{"id":66195,"date":"2005-01-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-01-17T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/01\/17\/la-psychologie-gw-du-good-news-only-devient-un-probleme-politique-crucial\/"},"modified":"2005-01-17T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-01-17T00:00:00","slug":"la-psychologie-gw-du-good-news-only-devient-un-probleme-politique-crucial","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/01\/17\/la-psychologie-gw-du-good-news-only-devient-un-probleme-politique-crucial\/","title":{"rendered":"La psychologie GW du \u201cgood news only\u201d devient un probl\u00e8me politique crucial<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

La psychologie du good news only devient un probl\u00e8me politique crucial<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t17 janvier 2005 Diverses indications ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 paru dans la presse, \u00e0 partir d’une information dont il a \u00e9t\u00e9 fait grand cas, du 3 janvier dernier, du Nelson Report<\/em> (et dont nous nous sommes nous-m\u00eames fait l’\u00e9cho<\/a>). Cette newsletter<\/em> de Ralph Nelson a tr\u00e8s grande r\u00e9putation \u00e0 Washington. L’information du 3 janvier est la suivante :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab Our sources say that attempts to brief Bush on various grim realities have been personally rebuffed by the President, who actually says that he does not want to hear bad news. Rather, Bush makes clear that all he wants are progress reports, where they exist, and those facts which seem to support his declared mission in Iraq . . . building democracy. that’s all he wants to hear about, we have been told. So in are the latest totals on school openings, and out are reports from senior US military commanders (and those intelligence experts still on the job) that they see an insurgency becoming increasingly effective, and their projection that it will just get worse.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t• On retrouve des traces des remarques de Ralph Nelson dans un commentaire de Srdja Trifkovic, dans Chronicle Magazine du 11 janvier 2005<\/a>, sous le titre de Mr. Bush and the lure of pseudo-reality<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le 14 janvier, dans sa chronique du Guardian<\/em>, Sidney Blumenthal, fait allusion au m\u00eame ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne, en l’\u00e9tendant \u00e0 toute l’administration, particuli\u00e8rement le d\u00e9partement de la d\u00e9fense (DoD), o\u00f9 des rapports d\u00e9crivant une situation d\u00e9favorable en Irak sont censur\u00e9s ou annul\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn a d\u00e9j\u00e0 largement mis en \u00e9vidence le ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne, que nous tendons \u00e9videmment \u00e0 assimiler \u00e0 notre concept de virtualisme: que ce soient les r\u00e9v\u00e9lations de Ron Suskind sur la faith-based community<\/a> dont le grand pr\u00eatre est GW, que ce soient les rapports de GW avec les militaires<\/a> (ce dernier point se rapprochant clairement des r\u00e9v\u00e9lations de Nelson et de Blumenthal, avec Seymour Hersh rapportant que des militaires suppriment les trop mauvaises nouvelles dans leurs rapports de crainte des r\u00e9actions de la hi\u00e9rarchie).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(En m\u00eame temps, on le sait, les hypoth\u00e8ses sur la personnalit\u00e9 de GW Bush, ses troubles psychologiques, ne manquent pas. On signale ici la derni\u00e8re en date que nous avons pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e, celle de Paul Levy<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEn m\u00eame temps que monte la tension \u00e0 Washington<\/a>, cette question de la personnalit\u00e9 de GW Bush, de son comportement, de son attitude psychologique, devient une question publique. Les conditions s’en pr\u00e9cisent de plus en plus chaque jour, \u00e9cartant les th\u00e8ses complotistes pour en arriver au cur de la question, qui est effectivement psychologique. Trifkovic \u00e9crit: \u00ab Especially alarming is the insistence of Nelson’s sources that this good news only directive comes from Bush himself, and that it is not the result of senior officials around him trying to mislead or insulate him. Nelson concludes that whether self-imposed, or due to manipulation by irresponsible subordinates, the information\/intelligence vacuum at the highest levels of the White House increasingly frightens those officials interested in objective assessment, and not just selling a political message.