{"id":66267,"date":"2005-03-18T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-03-18T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/03\/18\/lemergence-de-la-chine-et-dune-nouvelle-epoque\/"},"modified":"2005-03-18T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-03-18T00:00:00","slug":"lemergence-de-la-chine-et-dune-nouvelle-epoque","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/03\/18\/lemergence-de-la-chine-et-dune-nouvelle-epoque\/","title":{"rendered":"L’\u00e9mergence de la Chine et d’une nouvelle \u00e9poque<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’\u00e9mergence de la Chine et d’une nouvelle \u00e9poque<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t18 mars 2005 Nous signalons \u00e0 nouveau le texte fort important<\/a> de l’historien am\u00e9ricain Chalmers Johnson sur la Chine<\/a>, un v\u00e9ritable travail d’historien, justement, plus encore qu’une analyse g\u00e9opolitique. L’\u00e9tude de Johnson est centr\u00e9e sur le r\u00f4le de plus en plus central de la Chine dans les relations internationales.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’int\u00e9r\u00eat de cette \u00e9tude est de nous faire prendre conscience, m\u00eame si ceci n’en est pas l’id\u00e9e centrale, du fait consid\u00e9rable que nous sommes en train de changer d’\u00e9poque, et cela avec une tr\u00e8s grande rapidit\u00e9. Le texte nous fait r\u00e9aliser, au-del\u00e0 m\u00eame de la r\u00e9flexion de Johnson, que l’\u00e9poque de la guerre contre la terreur et du terrorisme comme point d’int\u00e9r\u00eat central des affaires du monde est en train de se clore. Une nouvelle \u00e9poque s’installe, qui est celle de l’affrontement multipolaire, avec des acteurs tels que la Chine, les USA et l’UE principalement, mais aussi le Japon et l’Inde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe passage ci-dessous sugg\u00e8re ce changement, avec la notion \u00e9vidente par rapport \u00e0 ce qu’on sait des habitudes politiques et politiciennes de Washington, d’Am\u00e9ricains distraits pendant trois ans par l’absurde folie irakienne, et laissant la Chine s’installer en position centrale avec les deux autres centres de puissance (USA et UE). Dans cette vision, m\u00eame des th\u00e8mes pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme universelles et promus comme des publicit\u00e9s de poudre \u00e0 lessiver, comme essentiellement le th\u00e8me de la d\u00e9mocratisation du Moyen-Orient, sont destin\u00e9s \u00e0 s’\u00e9vanouir assez rapidement. Ils occuperont encore quelques temps les chroniqueurs parisiens mais ne compteront plus gu\u00e8re. Dans ce contexte, l’affrontement isra\u00e9lo-palestinien ou la question libano-syrienne devraient se r\u00e9gionaliser et perdre de leur importance, sinon des pouss\u00e9es m\u00e9diatiques qui font beaucoup de bruit et laissent peu de trace. Seule devrait \u00e9merger de la situation au Moyen-Orient la querelle avec l’Iran, parce qu’elle concerne un grand pays et qu’elle implique les trois grands p\u00f4les de puissance (USA et UE, c’est l’\u00e9vidence, mais aussi la Chine, li\u00e9e \u00e0 l’Iran par un \u00e9norme accord \u00e9nerg\u00e9tique de $100 milliards de gaz et de p\u00e9trole \u00e0 livrer en 25 ans).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(On ajoutera que, dans ce contexte, l’affaire de la lev\u00e9e de l’embargo des armes europ\u00e9ennes vers la Chine est \u00e9videmment fondamentale puisqu’elle d\u00e9bouche sur une querelle USA-Europe majeure. Les trois p\u00f4les majeurs sont r\u00e9unis dans une pol\u00e9mique dont les termes sous-jacents sont fondamentaux.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab On April 25, 2001, during an interview on national television, President Bush was asked whether he would ever use the full force of the American military against China for the sake of Taiwan. He responded, Whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself. This was American policy until 9\/11, when China enthusiastically joined the war on terrorism’ and the president and his neocons became preoccupied with their axis of evil’ and making war on Iraq. The United States and China were also enjoying extremely close economic relations, which the big- business wing of the Republican Party did not want to jeopardize.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The Middle East thus trumped the neocons’ Asia policy. While the Americans were distracted, China went about its economic business for almost four years, emerging as a powerhouse of Asia and a potential organizing node for Asian economies. Rapidly industrializing China also developed a voracious appetite for petroleum and other raw materials, which brought it into direct competition with the world’s largest importers, the U.S. and Japan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb By the summer of 2004, Bush strategists, distracted as they were by Iraq, again became alarmed over China’s growing power and its potential to challenge American hegemony in East Asia. The Republican Party platform unveiled at its convention in New York in August proclaimed that America will help Taiwan defend itself. During that summer, the Navy also carried out exercises it dubbed Operation Summer Pulse ’04,’ which involved the simultaneous deployment at sea of seven of our twelve carrier strike groups. An American carrier strike group includes an aircraft carrier (usually with 9 or 10 squadrons of planes, a total of about 85 aircraft in all), a guided missile cruiser, two guided missile destroyers, an attack submarine, and a combination ammunition-oiler-supply ship. Deploying seven such armadas at the same time was unprecedented and very expensive. Even though only three of the carrier strike groups were sent to the Pacific and no more than one was patrolling off Taiwan at a time, the Chinese became deeply alarmed that this marked the beginning of an attempted rerun of 19th century gunboat diplomacy aimed at them.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’\u00e9mergence de la Chine et d’une nouvelle \u00e9poque 18 mars 2005 Nous signalons \u00e0 nouveau le texte fort important de l’historien am\u00e9ricain Chalmers Johnson sur la Chine, un v\u00e9ritable travail d’historien, justement, plus encore qu’une analyse g\u00e9opolitique. L’\u00e9tude de Johnson est centr\u00e9e sur le r\u00f4le de plus en plus central de la Chine dans les… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66267","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66267","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66267"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66267\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66267"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66267"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66267"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}