{"id":66232,"date":"2005-02-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-02-15T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/02\/15\/lirak-et-la-bataille-dalger\/"},"modified":"2005-02-15T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-02-15T00:00:00","slug":"lirak-et-la-bataille-dalger","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/02\/15\/lirak-et-la-bataille-dalger\/","title":{"rendered":"L’Irak et La bataille d’Alger<\/em>"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’Irak et La bataille d’Alger<\/em><\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\t14 f\u00e9vrier 2005 Nous nous arr\u00eatons \u00e0 un texte consacr\u00e9 \u00e0 la question du terrorisme et \u00e0 la fa\u00e7on dont, \u00e0 cette lumi\u00e8re, la guerre est men\u00e9e en Irak. Cette analyse est originaire de la grande presse am\u00e9ricaine (UPI) et elle est (pourtant) absolument remarquable. En cela, c’est d\u00e9j\u00e0, sur la question d\u00e9licatissime qu’il traite, un \u00e9v\u00e9nement remarquable. Il s’appuie sur la r\u00e9f\u00e9rence de la guerre d’Alg\u00e9rie et du film La bataille d’Alger<\/em>, la vision de ce film par l’auteur est m\u00eame la cause conjoncturelle de l’analyse, sur lequel tant de sornettes ont \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9crites. Richard Sale, Intelligence Correspondant<\/em> chez UPI, \u00e9vite lestement le pi\u00e8ge des sornettes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(Nous reviendrons sur le cheminement du film La bataille d’Alger<\/em> dans les r\u00e9flexions US, essentiellement au Pentagone, sur la guerre contre le terrorisme. C’est \u00e0 l’\u00e9t\u00e9 2003 qu’a \u00e9t\u00e9 signal\u00e9 pour la premi\u00e8re fois que ce film, et la guerre d’Alg\u00e9rie par cons\u00e9quent mais la guerre d’Alg\u00e9rie principalement au travers de ce film, servaient de r\u00e9f\u00e9rences aux experts du Pentagone et d’ailleurs pour essayer de comprendre la guerre contre le terrorisme. C’est dans un texte de David Ignatius, dans le Washington Post du 26 ao\u00fbt 2003<\/a>, qu’il est fait mention du fait dans la presse pour la premi\u00e8re fois, dans ces termes: \u00ab Pentagon sources report one hopeful sign that the military is thinking creatively and unconventionally about Iraq. The Pentagon’s special operations chiefs have scheduled a showing tomorrow in the Army auditorium of The Battle of Algiers, a classic film that examines how the French, despite overwhelming military superiority, were defeated by Algerian resistance fighters.<\/em> \u00bb Comme on le lit plus bas, Richard Sale rapporte cette remarque judicieuse d’une de ses sources sur l’effet de cette initiative: \u00ab Everyone seems to take away from it the message they want rather than the message the film conveys.<\/em> \u00bb C’est \u00e9vident d\u00e8s la remarque d’Igniatius, qui affirme que les Fran\u00e7ais furent battus par le FLN, ce qui est historiquement et militairement faux: la guerre d’Alg\u00e9rie fut militairement gagn\u00e9e par la France (c’\u00e9tait fait \u00e0 l’\u00e9t\u00e9 1960, apr\u00e8s le succ\u00e8s des op\u00e9rations Jumelles<\/em> et du plan Challe, qui bris\u00e8rent les structures politico-militaires de l’ALN) mais la politique d\u00e9cid\u00e9e par le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de Gaulle fut de donner l’ind\u00e9pendance \u00e0 l’Alg\u00e9rie.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tRichard Sale cite un de ses amis, colonel de l’U.S. Army, lui-m\u00eame citant le colonel Roger Trinquier, qui fit la guerre d’Indochine et la guerre d’Alg\u00e9rie (notamment \u00e0 la t\u00eate du 2\u00e8me RPC, R\u00e9giment de Parachutistes Coloniaux, devenu RPIMa, ou R\u00e9giment de Parachutistes d’Infanterie de Marine, et non comme officier de renseignement, comme l’indique Sale). Effectivement, Trinquier a \u00e9t\u00e9 une des principales sources de l’U.S. Army<\/a> dans son \u00e9tude de l’histoire et de la technique de la guerre contre-r\u00e9volutionnaire (comme l’appelait Trinquier).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est notamment \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re des \u00e9crits de Trinquier que Richard Sale propose son analyse (tr\u00e8s) critique du probl\u00e8me am\u00e9ricain face au terrorisme et \u00e0 la gu\u00e9rilla, principalement en Irak. Cela permet \u00e0 Sale de proposer des remarques bien inhabituelles sous une plume am\u00e9ricaine, comme celle-ci qui implique que tous les terroristes ne sont pas des cr\u00e9atures du Diable \u00e0 br\u00fbler imm\u00e9diatement et que la th\u00e8se philosophique du bien contre le mal de GW Bush n’est pas n\u00e9cessairement l’extr\u00eame de la pens\u00e9e politique occidentale :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab But Trinquier notes that the FLN terrorist should not be considered a criminal because he fights within the framework of his organization, without personal interest, for a cause he considers noble and for a respectable idea. Trinquier’s fairness of portrayal of the French attitude toward Algerian terrorism and the Frenchman’s refusal to talk cant from some melodramatic high ground of good vs. evil is refreshing, and his respect for the enemy clearly required great moral courage.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’ensemble de l’analyse est \u00e0 cette aune et montre aussi bien l’extraordinaire erreur g\u00e9n\u00e9rale qui caract\u00e9rise le comportement am\u00e9ricain en Irak. Il s’agit principalement des rapports des Am\u00e9ricains avec la population, ce par quoi, selon Trinquier et les Fran\u00e7ais, se gagne ou se perd une guerre anti-gu\u00e9rilla. \u00ab For the French, this was another principle to be observed. Your forces had to be in constant contact with the populace to develop rapport. If you withdrew to fortified areas, you left those vacated areas in control of the enemy. There were no Green Zones in Algiers.