{"id":66187,"date":"2005-01-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-01-10T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/01\/10\/de-la-globalisation-a-la-clinton-et-selon-wall-street-au-tsunami\/"},"modified":"2005-01-10T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-01-10T00:00:00","slug":"de-la-globalisation-a-la-clinton-et-selon-wall-street-au-tsunami","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/01\/10\/de-la-globalisation-a-la-clinton-et-selon-wall-street-au-tsunami\/","title":{"rendered":"De la globalisation \u00e0-la-Clinton (et selon Wall Street) au tsunami<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

De la globalisation \u00e0-la-Clinton (et selon Wall Street) au tsunami<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tOn sait que certains pays touch\u00e9s par le tsunami<\/em> font partie de ces pays asiatiques \u00e9mergents qui, dans les ann\u00e9es 1990, connurent de profonds remous \u00e9conomiques. C’est particuli\u00e8rement le cas pour la Tha\u00eflande et l’Indon\u00e9sie, deux pays qui furent au d\u00e9part de l’immense crise \u00e9conomique qui ravagea le monde \u00e9mergent, en 1997-98, avec les crises \u00e9conomiques notamment en Chine, en Russie, au Br\u00e9sil.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette crise, c’est fondamentalement la crise de la globalisation (pas crise de la mondialisation<\/a>). C’est la crise de la d\u00e9r\u00e9gulation, conduisant \u00e0 l’ouverture des march\u00e9s hors de toute r\u00e9gulation. Les bouleversements ainsi op\u00e9r\u00e9s ont boulevers\u00e9 le paysage social, culturel et d\u00e9mographique de ces pays. Il existe un lien entre cette situation et le terrible bilan de la catastrophe de l’Asie du Sud. Le 4 janvier, sur une cha\u00eene TV d’information, un dirigeant d’une ONG observait \u00ab que si le saccage des structures sociales, de l’environnement, des infrastructures \u00e9conomiques pour installer l’univers globalis\u00e9 de l’hyper-capitalisme et du tourisme exotique n’avait pas \u00e9t\u00e9 men\u00e9 au rythme fou o\u00f9 il fut \u00e0 cause du\/ depuis le cataclysme \u00e9conomique de 1997 (la globalisation venue des US), les densit\u00e9s d\u00e9mographiques et sociales dans les pays touch\u00e9s eussent \u00e9t\u00e9 compl\u00e8tement diff\u00e9rentes, les structures de r\u00e9sistance \u00e9galement, et les pertes humaines provoqu\u00e9es par le tsunami eussent \u00e9t\u00e9 tr\u00e8s, tr\u00e8s largement en-dessous du dixi\u00e8me de ce qui se passe, si bien qu’on n’en aurait pas parl\u00e9.<\/em> \u00bb (cit\u00e9 dans notre texte, rubrique F&C, du 6 janvier 2005<\/a>)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn comprend l’int\u00e9r\u00eat de rappeler l’un ou l’autre texte qui permettrait de mieux pr\u00e9ciser ce que fut cette crise de 1997-98, d’o\u00f9 elle vint, \u00e0 quel m\u00e9canisme elle r\u00e9pondait. C’est assez \u00e9difiant, et cela permet de fixer certaines responsabilit\u00e9s qui sont en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral \u00e9lud\u00e9es et \u00e9cart\u00e9es. Le cataclysme du tsunami<\/em> est aussi une crise; et ce cataclysme de tous les temps est aussi une crise postmoderne.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCi-dessous, nous publions deux textes qui \u00e9claireront les conditions dans lesquelles fut r\u00e9alis\u00e9e la r\u00e9volution de la globalisation des ann\u00e9es 1990. Un premier texte (le premier d’une s\u00e9rie de trois publi\u00e9s en f\u00e9vrier 1999) explique l’origine strat\u00e9gique de ce courant r\u00e9volutionnaire et mondial de la globalisation, son application et ses effets. Les t\u00e9moignages un peu contrits, emplis de doute, des principaux acteurs de ce mouvement, ils n’avaient pas le moindre doute lorsqu’ils le lanc\u00e8rent, permettent de mesurer la dimension probable de ce qui pourrait \u00eatre reconnu plus tard comme la perversion \u00e9conomique fondamentale d’une \u00e9poque. En passant, il est bon de mesurer le r\u00f4le et la responsabilit\u00e9 de l’administration Clinton, qu’on est habitu\u00e9 \u00e0 encenser par contraste avec l’administration GW, dans les \u00e9v\u00e9nements pr\u00e9liminaires et en bonne partie fondateurs de la situation pr\u00e9sente.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCe premier texte, paru dans l’International Herald Tribune<\/em> du 16 f\u00e9vrier 1999, est suivi d’un second, dans le m\u00eame journal, \u00e0 la date du 1er mars 1999. C’est un brillant commentaire du premier texte, fait par William Pfaff pour mieux situer l’ampleur de la d\u00e9marche et de ses effets catastrophiques. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Free Markets: Clinton Gave a Push <\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Nicholas D. Kristof and David E. Sanger, International Herald Tribune, February 16, 1999<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThey were serious men, prosperous and pinstriped, and they derided \u00a0\u00bbthe politics of class warfare\u00a0\u00bb as they conducted a job interview with the young governor from Arkansas. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt was steak dinner in a private room of the \u00a0\u00bb21\u00a0\u00bb Club in New York in June 1991, and the top Democratic executives on Wall Street were gathered at a round table to hold one of a series of meetings with presidential aspirants in what an organizer called \u00a0\u00bban elegant cattle show.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThey were questioning a man with a meager salary but a silver tongue, and this was another show in which Governor Bill Clinton charmed his way to a blue ribbon by impressing the executives with his willingness to embrace free trade and free markets.