{"id":66188,"date":"2005-01-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-01-10T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/01\/10\/un-regard-diconoclaste-sur-le-jsf-so-baloney\/"},"modified":"2005-01-10T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-01-10T00:00:00","slug":"un-regard-diconoclaste-sur-le-jsf-so-baloney","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/01\/10\/un-regard-diconoclaste-sur-le-jsf-so-baloney\/","title":{"rendered":"Un regard d’iconoclaste sur le JSF: \u201cSo, baloney\u201d<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un regard d’iconoclaste sur le JSF: So, baloney<\/em><\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t10 janvier 2005 Frank C. Lanza, 73 ans, est un vieux routier de l’industrie d’armement US. C’est un des plus vieux CEO am\u00e9ricain, \u00e0 la t\u00eate de la compagnie L-3 Communications Corp., qui fait partie du deuxi\u00e8me tiers des compagnies d’armement US, en-dessous des cinq dinosaures (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, General Dynamics). Dans un r\u00e9cent (3 janvier 2005) num\u00e9ro d’Aviation Week & Space Technology<\/a>, on trouve dans la rubrique Face To Face<\/em> un \u00abLanza Unleashed<\/em>\u00bb d’un r\u00e9el int\u00e9r\u00eat. Lanza est de cette sorte d’homme qui, m\u00eame \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur d’un syst\u00e8me dont il \u00e9pouse la cause et les int\u00e9r\u00eats, ne parvient pas \u00e0 se conformer au langage convenu de ce syst\u00e8me.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNous avons choisi de reproduire les passages de ses d\u00e9clarations qui concernent la situation au Pentagone, et, dans ce cadre, la situation de deux programmes d’avions de combat dont nous suivons en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement les d\u00e9veloppements.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab FLAWED PENTAGON OVERSIGHT: What used to be called <\/em>[acquisition] ‘reform’ is now ‘deform,’ and over the last 5-6 years the Defense Dept. and the military have abrogated their responsibility <\/em>[for overseeing major acquisition programs]. Why? Because they didn’t have the resources What has happened is we’ve let programs get underbid dramatically <\/em>[and had] some pretty bad management scenarios. <\/em>[At L-3] it would be totally unacceptable to have a program that overruns 100%, 200%, 300%… Look at how many studies they’ve run on <\/em>[the Space-Based Infrared satellite system] to find alternatives. <\/em>[They] threaten termination, and all they do is write a check for another $1 billion. So there’s no incentive anymore for companies to really perform to what they commit to because everything’s cost reimbursable. There doesn’t seem to be much to do with past performance. Do you see contracts being stopped because of past performance? I haven’t.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb BIG CHANGES AHEAD? [The Pentagon] really hasn’t established a budget for real transformation yet. . . . We thought it would happen in <\/em>[the fiscal 2005 budget]. Then Iraq came along, which postponed that real transformation budget. The <\/em>[Quadrennial Defense Review] that’s going to occur in ’05 is going to look at force structure. It’s going to look at what platforms are important. It’s going to look at whether the budget is equally shared between Air Force, Navy and Army, where the Army now gets about 23% and says it wants 30%. . . . The Army can only go up, not down.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb VULNERABLE PROGRAMS: There’s going to be major impact on tactical air, major impact on shipbuilding. There’s going to be a decision about how much space is worth to us We already know that the Joint Strike Fighter <\/em>[JSF] is going to be cut probably in half, the F\/A-22 has been cut by a third, we know that the DD(X) is already in trouble You have to say tactical air cannot be considered the highest priority in the Air Force any longer. What air force in the world can compete with the U.S. Air Force?… The F\/A-22’s not going to be terminated. But how many do you need? (USAF initially planned to buy 750; the number is now about 275.) The priority is on delivering ordnance. And we have a problem in far reach. <\/em>[In the Iraq war] we were flying airplanes for 24 hours to do bombing runs A bomber, or some version of a longer-range <\/em>[aircraft] is very possible.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb JSF AS A COOPERATIVE PROGRAM: I don’t think <\/em>[JSF] has anything to do with international collaboration, nor does it give you a card to the future. So baloney. What was smart is they got international collaboration to make sure it didn’t get terminated I’m not saying we’re going to terminate it, but you don’t need to buy it today, because you have very capable aircraft. If you add the F\/A-22 to it for air superiority you don’t have to have a JSF tomorrow morning. So it can be stretched.