure that the military had the right mix of weapons and equipment.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEffectivement, le d\u00e9bat sur une \u00e9ventuelle r\u00e9duction du F\/A-22 va s’\u00e9largir. La question devra \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9e en fonction de l’autre programme, le JSF, et dans le cadre de la QDR 2005. L’USAF n’a pas encore d\u00e9clench\u00e9 sa contre-offensive. (Les Air Force officials<\/em> cit\u00e9s dans l’article [\u00ab Senior Pentagon and Air Force officials were still discussing details of the cutbacks<\/em> \u00bb] d\u00e9signent la direction civile de l’Air Force, qui peut difficilement d\u00e9fendre la position de l’Air Force parce qu’elle est notablement affaiblie. Le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 l’Air Force et son adjoint, James Roche et Marvin Sambur, sont d\u00e9missionnaires \u00e0 la suite du scandale des KC-767<\/a>. L’USAF n’a pas encore fait peser son poids dans ce d\u00e9bat de la r\u00e9duction des F\/A-22.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’un point de vue militaire, le maintien du F\/A-22 au chiffre de production actuel, et m\u00eame au-del\u00e0 (277 exemplaires, ou 381), a tout son sens, alors que budg\u00e9tairement la r\u00e9duction est paradoxalement tr\u00e8s co\u00fbteuse. L’attaque contre le F\/A-22 va radicaliser l’argument de l’USAF, au profit du F\/A-22 et aux d\u00e9pens du JSF. La bataille de la QDR 2005 a commenc\u00e9 et le JSF en sera un des principaux protagonistes<\/a>, sous le regard int\u00e9ress\u00e9 et \u00e9ventuellement inquiet des Europ\u00e9ens.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Haro sur le Raptor 30 d\u00e9cembre 2004 Les grandes manuvres de la QDR 2005 ont commenc\u00e9. Et il appara\u00eet \u00e9vident que l’orientation prise est que ce sera bien une QDR r\u00e9volutionnaire, r\u00e9pondant \u00e0 la situation de crise sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent o\u00f9 se trouvent le Pentagone, les finances publiques et l’arm\u00e9e US en Irak. On sait que… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[250,3234],"class_list":["post-66174","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-jsf","tag-roche"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66174","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66174"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66174\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66174"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66174"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66174"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}