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAu-del\u00e0 de l’analyse de la guerre et de ses \u00e9checs, il est manifeste qu’on se trouve devant deux conceptions du monde, deux attitudes psychologiques collectives profond\u00e9ment \u00e9trang\u00e8res l’une \u00e0 l’autre. Rappelant la guerre d’Alg\u00e9rie et les conceptions fran\u00e7aises en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, l’analyse montre que toutes les conceptions sur le terrorisme, sur la gu\u00e9rilla, sur les affrontements soi- disant de civilisations, pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s aujourd’hui comme des conflits postmodernes, caract\u00e9ristiques du XXI\u00e8me si\u00e8cle et inaugurant une \u00e8re nouvelle, sont en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes bien anciens, qui ont toujours exist\u00e9 d’une fa\u00e7on ou l’autre, particuli\u00e8rement dans le cadre des conflits de la colonisation et de la d\u00e9colonisation. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici le texte de Richard Sale<\/a>, publi\u00e9 le 11 f\u00e9vrier 2005.<\/p>\n

Review: Battle of Algiers<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\tBy Richard Sale, UPI Intelligence Correspondent, February 11, 2005<\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNew York Over the weekend I viewed the film \u00a0\u00bbThe Battle of Algiers,\u00a0\u00bb which I had not seen since the mid-1970s. Made by leftist filmmaker, Gille Pontecorvo, the film was startlingly real and, given its highly charged subject, displays an amazing fairness toward both sides.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis may seem an odd time to review a film made in 1966, but it is a film that has been frequently viewed within the last two years or so by senior Bush administration officials, according to serving U.S. intelligence sources. Everyone seems to take away from it the message they want rather than the message the film conveys, one of these told United Press International, speaking on condition of strict anonymity.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut what made the film stand out for me was that the principles of counterinsurgency are so accurately presented.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tI had a recent angry e-mail from a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel in Iraq who said that modern masterpieces of intelligence writing such as Modern War by Roger Trinquier, an intelligence officer of the French Army who played a major part in helping Paris win the Battle of Algiers, were being neglected by everyone in Iraq, but especially people in the press. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSo this column may be the appropriate place to give Trinquier’s principles some attention. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVery early in the film, the Algerian insurgent organization the FLN, or National Liberation Front issues a directive aimed at the populace. The directive is quite paternal and dictatorial in its tone. The FLN, the directive says, knows what is best for the populace to do and believe in order to rid Algiers of the French yoke, and, on the grounds of this worthy aim, indicative of superiority, demands the support of the populace.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThus, a key objective of any insurgency very quickly emerges: in a guerrilla war, the allegiance of the civilian population becomes the most vital objectives of the struggle. Failing that, control of the populace is next in importance, a difficult goal to attain since insurgents often can impose themselves on the bulk of the population by means of terror, and in spite of the population’s own views. As a result, even a cowed population can be used against the legitimate power, providing cover and support, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn the film, it’s clear the FLN was quick to use terror as part of its recruitment and assertion of authenticity. In seeking to control the Algerian people, the FLN chose terror and the murder of innocents as an appropriate weapon, and its effectiveness is undeniable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhat one sees next in the film is that the FLN, a clandestine group of 1,200 armed men supported by another 4500, is very clear about its aims: it wants to overthrow French authority and replace it with its own.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTrinquier says in his book: What characterizes modern terrorism, and makes for its basic strength, is the slaughter of generally defenseless persons.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tTrinquier also adds another strength utilized by insurgents: Agents of the (FLN) have a free hand to organize and to manipulate the population at will. The atrocities committed by the FLN to increase its hold over the population of Algiers were innumerable, says Trinquier, a real echo of the slaughter of innocents in Iraq.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut Trinquier notes that the FLN terrorist should not be considered a criminal because he fights within the framework of his organization, without personal interest, for a cause he considers noble and for a respectable idea. Trinquier’s fairness of portrayal of the French attitude toward Algerian terrorism and the Frenchman’s refusal to talk cant from some melodramatic high ground of good vs. evil is refreshing, and his respect for the enemy clearly required great moral courage.