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl est caract\u00e9ristique que les deux textes que nous citons ici, qui n’ont entre eux aucune connexion, en viennent naturellement \u00e0 la m\u00eame conclusion qui est \u00e9galement dans tous les esprits. GW est en train de transformer sa pr\u00e9sidence en une situation de bunker.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tSrdja Trifkovic \u00e9crit: \u00ab Germany’s defeat in World War II was greatly accelerated by Hitler’s refusalespecially in the final two yearsto accept any bad news, and to accuse those trying to present such news of disloyalty, defeatism, or stupidity. Enemy forces were invariably underrated, own strength overestimated, and self-deceptions believed with such firmness that, by mid-1944, Field Marshal Rommel felt compelled to conclude that the Fuehrer was living in a Wolkenkuckucksheim (\u00a0\u00bbcloud cuckoo land\u00a0\u00bb). Is it conceivable that the atmosphere in the White House is beginning to resemble that at Rastenburg?<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSidney Blumenthal \u00e9crit: \u00ab President Bush clings to good news and happy talk, such as the number of school openings in Iraq. Those with gloomy assessments are not permitted to appear before him. The president orders no meetings on options based on worst-case scenarios. Military strategists and officers are systematically ignored. Suppression of contrary \u00a0\u00bbmetrics\u00a0\u00bb is done in his name and spirit. Bush makes his decisions from a self-imposed bunker, a situation room of the mind, where ideological fantasies substitute for reality.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tNous sommes au tout d\u00e9but du deuxi\u00e8me mandat de GW Bush. La crise irakienne ne cesse de bouillonner. Le pays, l’Irak, est devenu, selon l’analyse de la CIA elle-m\u00eame<\/a>, le nouveau \u00ab paradis des terroristes<\/em> \u00bb, rempla\u00e7ant en cela l’Afghanistan d’avant l’intervention d’octobre 2001. Voil\u00e0 qui assure la dur\u00e9e de la crise irakienne, avec la confrontation avec l’arm\u00e9e US, donc la dur\u00e9e de la tension \u00e0 Washington. La situation de tension directement g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9e par cette crise irakienne a effectivement atteint Washington et est directement confront\u00e9e d\u00e9sormais \u00e0 cette interrogation sur la personnalit\u00e9 et le comportement de GW Bush. On comprend combien, par son caract\u00e8re irrationnel, cette interrogation \u00e9chappe aux processus de s\u00fbret\u00e9 habituels touchant le fonctionnement du syst\u00e8me. Par la force des choses, c’est-\u00e0-dire la combinaison des \u00e9vidences du pouvoir et de l’importance du pr\u00e9sident dans une crise, cette interrogation va devenir le centre de la crise et va bient\u00f4t \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme le verrou de la crise. Il s’agit d’une situation compl\u00e8tement, totalement sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent: m\u00eame l’\u00e9pisode du Watergate ne peut lui \u00eatre compar\u00e9, dans la mesure o\u00f9 aucun aspect l\u00e9gal, institutionnel, rien de rationnel, si l’on veut, n’est pour l’instant engag\u00e9. Par d\u00e9finition, c’est une situation incontr\u00f4lable et il est impossible d’en pr\u00e9voir les cons\u00e9quences, sauf le constat que toutes les cons\u00e9quences sont possibles.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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La psychologie du good news only devient un probl\u00e8me politique crucial 17 janvier 2005 Diverses indications ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 paru dans la presse, \u00e0 partir d’une information dont il a \u00e9t\u00e9 fait grand cas, du 3 janvier dernier, du Nelson Report (et dont nous nous sommes nous-m\u00eames fait l’\u00e9cho). Cette newsletter de Ralph Nelson a tr\u00e8s… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[1081,4410,3637,4373],"class_list":["post-66195","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-blumenthal","tag-nelson","tag-report","tag-suskind"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66195","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66195"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66195\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66195"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66195"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66195"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}