{"id":66190,"date":"2005-01-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-01-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/01\/12\/lanti-empire-les-americains-lirak-et-le-chaos\/"},"modified":"2005-01-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-01-12T00:00:00","slug":"lanti-empire-les-americains-lirak-et-le-chaos","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/01\/12\/lanti-empire-les-americains-lirak-et-le-chaos\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>L&rsquo;anti-Empire : les Am\u00e9ricains, l&rsquo;Irak et le chaos<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">L&rsquo;anti-Empire : les Am\u00e9ricains, l&rsquo;Irak et le chaos<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t12 janvier 2005  L&rsquo;Histoire va vite. En deux ann\u00e9es bien remplies, elle a inflig\u00e9 le plus cat\u00e9gorique des d\u00e9mentis possibles \u00e0 l&rsquo;affirmation imp\u00e9riale de l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique. L&rsquo;am\u00e9ricanisme,  pour \u00eatre plus pr\u00e9cis et plus juste en cette occurrence,  est sans doute la force la plus anti-imp\u00e9riale qui ait jamais exist\u00e9, dans le sens o\u00f9 ce mouvement et son expression de puissance sont une force dispensatrice de chaos alors qu&rsquo;on attend d&rsquo;un projet imp\u00e9rial qu&rsquo;il installe un ordre (ordre nouveau, ordre imp\u00e9rial, etc, qu&rsquo;importe la d\u00e9signation dans ce cas, pourvu qu&rsquo;il y ait un ordre).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;am\u00e9ricanisme est une force de d\u00e9sordre, de destruction, de rupture, sans rien \u00e0 proposer en \u00e9change que le chaos ainsi cr\u00e9\u00e9. C&rsquo;est la conclusion (ou la confirmation) \u00e0 laquelle on est conduit \u00e0 la lecture d&rsquo;un <a href=\"http:\/\/atimes.com\/atimes\/Middle_East\/GA12Ak02.html\" class=\"gen\">tr\u00e8s long article sur atimes.com<\/a>, de Michael Schwartz, professeur de sociologie \u00e0 l&rsquo;Universit\u00e9 de l&rsquo;\u00c9tat de New York.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tSchwartz est publi\u00e9 sur quelques sites fameux et de bonne r\u00e9putation (TomDispatch, ZNet, Asian Times), il est l&rsquo;auteur de <em>Radical Politics and Social Structure<\/em>, <em>The Power Structure of American Business<\/em> (avec Beth Mintz), <em>Social Policy and the Conservative Agenda<\/em> (avec Clarence Lo). Il a \u00e9tudi\u00e9 attentivement, en sociologue, les structures sociales et politiques qui se sont mises en place ces deux derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es en Irak, dans divers bastions de la r\u00e9sistance. Son attention s&rsquo;est essentiellement port\u00e9e sur Sadr City, le bastion du jeune chef religieux chiite dans un faubourg de Bagdad : \u00ab <em>Sadr City  the overcrowded, under-serviced 3 million-person Baghdad slum that has been the site of some of the fiercest fighting in Iraq  is the linchpin of the war<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAyant lu cet article et ayant not\u00e9 quelques passages m\u00ealant chaos et Am\u00e9rique, nous nous sommes attach\u00e9s \u00e0 rechercher le mot chaos dans le texte pour constater qu&rsquo;\u00e0 chacune de ses apparitions, effectivement, il est li\u00e9 aux mots Am\u00e9rique ou Am\u00e9ricains et r\u00e9p\u00e8te le constat que l&rsquo;am\u00e9ricanisme est, en Irak, la principale force de d\u00e9sordre. La conclusion implicite, et m\u00eame explicite de Schwartz va de soi : le d\u00e9part des Am\u00e9ricains n&rsquo;entra\u00eenerait certainement pas le chaos ou la guerre civile, il permettrait au contraire \u00e0 un certain ordre de s&rsquo;\u00e9tablir. (\u00ab <em>US success in defeating the guerrillas would result in chaos, whereas a guerrilla victory would bring greater stability (and perhaps too strict an order) to the Iraqi cities.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl s&rsquo;agit sans aucun doute d&rsquo;un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne compl\u00e8tement diff\u00e9rent de ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 exp\u00e9riment\u00e9 jusqu&rsquo;ici. La pouss\u00e9e am\u00e9ricaniste n&rsquo;est certainement pas n\u00e9o-imp\u00e9rialiste ou n\u00e9o-h\u00e9g\u00e9moniste, m\u00eame si elle inclut certains caract\u00e8res et m\u00e9thodes de ces mouvements. Elle n&rsquo;est certainement pas le renouvellement postmoderne des anciens empires coloniaux, essentiellement britanniques et fran\u00e7ais. Les similitudes portent sur des aspects formels ou des aspects tactiques. Sur le fond, la diff\u00e9rence est si fondamentale qu&rsquo;on peut parler de contradiction. Tant que la critique anti-am\u00e9ricaine ou, plus g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement, anti-lib\u00e9rale et anti-capitaliste, voire m\u00eame la critique souverainiste, n&rsquo;auront pas compris cette profonde originalit\u00e9 du mouvement am\u00e9ricaniste