{"id":66273,"date":"2005-03-24T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-03-24T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/03\/24\/un-message-chaleureux-de-amcham-eu-a-propos-du-marche-europeen-de-larmement\/"},"modified":"2005-03-24T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-03-24T00:00:00","slug":"un-message-chaleureux-de-amcham-eu-a-propos-du-marche-europeen-de-larmement","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/03\/24\/un-message-chaleureux-de-amcham-eu-a-propos-du-marche-europeen-de-larmement\/","title":{"rendered":"Un message chaleureux de \u201cAmCham EU\u201d \u00e0 propos du march\u00e9 europ\u00e9en de l’armement<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un message chaleureux de AmCham EU \u00e0 propos du march\u00e9 europ\u00e9en de l’armement<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

D’abord, un commentaire amical<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLe 22 f\u00e9vrier, The American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union (AmCham EU) a diffus\u00e9, d’une mani\u00e8re informelle dont nous avons pourtant b\u00e9n\u00e9fici\u00e9 par l’un ou l’autre myst\u00e9rieux canal, une analyse critique sur le Green Paper publi\u00e9 en 23 septembre 2004 par la Commission europ\u00e9enne. C’est donc bien gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la plus grande des chances et au plus chaleureux des hasards que nous publions ce document.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(Le Green Paper est une tentative de la Commission europ\u00e9enne de pr\u00e9senter une position sur l’organisation \u00e9ventuelle d’un march\u00e9 commun de l’armement en Europe. Comme d’habitude dans cette sorte de document venu de la Commission, l’accent est mis sur la dimension \u00e9conomique, la comp\u00e9titivit\u00e9 notamment, aux d\u00e9pens de l’aspect politique et strat\u00e9gique de l’armement. Ce dernier aspect, politique et strat\u00e9gique, est pourtant en train de s’imposer avec une \u00e9vidence aveuglante si l’on se r\u00e9f\u00e8re \u00e0 l’importance strat\u00e9gique et politique que la querelle euro-am\u00e9ricaine sur l’intention europ\u00e9enne de lever l’embargo des armements vers la Chine est en train d’acqu\u00e9rir.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tAmCham EU ? La Chambre de Commerce am\u00e9ricaine aupr\u00e8s de l’UE, ou AmCham EU, se pr\u00e9sente elle-m\u00eame de cette fa\u00e7on, dans le document pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 ici : \u00ab The American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union (AmCham EU) is the voice of companies of American parentage committed to Europe towards the institutions and governments of the European Union. It aims to ensure an optimum business and investment climate in Europe. AmCham EU facilitates the resolution of EU US issues that impact business and plays a role in creating better understanding of EU and US positions on business matters. Total US investment in Europe amounts to $850 billion, and currently supports over 3.5 million jobs.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLe document de AmCham EU, document de lobbyist<\/em> par excellence, est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 dans le style le plus amical possible. Il s’agit d’\u00e9tablir un esprit d’\u00e9quipe, une comp\u00e9tition \u00e9quilibr\u00e9e et loyale, tout cela avec les amis europ\u00e9ens, pour parvenir \u00e0 un march\u00e9 global de l’armement dont les deux principaux piliers seront l’industrie am\u00e9ricaine et l’industrie europ\u00e9enne. Il y a dans ce document un souci d’\u00e9quit\u00e9, de loyaut\u00e9, de p\u00e9dagogie g\u00e9n\u00e9reuse et gratuite. Tout cela r\u00e9chauffe le cur, quant aux perspectives d’entente transatlantique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAmCham EU observe le processus pr\u00f4n\u00e9 par le Green Paper et l’applaudit d’abord sans restriction sur le principe dont il t\u00e9moigne. Toute tentative de rentabilisation, d’am\u00e9lioration de l’efficacit\u00e9, d’efficience am\u00e9lior\u00e9e, de productivit\u00e9 renforc\u00e9e, de d\u00e9r\u00e9gulation, d’ouverture des fronti\u00e8res, de mise en charpie des barri\u00e8res est per\u00e7ue par AmCham EU avec la plus extr\u00eame faveur, voire un d\u00e9lice confinant \u00e0 l’ivresse. Nous sommes bien en territoire am\u00e9ricaniste. L’interlocuteur am\u00e9ricain donne m\u00eame des conseils qui contribueront sans aucun doute \u00e0 conforter les esprits : \u00ab The absence of harmonised operational military requirements and a cooperative (or centralised) procurement authority currently present obstacles to efficient military procurement.