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis same exacting balance is accurately portrayed in the film.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHow did the French win the battle of Algiers? By means of information, the careful collection of intelligence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tI read somewhere that when Napoleon captured cities in the Rhine in 1806, he first made an inventory of the houses there, giving each a number. He then had his officials interview the oldest inhabitant of the house and got from him or her a list of tenants. Any tenants who remained missing or unaccounted for were presumed to be suspects and became objects of investigation and\/or pursuit.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA friend of mine in England, Colin Rowat, told me recently that the British intelligence had done something similar when they entered Iraq in the 1920s, undergoing a very careful program of mapping the tribes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn the film, a French paratroop colonel is shown before a blackboard outlining what they know about the organization set up so each member knows only the man who chose him to serve and the two men he chose as his subordinates.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAccording to Trinquier, French intelligence was very methodical. It divided the city into districts, each of which had a chief and two or three assistants. These divided the district into sub-districts, and so on, until each building or group of buildings got a chief and two or three assistants who were in direct contact with the populace.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFor the French, this was another principle to be observed. Your forces had to be in constant contact with the populace to develop rapport. If you withdrew to fortified areas, you left those vacated areas in control of the enemy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThere were no Green Zones in Algiers.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAnd the French, unlike U.S. forces in Iraq, were delicately tactful in their dealings with the populace they knew the inhabitants would reject any cooperation that would subject them to enemy retaliation and so were very canny and careful.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe French also conducted a census of the city’s entire population. Once a relation was established with the populace, the chiefs of sub divisions were designated. The chief qualification of the sub-district leader was that he have firm attachments in the sub-district, whether it was a shop, business, or large family that would be difficult for him to abandon.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe sub-district leader stood at the apex of an organization that was parallel to the terrorists’.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAs a next step, all the city inhabitants were given a census card, one of which was in the hands of French intelligence or French police.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe French immediately understood that the chief object of their warfare was the protection of the population, not the pursuit and killing of bad guys.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe film makes clear that to gain information on FLN cells before those cells could regroup, merciless torture was employed. The French colonel of intelligence admits this to the French press, but asks them, do they want France to remain in Algiers or get out? If they want Algeria to remain French, then they must be willing to bear the moral risks and heavy ethical costs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn no way do I condone torture, but I have not been forced to face the necessities that the French had to face in getting intelligence swiftly in order to collapse the terrorist cells.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn any case, the film is a masterpiece well worth seeing. Considering the scriptwriter, Franco Solinas, was a communist, the work has remarkable evenness of characterization throughout. It may not be just, but it is fair. And the message is clear: The French won the battle, but lost the war.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlgeria became independent, and the film ends with joyous Arab crowds in the streets, celebrating, keeping out of sight the slaughter by the FLN of between 30,000 to 150,000 Arabs who had remained loyal to France, this figure according to military historian John Keegan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’Irak et La bataille d’Alger 14 f\u00e9vrier 2005 Nous nous arr\u00eatons \u00e0 un texte consacr\u00e9 \u00e0 la question du terrorisme et \u00e0 la fa\u00e7on dont, \u00e0 cette lumi\u00e8re, la guerre est men\u00e9e en Irak. Cette analyse est originaire de la grande presse am\u00e9ricaine (UPI) et elle est (pourtant) absolument remarquable. En cela, c’est d\u00e9j\u00e0, sur… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4453,4454,4450,4451,4452,4281,4449],"class_list":["post-66232","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-bataiulle","tag-dalger","tag-fln","tag-parachutistes","tag-pontecorvo","tag-torture","tag-trinquier"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66232","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66232"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66232\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66232"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66232"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66232"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}