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbWhat was discussed was the need for the Democratic Party to have a new and much more forward-looking economic policy,\u00a0\u00bb Roger Altman, a leading investment banker and an organizer of the evening, recalled recently. \u00a0\u00bbThe Democratic Party needed to move into a new economic world.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAides describe that evening as an important step in the business education of Mr. Clinton, who came to repeat and amplify the themes, especially the need to move away from protectionism and push for more open markets in Asia and all over the world. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt was also the time that Mr. Clinton first met Robert Rubin, then the head of Goldman Sachs & Company, and although the initial encounter was cool, the two men eventually forged a close partnership that has left an enormous imprint on the global economy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMr. Clinton and Mr. Rubin, who became his treasury secretary in 1995, took the American passion for free trade and carried it further to press for freer movement of capital. Along the way, they pushed harder to win opportunities for American banks, brokerages and insurance companies.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis drive for free movement of capital as well as goods was one factor in the long American-led boom in financial markets around the globe. Yet, in retrospect, Washington’s ‘policies also fostered vulnerabilities that are an underlying cause of the economic crisis that began in Thailand in July 1997, rippled through Asia and Russia, and is now shaking Brazil and Latin America.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCountries like Thailand and Russia and Brazil are in trouble today largely for internal reasons, including poor banking practices and speculation that soared out of control. But some economists also say that if those countries had weak foundations, it is partly because Washington helped supply the blueprints.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThey argue that the Clinton administration pushed too hard for financial liberalization and freer capital flows allowing foreign money to stream into these countries and local money to move out. In many cases, foreign countries were happy to open up in this way because they thought it was the best road to economic development, but a wealth of evidence has shown that over-hasty liberalization can lead to banking chaos and financial crises<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEven some former administration officials acknowledge that they went too far. Mickey Kantor, the former trade representative and commerce secretary, now says that the United States was insufficiently aware of the kind of chaos that financial liberalization could provoke.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbIt would be a legitimate criticism to say that we should have been more nuanced, more foresighted that this could happen,\u00a0\u00bb he said. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSpeaking of the risks of financial liberalization without modern banking and legal systems, he compared them to \u00a0\u00bbbuilding a skyscraper with no foundation.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlthough the Clinton administration always talked about financial liberalization as the best thing for other countries, it is also clear that it pushed for free capital f1ows in part because this was what its supporters in the banking industry wanted.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbOur financial services industry wanted into these markets,\u00a0\u00bb said Laura D’ Andrea Tyson, the former chairman of Mr. Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers and later head of the National Economic Council.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMs. Tyson says she disagreed to some extent with the push and was concerned about \u00a0\u00bba tendency to do this as a blanket approach, regardless of the size of a country or the development of a country.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFree capital flows, she worried, could overwhelm small countries or those with weak banking and legal systems, leading to a \u00a0\u00bbrun on a country.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis is not to say that American officials are primarily to blame for the crisis. Responsibility can be assigned all around, not only to Washington policymakers, but also to the officials and bankers in emerging-market countries who created the mess; to Western bankers and investors who blindly handed them money; to Western officials who hailed free capital flows and neglected to make them safer; to Western scholars and journalists who wrote paeans to emerging markets and the \u00a0\u00bbAsian Century\u00a0\u00bb – and to the people who planned an empty city named Muang Thong Thani.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMuang Thong Thani rises up above barren fields on the edge of Bangkok. It is a dazzling complex of two dozen huge gray-white buildings soaring nearly 30 stories high and surrounded by streets lined with shops, town houses .and detached home. Walk closer and it feels eerie, for it is a ghost city.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlong one street of 100 houses, the windows are mere holes in the walls, and yards have weeds that grow as high as a person.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMuang Thong Thani was built during Thailand’s boom as a product of free capital flows and financial liberalization. It was the great dream of Anant Kanjanapas.