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tCes quelques commentaires laissent l’impression, \u00e0 notre sens compl\u00e8tement justifi\u00e9e que le Pentagone et, d’une fa\u00e7on plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, le monde du complexe militaro-industriel forment, derri\u00e8re l’apparence rationnelle et rassurante de la puissance, un ensemble essentiellement caract\u00e9ris\u00e9 par le d\u00e9sordre. Cette id\u00e9e doit rester constante dans l’\u00e9valuation qu’on fait de la puissance militaire US. Le facteur du d\u00e9sordre explique bien des circonstances dites par ailleurs inexplicables.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes commentaires de Lanza sur les deux programmes d’avions de combat sont encore plus int\u00e9ressants. Ils permettent de mieux saisir la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de leurs positions, au-del\u00e0 des batailles d’influence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• C’est sur le F\/A-22 que Lanza est le plus cat\u00e9gorique, bien que cet avion soit le principal vis\u00e9 dans les r\u00e9ductions budg\u00e9taires annonc\u00e9es<\/a>. Toutes les remarques de Lanza paraissent de bon sens: le F\/A-22 sera prot\u00e9g\u00e9, reste \u00e0 fixer exactement le volume de la production. Implicitement, Lanza met en avant les capacit\u00e9s strat\u00e9giques de cet avion lorsqu’il parle de l’int\u00e9r\u00eat d\u00e9clinant du domaine a\u00e9rien tactique, au contraire du domaine strat\u00e9gique\/de p\u00e9n\u00e9tration. (\u00ab we have a problem in far reach<\/em> A bomber, or some version of a longer-range <\/em>[aircraft] is very possible.<\/em> \u00bb) Dans le contexte o\u00f9 elle est dite, une telle remarque est une forte plaidoirie implicite pour les versions \u00e0 long rayon d’action du F-22, le FA-22 et, surtout, le FB-22 de bombardement, avec un rayon d’action de 1.800 miles, qui est propos\u00e9 par l’USAF. (On peut en effet s’attendre dans les mois qui viennent \u00e0 une contre-offensive en force de l’USAF et de son F-22, centr\u00e9e sur les nouvelles versions de l’avion, comme le FB-22.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• En quelques mots, le point de vue de Lanza sur le JSF est fascinant. Il exp\u00e9die de deux mots ce qui est chant\u00e9 (en Europe) depuis des ann\u00e9es comme l’arch\u00e9type du lien transatlantique en mati\u00e8re d’aviation militaire, de technologies et de coop\u00e9ration industrielle avanc\u00e9e, et ces deux mots sont: \u00ab So, baloney<\/em> \u00bb. Lanza n’attribue au programme de coop\u00e9ration internationale du JSF qu’un seul but r\u00e9el: emp\u00eacher qu’on liquide le programme JSF (am\u00e9ricain). Pour le reste, Lanza attribue au JSF une fonction de bouche-trous plus ou moins manipul\u00e9, estime que la perspective de sa production est d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 r\u00e9duite de moiti\u00e9 (alors que le Pentagone continue imperturbablement \u00e0 parler de 1.700 avions pour l’USAF, soit la production compl\u00e8te), et qu’il est destin\u00e9 \u00e0 \u00eatre r\u00e9duit encore et retard\u00e9 selon les opportunit\u00e9s et les n\u00e9cessit\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette vision cynique du programme JSF est \u00e9videmment bien plus proche de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 que tout ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 dit et \u00e9crit sur lui, de source officielle US et (surtout) de source europ\u00e9enne. Plus que jamais, le JSF nous appara\u00eet comme un outil de manipulation et sa concurrence d\u00e9sormais ouverte avec le F\/A-22<\/a> doit tr\u00e8s vite mettre ce fait en \u00e9vidence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un regard d’iconoclaste sur le JSF: So, baloney 10 janvier 2005 Frank C. Lanza, 73 ans, est un vieux routier de l’industrie d’armement US. C’est un des plus vieux CEO am\u00e9ricain, \u00e0 la t\u00eate de la compagnie L-3 Communications Corp., qui fait partie du deuxi\u00e8me tiers des compagnies d’armement US, en-dessous des cinq dinosaures (Lockheed… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4195,1205,4247],"class_list":["post-66188","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-aviation","tag-transatlantique","tag-week"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66188","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66188"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66188\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66188"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66188"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66188"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}