{"id":66191,"date":"2005-01-13T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-01-13T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/01\/13\/et-si-on-partait-maintenant-et-vite\/"},"modified":"2005-01-13T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-01-13T00:00:00","slug":"et-si-on-partait-maintenant-et-vite","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/01\/13\/et-si-on-partait-maintenant-et-vite\/","title":{"rendered":"Et si on partait, maintenant, et vite?<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Et si on partait, maintenant, et vite?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t13 janvier 2005 C’est le dernier sujet \u00e0 la mode, le toute la ville en parle du moment, le hot topic<\/em>. Impressionnant quand il s’agit de Washington, encore plus quand il s’agit de l’Irak \u00e0 Washington, supr\u00eamement impressionnant lorsqu’il s’agit de parler d’un d\u00e9sengagement des Am\u00e9ricains d’Irak. Plus personne ne songe aujourd’hui \u00e0 s’en cacher, le sujet est sur la table. On est au point o\u00f9 un \u00e9dito du New York Times du jour<\/a> recommande de postposer les \u00e9lections, pour \u00e9viter, ou, \u00e0 tout le moins, retarder le pire : \u00ab The coming elections long touted as the beginning of a new, democratic Iraq – are looking more and more like the beginning of that worst-case scenario. It’s time to talk about postponing the vote.<\/em> \u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est ce que nous confient David A. Sanger et Eric Schmitt, dans le Washington Post du 10 janvier 2005<\/a> : en un mot, \u00ab How U.S. Might Disengage in Iraq?<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Three weeks before the election in Iraq, conversation has started bubbling up in Congress, in the Pentagon and some days even in the White House about when and how American forces might begin to disengage in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb So far it is mostly talk, not planning. The only thing resembling a formal map to the exit door is a series of Pentagon contingency plans for events after the Jan. 30 elections. But a senior administration official warned over the weekend against reading too much into that, saying the Pentagon has plans for everything, from the outbreak of war in Korea to relief missions in Africa.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The rumblings about disengagement have grown distinctly louder as members of Congress return from their districts after the winter recess, and as military officers try to game out how Sunni Arabs and Shiites might react to the election results. The annual drafting of the budget is a reminder that the American presence in Iraq is costing nearly $4.5 billion a month and putting huge strains on the military. And White House officials contemplate the political costs of a second term possibly dominated by a nightly accounting of continuing casualties.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb By all accounts, President Bush has not joined the conversation about disengagement so far, though a few senior members of his national security team have.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb A senior administration official said in an interview this weekend that Mr. Bush still intended to stick to his plan, refining his strategy of training Iraqis to take over security duties from Americans, but not wavering from his promise to stay until the job is done. We are not in the business of trying to float timetables, the official insisted. The only metric we have is when we can turn more and more over to local forces.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But all over Washington, there is talk about new ways to define when the mission is accomplished not to cut and run, but not to linger, either. Several administration officials acknowledge that Mr. Bush will face crucial decisions soon after Jan. 30, when it should become clearer whether the election has resulted in more stability or more insurgency.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tEn quelques semaines, la perspective a compl\u00e8tement bascul\u00e9. La r\u00e9\u00e9lection de GW avait conduit \u00e0 un regain d’optimisme, \u00e0 une tentative de r\u00e9affirmation de puissance qui s’\u00e9tait traduite sur le terrain par le lamentable \u00e9crasement de Falloujah. Malgr\u00e9 l’action de divers commentateurs hollywoodiens<\/a>, l’attaque de Falloujah est un \u00e9chec sanglant pour ce qui est de son effet sur la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale. Depuis, la situation n’a cess\u00e9 de se d\u00e9t\u00e9riorer. L’optimisme post-\u00e9lectoral a brusquement bascul\u00e9 en un pessimisme cr\u00e9pusculaire \u00e0 Washington.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa publication simultan\u00e9e, le m\u00eame jour sur le site Antiwar.com<\/em>, de deux textes de deux pal\u00e9o-conservateurs isolationnistes fameux, le r\u00e9publicain Patrick Buchanan<\/a> et le libertarien Justin Raimundo<\/a>, applaudissant \u00e0 l’\u00e9volution radicale de l’opinion washingtonienne, est un signe qui ne trompe pas. Mettant en \u00e9vidence l’\u00e9volution washingtonienne, les deux auteurs montrent que son fondement, m\u00eame chez des experts catalogu\u00e9s au centre et connus comme internationalistes, se trouve ancr\u00e9 dans la logique isolationniste. Raimundo souligne que, m\u00eame chez un expert militaire travaillant avec le Pentagone comme Edward Luttwak, la perspective id\u00e9ale aujourd’hui est un d\u00e9sengagement complet.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab [Luttwak said:]With Iraq more like Spain in 1808 than like Germany or Japan after 1945, any democracy it sustains is bound to be more veneer than substance. Its chances of survival will be much higher if pan-Arab nationalists, Islamists, and foreign meddlers are neutralized by diplomacy and disengagement. Leaving behind a major garrison would only evoke continuing hostility to both Americans and Iraqi democrats. Once U.S. soldiers have left Iraqi cities, towns, and villages, some could remain a while in remote desert bases to fight off full-scale military attacks against the government but even this could incite opposition, such as happened in Saudi Arabia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb [Luttwak is] right about the garrison: it would be a target of choice, and a de-legitimizing factor (perhaps a critical one) in deciding the fate of the regime we leave behind. Total disengagement is risky, and Luttwak acknowledges this, but its risks are actually lower than the alternative of an indefinite occupation, and its benefits might surprise us. I’m sure Scowcroft, Brzezinski, Scheuer, and an increasingly vocal majority of the American people would agree.