{"id":66234,"date":"2005-02-18T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-02-18T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/02\/18\/initiative-schroeder-et-tempete-a-lotan\/"},"modified":"2005-02-18T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-02-18T00:00:00","slug":"initiative-schroeder-et-tempete-a-lotan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/02\/18\/initiative-schroeder-et-tempete-a-lotan\/","title":{"rendered":"Initiative Schr\u00f6der et temp\u00eate \u00e0 l’OTAN<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Initiative Schr\u00f6der et temp\u00eate \u00e0 l’OTAN<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t18 f\u00e9vrier 2005 Nul ne peut douter que c’est avec les meilleures intentions du monde que le chancelier Schr\u00f6der a lanc\u00e9 son initiative samedi dernier, \u00e0 Munich. (Il demande l’instauration d’un groupe de concertation de haut niveau, au sein duquel USA et Europe pourraient discuter de probl\u00e8mes non-militaires qui se posent aux deux blocs. Schr\u00f6der expliquait que les relations dans leur forme pr\u00e9sente, \u00e0 l’OTAN, \u00ab ne font justice ni \u00e0 l’importance grandissante de l’Union, ni aux nouvelles demandes de coop\u00e9ration transatlantique<\/em> \u00bb.) L’OTAN est en train d’en subir les effets. Nos sources \u00e0 l’organisation d\u00e9crivent \u00ab la v\u00e9ritable temp\u00eate qui souffle avec la proposition Schr\u00f6der et il est devenu en quelques jours impensable qu’on n’en parle pas lors du sommet de l’OTAN de mardi, avec GW Bush<\/em> \u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEntre-temps, depuis samedi, Schr\u00f6der est revenu sur le sujet le 15 f\u00e9vrier, apr\u00e8s une rencontre avec Barroso. \u00ab That some people at the conference itself may have held a somewhat different view is something I can fully understand. But I really believe that it contributes to a strengthening of NATO and transatlantic relations if we speak more openly on political issues than we have tended to in the past<\/em> \u00bb. La position de Schr\u00f6der est donc claire: \u00ab I Stand by what I said at the Munich conference.<\/em> \u00bb Schr\u00f6der est appuy\u00e9 par Solana, qui d\u00e9clare: \u00ab This is an initiative that goes in the direction of making more effective the trans-Atlantic cooperation.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa violence de certains commentaires am\u00e9ricains, par le m\u00e9pris pour Schr\u00f6der qu’on y distingue, est r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice de bien des attitudes et des jugements que rien n’a \u00e9cart\u00e9s dans les activit\u00e9s mondaines de ces derniers jours. Il ne peut \u00e9tonner personne qu’un de ces commentaires soit, le 14 f\u00e9vrier dans l’International Herald Tribune,<\/a> le fait de John Vinocur, homme-lige des remises en place des alli\u00e9s r\u00e9calcitrants, particuli\u00e8rement les Allemands. L’intervention de Vinocur a \u00e9t\u00e9 si brutale que IHT s’est cru oblig\u00e9, renseignements pris, de rectifier le tir, ou, dans tous les cas, de l’adoucir notablement: non, apr\u00e8s tout, Schr\u00f6der ne dit pas que des insolences insupportables \u00e0 des oreilles washingtoniennes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici donc Vinocur-Bingo :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Diplomacy in action. Here was Condoleezza Rice scooting to Paris and Brussels and Luxembourg, deftly working the idea that Europe mattered and the United States respected it. And here was a group of heavyweight American pols in town for a postscript, attending the weekend’s yearly seminar of defense and security experts (Don Rumsfeld and John McCain among the Republicans, Joe Lieberman and Hillary Clinton for the Democrats) and thinking, fair traders all, there might be some signs of a quick and generous European response.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The fact was that a speech by Gerhard Schr\u00f6der, billed as a German-take-on-the-world and read out by Defense Minister Peter Struck (Schr\u00f6der called in sick), grated. The Bush folk, trying so hard to be Europe-amenable seven days before the president’s arrival, suddenly found themselves laboring not to look too wrong-footed, embarrassed or provoked by a message from the chancellor they did not fully expect.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb What they got from Schr\u00f6der was a complaining five pages, mostly about the unsatisfactory state of trans-Atlantic relations. His call for an umpteenth blue-ribbon panel to assess what to do followed. But it did not sing, either of great affection for the old alliance of democracies that faced down the Soviet Union and led to German reunification, or of new idealistic ambitions for NATO, if the chancellor had any close to his heart. Alongside Rice’s careful mix last week of high regard for Europe and passionately stated aspirations for freedom in places where there is none now, Schr\u00f6der’s horizons were almost provincial<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t Suivi du rectif’ (ou faisant fonction de), sous forme de l’\u00e9dito de l’IHT<\/a> du 15 f\u00e9vrier :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab None of that undermines the validity of the point Schr\u00f6der made. NATO was not where Iraq was debated, nor is it where arms sales to China or the nuclear program in Iran are being discussed. That may be the way the Bush administration would prefer to keep things. But Schr\u00f6der evidently took to heart what Rice said on her European visit about building a real trans-Atlantic partnership; if this is really to happen, he said in effect, the existing avenues of communications – most notably NATO – have to be re-examined. His aides subsequently insisted that his intention was not to bury NATO, but to rejuvenate it. At the least, he hoped to throw out some ideas for discussion next week at a NATO summit and in Schr\u00f6der’s scheduled meetings with Bush.