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOne of 11 children born to an ethnic Chinese business tycoon in Thailand. Mr. Anant grew up with the wealth that his family had acquired through developing property and selling watches in Asia.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe family’s Bangkok Land company began acquiring parcels of property near the airport. and they broke ground in 1990 on a megaproject to build a privately owned satellite city for Bangkok. Muang Thong Thani was to have a population of 700.000, bigger than Boston’s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe project was greeted enthusiastically, as all proposals were in the early 1990s, and Bangkok Land issued shares on the Thai Stock Exchange in 1992 to raise money. Its shares were hot, picked up by J. Mark Mobius, the. emerging-markets guru, and by funds like the Thai International Fund and the Thai Euro Fund, which between them bought more than one million shares of Bangkok Land.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFree movement of capital is nothing new, for it was the norm during most of Western history. At the beginning of this century, anyone could move money across borders without difficulty.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Great Depression changed all that. Governments moved to control capital so as to avoid what they saw as the chaos of capital rushing out of countries and triggering financial crises.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe result was that most countries of the world, including the United States in the 1960s, limited the right of companies and citizens to buy foreign securities or invest overseas. People were often allowed to buy only small amounts of foreign currency.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThen, as memories of the Depression faded, the tide shifted again in the 1970s and ’80s. Starting in the United States and Europe, it became fashionable to let money move freely, and the Reagan administration began to push for free capital flows in other countries.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Clinton administration inherited that agenda and amplified it. Previous administrations had pushed for financial liberalization principally In Japan, but under Mr. Clinton it became a worldwide effort directed at all kinds of countries, even smaller ones much less able to absorb it than Japan. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbWe pushed full steam ahead on all areas of liberalization, including financial,\u00a0\u00bb recalled Jeffrey Garten, a former senior Commerce Department official who is now dean of the Yale School of Management. \u00a0\u00bbI never went on a trip when my brief didn’t include either advice or congratulations on liberalization.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis push for financial liberalization reflected Mr. Clinton’s growing enthusiasm for markets and his desire to make the economy a centerpiece of his foreign policy. He created the National Economic Council as a counterpart to the National Security Council, and asked Mr. Rubin to be its first bead. More broadly, this push was part of a global ideological shift in favor of free markets, as well as an increasing enthusiasm among developing countries themselves for 1ifting restrictions on the flow of money. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbWe were convinced we were moving with the stream,\u00a0\u00bb Mr. Garten said, \u00a0\u00bband that our job was to make the stream move faster.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMr. Garten said he could not recall hearing any doubts expressed about the policy, either within the administration or among officials overseas. Referring to Mr. Rubin, Mr. Kantor and former Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, Mr. Garten said, \u00a0\u00bbThere wasn’t a fiber in those three bodies – or in mine – that didn’t want to press as a matter of policy for more open markets wherever you could make it happen.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbIt’s easy to see in retrospect that we probably pushed too far, too fast.\u00a0\u00bb he said, adding, \u00a0\u00bbIn retrospect, we overshot, and in retrospect, there was a certain degree of arrogance.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe push for financial liberalization was directed at Asia in particular, largely because it was seen as a potential gold mine for American banks and brokerages. Neither Mr. Clinton nor Mr. Rubin had much experience in Asia – Mr. Clinton as governor had led trade delegation to promote Arkansas chickens and rice, and Mr. Rubin had done business in Japan for Goldman Sachs. But Mr. Clinton as president has worked hard to strengthen American ties with Asia, as well as his own.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe idea was to press Asia to ease its barriers to American goods and financial services, helping Fidelity sell mutual funds, Citibank sell checking accounts and American International Group sell insurance. Mr. Clinton’s links to Asia caused embarrassment after they led to the campaign finance scandals of 1996, but fundamentally, they reflected an appetite for business opportunities in Asian countries that had changed, as Mr. Clinton once put it, \u00a0\u00bbfrom dominoes to dynamos.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHis cabinet approved a \u00a0\u00bbbig emerging markets\u00a0\u00bb plan to identify 10 rising economic powers and push relentlessly to win business for American companies there. Under Mr. Brown, the Commerce Department even built what it called a war room, where computers tracked big contracts, and everyone from the CIA to ambassadors to the president himself was called upon to help land deals.