grim\u00e9 en imp\u00e9rialisme et sa fonction fondamentale de destruction, elles n&#8217;embrasseront pas le caract\u00e8re exceptionnel du temps historique que nous vivons. Il s&rsquo;agit sans aucun doute d&rsquo;une bataille entre une colossale force d\u00e9structurante et les structures existantes (toutes les structures existantes, les unes apr\u00e8s les autres). Effectivement, et rencontrant ainsi de fa\u00e7on paradoxale les partisans chr\u00e9tiens int\u00e9gristes de GW, cette bataille-l\u00e0 a quelque chose d&rsquo;une bataille finale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous restituons ci-apr\u00e8s les passages mariant effectivement, chaque fois avec un lien de cause \u00e0 effet, la notion de chaos et l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique ou les Am\u00e9ricains.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>The existence of these dual governments in many cities rebuts American claims that US withdrawal would result in chaos. Ironically, just the reverse is true; US success in defeating the guerrillas would result in chaos, whereas a guerrilla victory would bring greater stability (and perhaps too strict an order) to the Iraqi cities<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Ironically, the American attacks in the fall of 2004 underscore the larger contradictions in American policy in Iraq: that the chaos American leaders keep saying they are preventing will, in fact, occur only if US military forces succeed in destroying these nascent city-states.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>In the Shi&rsquo;ite areas of the country, the US maintains a form of technical control, but most troops are stationed outside the cites and do not pacify or disrupt daily lives. There is no evidence to suggest that the American presence has reduced violence or prevented chaos. In fact, accepted wisdom has been that American entry into the cities would be a disruptive, not a pacifying, force.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The final irony is that US success against the guerrillas would almost certainly guarantee long-term chaos in Iraqi society. The evacuation and destruction of Fallujah certainly suggests this, but the chaos there is so monumental that it is probably not typical. The situations in Samarra  successfully reconquered by the US just before Fallujah  and Mosul  the main battleground after Fallujah  are more representative. In each city, the fall and early winter of 2004 were marked by the ongoing guerrilla war, the constant disruption of city life, an absence of any orderly law enforcement, and degenerating economic and social conditions.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The US effort to destroy the insurgency can only succeed if it also destroys the ability of Iraqis to govern their own communities. Since the local clerics and tribal leaders have  from the very beginning  been instrumental in the resistance, defeating the guerrillas involves detaining or killing the leaders who form the backbone of local civil society. This became apparent in the fall of 2004, before the demolition of Fallujah, when the US failed to convince \u00a0\u00bbmoderates\u00a0\u00bb in key cities to negotiate truce agreements that delivered militant leaders to the Americans for arrest and punishment. The failure of these negotiations left the US with the choice of conceding rule to the insurgents or attempting to reconquer the cities and removing the local leadership. In Fallujah, the US military leadership decided that they could only accomplish this by demolishing much of the city and converting the vast majority of residents into refugees.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Contrary to the almost universally accepted mantra, the US is not preventing chaos in Iraq, it is creating it.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;anti-Empire : les Am\u00e9ricains, l&rsquo;Irak et le chaos 12 janvier 2005 L&rsquo;Histoire va vite. En deux ann\u00e9es bien remplies, elle a inflig\u00e9 le plus cat\u00e9gorique des d\u00e9mentis possibles \u00e0 l&rsquo;affirmation imp\u00e9riale de l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique. L&rsquo;am\u00e9ricanisme, pour \u00eatre plus pr\u00e9cis et plus juste en cette occurrence, est sans doute la force la plus anti-imp\u00e9riale qui ait jamais&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4336,4408],"class_list":["post-66190","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-falloujah","tag-sadr"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66190","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66190"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66190\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66190"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66190"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66190"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}