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb We don’t want to bury NATO either, but there is a lot to reexamine. Many leaders on both sides of the Atlantic would probably prefer to paper over the bitter disputes of the past three years with stirring affirmations of shared values and goals.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Certainly there are many in the Bush administration who would prefer to keep NATO the way it is, as an alliance they can control or ignore. Schr\u00f6der’s message was that they cannot. It is precisely because the United States and Europe have seen the dangers of estrangement in Iraq, because they share so many challenges, and because the North Atlantic alliance is so critical to their common future, that they must embark on a serious and thorough review of what needs to be fixed, and how.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCes deux appr\u00e9ciations, la critique abrupte et la r\u00e9habilitation raisonnable peuvent \u00e9galement \u00eatre vues comme compl\u00e9mentaires. En effet, le discours de Schr\u00f6der demande deux choses, ce qui est bien mis en \u00e9vidence par une analyse de WSWS<\/a> de ce jour:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• D’une part, un r\u00f4le international accru pour l’Allemagne, passant notamment par un si\u00e8ge permanent (avec droit de veto) au Conseil de S\u00e9curit\u00e9 de l’ONU. C’est ce qui a provoqu\u00e9 la col\u00e8re de Vinocur. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• D’autre part, un rafra\u00eechissement\/rajeunissement de l’OTAN, avec sa transformation en organe de consultation entre UE et USA. C’est ce qui am\u00e8ne l’approbation de l’\u00e9dito du IHT.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes r\u00e9actions sont chaotiques et d\u00e9sordonn\u00e9es. Il n’est pas s\u00fbr que ce soit le fond des choses qui provoque ces r\u00e9actions, mais plut\u00f4t le seul fait qu’il s’agisse d’une proposition s\u00e9rieuse, portant sur la substance. La p\u00e9riode actuelle devait \u00eatre consacr\u00e9e exclusivement \u00e0 la forme, c’est-\u00e0-dire l’apparence, qui devait sanctionner l’irr\u00e9sistible r\u00e9conciliation USA-UE. On ne s’attendait pas \u00e0 ce qu’une proposition f\u00fbt introduite dans le circuit, qui port\u00e2t sur le fond.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDe m\u00eame, \u00e0 l’OTAN, ces derniers jours, nos sources signalent qu’on assiste \u00e0 un changement \u00e9trange, en m\u00eame temps que l’ordre du jour a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9 \u00e0 plusieurs reprises (les Ukrainiens, qu’on devait rencontrer le matin, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 invit\u00e9s au d\u00e9jeun\u00e9 jusqu’alors r\u00e9serv\u00e9 aux seuls 26 de l’OTAN. Puis le programme initial a \u00e9t\u00e9 remis en place). Mais, plus important encore: \u00ab Il \u00e9tait entendu, <\/em>disent nos sources, que ce sommet devait \u00eatre tr\u00e8s consensuel, donc porter essentiellement sur la forme et le moins possible sur le fond. Mais on assiste depuis quelques jours \u00e0 un \u00e9trange ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne. Des questions nouvelles sont inscrites \u00e0 l’ordre du jour, qui portent sur des questions s\u00e9rieuses, des d\u00e9saccords s\u00e9v\u00e8res, etc.<\/em> \u00bb Ces m\u00eames sources signalent qu’il n’y a pas encore de communiqu\u00e9 d\u00e9finitif, ce qui contraste notablement avec les habitudes et les traditions de l’OTAN, o\u00f9 aucune r\u00e9union importante ne s’ouvrait sans que le communiqu\u00e9 de cette r\u00e9union soit pr\u00eat, \u00e0 la virgule pr\u00e8s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe constat, bien plus que des pr\u00e9visions difficiles \u00e0 \u00e9noncer, est surtout d’un r\u00e9el d\u00e9sordre. Cela marque le caract\u00e8re inhabituel d’une rencontre dont l’importance a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9mesur\u00e9ment grandie alors que l’accord \u00e9tait fait pour qu’on ne parl\u00e2t que de sujets de forme et d’apparences consensuelles, alors que de nombreux et \u00e9pineux probl\u00e8mes existent. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Initiative Schr\u00f6der et temp\u00eate \u00e0 l’OTAN 18 f\u00e9vrier 2005 Nul ne peut douter que c’est avec les meilleures intentions du monde que le chancelier Schr\u00f6der a lanc\u00e9 son initiative samedi dernier, \u00e0 Munich. (Il demande l’instauration d’un groupe de concertation de haut niveau, au sein duquel USA et Europe pourraient discuter de probl\u00e8mes non-militaires qui… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4455,3836,4080,3229],"class_list":["post-66234","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-iht","tag-munich","tag-vinocur","tag-wehrkunde"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66234","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66234"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66234\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66234"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66234"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66234"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}