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFreer flow of money pumped up the Thai economy, and with the help of foreign cash Mr. Anant began to realize his dream. Muang Thong Thani gradually emerged from the surrounding fields, with its skyscrapers focused on a business district called Bond Street.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe result is that since the crash, Muang Thong Thani has everything but inhabitants. Bond Street is a mile-and-a-quarter strip of modern, window-lined buildings, but aside from a handful of colourful storefronts – a bank, a restaurant, a pharmacy and a few others – they are empty.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe command center for free markets is the third floor of the U. S. Treasury, where Mr. Rubin and his deputy, Lawrence Summers, share a Suite facing the Washington Monument. Mr. Rubin presides in a spacious office.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHistorically, the Treasury has tended to slake out free-market positions; but Mr. Rubin stepped up the pace even further, for he showed an intuitive tilt toward the market based on his three decades as an investment banker.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWithin the Clinton administration, Mr. Rubin and Mr. Summers won increasing influence because of their skill at marrying international finance and foreign policy. Mr. Summers had been a prominent economics professor at Harvard, and Mr. Rubin had made a fortune on Wall Street, enabling him to take off on vacations with a fly-fishing rod that, as an aide joked, \u00a0\u00bbprobably costs more than your house.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWithin the administration, there were occasional arguments about the virtues of free capital flows. Academic economists like Ms. Tyson and Joseph Stiglitz, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, sometimes argued that the Treasury was too dogmatic in insisting upon free flows. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut there is considerable evidence that top administration officials were involved in some efforts to seek freer capital flows, as when they pressed South Korea to liberalize its financial system.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAfter interagency discussions, the administration dangled an attractive bait: If Korea gave in, it would be allowed to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the club of industrialized nations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbTo enter the OECD,\u00a0\u00bb recalled a senior official of the organization, \u00a0\u00bbthe Koreans agreed to liberalize faster than they had originally planned. They were concerned that if they went too fast, a number of their financial institutions would be unable to adapt.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn the end, Korea opened up the wrong way: It kept restrictions on long-term investments like buying Korean companies, but it dropped those on short-term money like bank loans, which could be pulled out quickly.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA flood of capital poured into emerging markets in the early and mid-l990s, including $93 billion in 1996 alone into just five countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. Then there was a net outflow of $12 billion from those five countries in 1997. This turnabout, which was most evident in short-term loans, amounted to a financial hurricane, one that would harm any country in the world.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSo, while economists welcome free capital flows in principle, extensive scholarly work had clearly established the importance of \u00a0\u00bbsequencing,\u00a0\u00bb meaning that countries should liberalize capital flows only after building up hank supervision and a legal infrastructure. A French scholar, Charles Wyplosz, of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, concludes in an academic paper that \u00a0\u00bbfinancial market liberalization is the best predictor of currency crisis.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

This International Economic Crisis Was Unnecessary<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy William Pfaff, International Herald Tribune, March 1, 1999<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPARIS – There has been remarkably little reaction to the splendid articles on the international economic crisis, prepared by an editorial team led by Nicholas Kristof that appeared from Feb.15 to 18 in The New York Times (IHT. Feb. 16 to 19, 1999).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tModerate and judicious in tone, the series reveals the extent to which the crisis of the globalized economy (not yet over) was unnecessary, the unanticipated product of a self-interested policy that originated in the American financial community and was taken up by the U.S. government. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDuring the past decade, the conventional wisdom of governments and international economic organizations, as well as of much of the university economic policy community and the press, has been that deregulation and \u00a0\u00bbglobalization\u00a0\u00bb of the international economy have been a natural, even inevitable development.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThat view has held that globalization results from technological innovations in communications, from banking and industrial organization, and ultimately from the economic reality that international trade exploiting the comparative advantage of national economies produces progress for all.