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tToutes ces agitations \u00e0 l’approche des \u00e9lections ne reposent pas seulement sur des sp\u00e9culations. Pour certains, l’enjeu des \u00e9lections est d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 le d\u00e9part des Am\u00e9ricains. Le Financial Times du 10 janvier<\/a> rapportait ceci: \u00ab On Saturday the conservative Sunni organisation, the Association of Muslim Scholars, joined the calls after meeting US representatives to demand a timetable for withdrawal. The group was reported to have said it would abandon its election boycott in return for a departure date for US forces.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’atmosph\u00e8re \u00e0 Washington est encore plus singuli\u00e8re. Elle pourrait para\u00eetre suivre l’\u00e9volution de la situation en Irak mais, en r\u00e9alit\u00e9, correspond \u00e9galement, en bonne partie, \u00e0 une \u00e9volution psychologique propre \u00e0 l’establishment<\/em> washingtonien. L’\u00e9lan de l’\u00e9lection pr\u00e9sidentielle d\u00fb aux conditions tr\u00e8s tendues qu’on a connues, o\u00f9 m\u00eame les d\u00e9mocrates se sont abstenus de toute attaque d’une r\u00e9elle signification contre la politique de GW Bush pour resserrer les rangs au nom d’une certaine solidarit\u00e9, est bris\u00e9 aujourd’hui. La chute d\u00e9pressionnaire de l’humeur correspond \u00e0 un retour aux r\u00e9alit\u00e9s, avec la situation extraordinairement catastrophique que conna\u00eet l’Irak, avec une perception d’autant plus cr\u00e9pusculaire que l’optimisme de la p\u00e9riode pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente fut artificiel. Ce sont ces conditions qui justifient les remous politiques de Washington, violences feutr\u00e9es mais n\u00e9anmoins significatives. Elles conduisent un Buchanan \u00e0 \u00e9crire :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab President Bush now approaches the crossroads LBJ reached in December 1967. Then, Gen. William Westmoreland came home to tell LBJ he needed 200,000 more troops, in addition to the 500,000 already committed. A war-weary LBJ said no. Came then the Tet Offensive, and the presidency of Lyndon Johnson was broken.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Bush is nearing his Tet moment. After the Jan. 30 elections, he will have three options. Persevere in a no-win war with 150,000 U.S. troops bleeding indefinitely, until America turns on him, his policy, and his party. Send in tens of thousands of fresh U.S. troops to crush the insurgency, as we undertake a years-long program of training Iraqis to defend their own democracy. Third, find an honorable exit, and leave Iraq to the Iraqis.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tPour autant, rien n’est jou\u00e9, d’abord, parce que ce n’est pas un jeu, m\u00eame pas une bataille politique. Au-del\u00e0 des circonstances politiciennes, il y a l’extraordinaire pression des \u00e9v\u00e9nements en Irak et, pour l’instant, litt\u00e9ralement, un pr\u00e9sident qui ne se doute de rien. (La fiction d’un GW Bush n’acceptant que les bonnes nouvelles n’en est pas une, selon l’excellent et bien inform\u00e9 Nelson Report<\/em> du 7 janvier , relay\u00e9 par Antiwar.com<\/a> : \u00ab There is rising concern amongst senior officials that President Bush does not grasp the increasingly grim reality of the security situation in Iraq because he refuses to listen to that type of information. Our sources say that attempts to brief Bush on various grim realities have been personally rebuffed by the President, who actually says that he does not want to hear bad news.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa d\u00e9cision (retrait d’Irak?) serait tr\u00e8s difficile \u00e0 prendre en temps normal ; qu’on imagine avec de telles extravagances, de telles tensions D’autre part, il faut que la r\u00e9sistance, sur le terrain, accepte de laisser la situation permettre un \u00e9ventuel d\u00e9part honorable aux Am\u00e9ricains. Mais non, il y a surtout ceci : constamment, les Am\u00e9ricains ont \u00e9t\u00e9 men\u00e9s par les \u00e9v\u00e9nements qu’ils suscitaient par leurs \u00e9pouvantables maladresses, qui sont en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 le reflet de leur comportement normal. Cela va continuer. Cela va s’acc\u00e9l\u00e9rer. Paradoxalement, la pire des occurrences serait que la situation interdise un d\u00e9part d\u00e9cent des Am\u00e9ricains, comme celui qu’on propose aujourd’hui. La puissance am\u00e9ricaine s’ab\u00eemerait dans le trou noir du risque \u00e9pouvantable et grandissant d’une v\u00e9ritable d\u00e9route.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Et si on partait, maintenant, et vite? 13 janvier 2005 C’est le dernier sujet \u00e0 la mode, le toute la ville en parle du moment, le hot topic. Impressionnant quand il s’agit de Washington, encore plus quand il s’agit de l’Irak \u00e0 Washington, supr\u00eamement impressionnant lorsqu’il s’agit de parler d’un d\u00e9sengagement des Am\u00e9ricains d’Irak. Plus… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3335,4409,1383],"class_list":["post-66191","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-buchanan","tag-luttwak","tag-raimundo"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66191","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66191"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66191\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66191"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66191"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66191"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}