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tResistance to globalization has been considered futile. Objections to it – based on political or social arguments concerning the ability of such nations as Russia or Indonesia to function responsibly in a globalized economy – have been dismissed. It was said that market forces would automatical1y correct excesses and enforce the general interest.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis belief was not universally shared among political economists. It originated as the sectarian enthusiasm of a minority of writers and theorists in Britain and the United States, beginning in the 1970s, and it derived more from their political hostility to \u00a0\u00bbbig government\u00a0\u00bb than from objective economic analysis. It was an argument naturally appealing in business circles and the financial community.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe New York Times series documents the process by which international financial deregulation was sold by Wall Street to the Clinton administration (indeed, to Bill Clinton while he was still governor of Arkansas), causing it to aggressively promote global deregulation and use the political power of the United States to remake world finance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJeffrey Garten of the Yale University School of Management, who was an official in the Commerce Department during Mr. Clinton’s first term, says, \u00a0\u00bbWe were convinced that we were moving with the stream.\u00a0\u00bb He and his colleagues pressed \u00a0\u00bbas a matter of policy for more open markets wherever you could make it happen.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbAlthough the Clinton administration always talked about financial liberalization as the best thing for other countries,\u00a0\u00bb Mr. Kristof notes, \u00a0\u00bbit is also clear that it pushed for free capital flows in part because this is what its supporters in the banking industry wanted. \u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe success of this campaign produced a fundamental change in the world economy, with consequences yet to be fully felt. Goods and commodities were replaced, as the principal components of international trade, by stocks, bonds and currencies. The global financial market replaced the global economy. The total worth of financia1 derivatives traded in 1997 was 12 times the worth of the entire world economy. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhen crisis arrived that year, the same investors who had profited from globalized markets worsened the crisis by speculating against newly weakened currencies. The United States used its own resources and those of the IMF to rescue Western investors and U.S. and European banks. That is now generally acknowledge.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe countries that were the victims of the crisis were pressed by Washington to adopt measures of austerity, imposing severe economic and social costs on their populations – a policy that is now widely conceded to have been wrong.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMr. Kristof adds that \u00a0\u00bbwhen the crisis seemed as if it might strike the United States,\u00a0\u00bb in September 1998, \u00a0\u00bbthe administration had a change of heart\u00a0\u00bb about austerity as the appropriate response. \u00a0\u00bbMr. Clinton [welcomed] three interest rate cuts by the Federal Reserve, pressing Europe and others to cut rates as well,\u00a0\u00bb and the Federal Reserve arranged the rescue of Long-Term Capital management.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTo millions in Asia, Russia and Latin America, deregulation of the international economy must look like a vast swindle. It was not, in fact, a swindle. It was something perhaps worse. It was an irresponsible and, in crucial respects, disastrous experiment, inspired by ideology, promoted by Western groups that expected to profit from it, backed by the power of the U.S government.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe more prominent victims were Indonesia, Thailand, China, Russia and Brazil, and the affair is not over.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWestern defenders of the experiment argue that despite all that went wrong, there has been a large net increase in international growth and wealth. This does not take into account the political carnage. That, unfortunately, has in the past proved to be the outcome of economic crises which has the most lasting consequences.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

De la globalisation \u00e0-la-Clinton (et selon Wall Street) au tsunami On sait que certains pays touch\u00e9s par le tsunami font partie de ces pays asiatiques \u00e9mergents qui, dans les ann\u00e9es 1990, connurent de profonds remous \u00e9conomiques. C’est particuli\u00e8rement le cas pour la Tha\u00eflande et l’Indon\u00e9sie, deux pays qui furent au d\u00e9part de l’immense crise \u00e9conomique… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[8],"tags":[4038,4407,4301],"class_list":["post-66187","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notre-bibliotheque","tag-brown","tag-kantor","tag-rubin"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66187","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66187"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66187\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66187"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66187"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66187"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}