<\/em> \u00bb M\u00eame si c’est enfoncer des portes ouvertes, cela brasse un peu d’air lib\u00e9ralisant et ce n’est pas si mal, effectivement, nous, en Europe, nous aurions bien besoin d’une telle autorit\u00e9 centrale pour harmoniser les besoins et les acquisitions. (N.B. : cela fait entre 40 et 50 ans \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s que cette sorte de r\u00e9forme est demand\u00e9e par les partisans d’une int\u00e9gration europ\u00e9enne. On verra.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPuis vient, aussit\u00f4t, la restriction centrale. Elle ne cessera plus d’\u00eatre r\u00e9p\u00e9t\u00e9e, comme un refrain lancinant tout au long du rapport, dans la synth\u00e8se, l’analyse, les commentaires, les conclusions, le post-scriptum s’il y en avait un. Elle tient en une question d\u00e9sol\u00e9e que nos r\u00e9sumons dans sa substance : pourquoi cette proposition de rentabilisation bienvenue porte-t-elle sur le seul march\u00e9 europ\u00e9en, et non sur le march\u00e9 europ\u00e9en consid\u00e9r\u00e9 d’un point de vue global, c’est-\u00e0-dire avec acc\u00e8s libre et illimit\u00e9, tout de suite, pendant qu’il se fait, pour l’aider \u00e0 se faire, bien s\u00fbr?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCette id\u00e9e est pr\u00e9sente d\u00e8s les points de synth\u00e8se qui r\u00e9sument l’esprit du texte : \u00ab European industry needs better access to the U.S. technology base and to the U.S. market, AmCham EU stresses that Europe’s own market must therefore remain open to participation by the global defence industry if European firms are themselves to increase their competitiveness.<\/em> (avant dernier point); et encore (dernier point): \u00ab AmCham EU considers that interim steps of consolidating Europe first may, in fact, impede the adjustments required for Europe’s industries to attain and maintain their global roles. Indeed, the defence market is global, not regional, and efforts to improve market efficiency must take this reality into account.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa ficelle est-elle un peu grosse? Comme \u00e0 l’habitude, elle est \u00e9vidente. Les Am\u00e9ricains ont une puissance financi\u00e8re consid\u00e9rable derri\u00e8re leurs industries, puissance qui permet l’initiative d’acquisition d’une fa\u00e7on syst\u00e9matique. Ils poss\u00e8dent une puissance d’influence politique plus que consid\u00e9rable, avec un tel r\u00e9seau de soutien parmi les \u00e9lites europ\u00e9ennes d’une telle densit\u00e9 qu’on pourrait presque parler d’une classe politique en soi, compl\u00e8tement acquise aux int\u00e9r\u00eats am\u00e9ricains. La r\u00e9ciproque (p\u00e9n\u00e9tration du march\u00e9 am\u00e9ricain) est aujourd’hui impossible, comme elle le sera demain, non pas pour des raisons \u00e9conomiques (incapacit\u00e9 de concurrence) mais pour des raisons structurelles, \u00e0 la fois l\u00e9gislatives et \u00e9conomiques.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes USA sont un syst\u00e8me \u00e9conomique et politique structurellement protectionniste. Cette tendance existe d\u00e9j\u00e0 dans la structure de base, l’organisation en syst\u00e8me f\u00e9d\u00e9ral donnant au gouvernement et au Congr\u00e8s f\u00e9d\u00e9raux des droits et aux \u00c9tats d’autres droits : un produit peut \u00eatre autoris\u00e9 \u00e0 p\u00e9n\u00e9trer aux USA par Washington et ne pas l’\u00eatre dans tel ou tel \u00c9tat. Cette structure est historique et fondamentale : elle a exist\u00e9 d\u00e8s le d\u00e9part, elle existe et elle existera, \u00e0 moins que les USA subissent une r\u00e9volution structurelle de fond en comble. Elle existe et existera, notamment dans ce domaine de l’armement, parce que les USA ne cessent de fabriquer des r\u00e8gles bureaucratiques et de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale qui ne cessent de renforcer des barri\u00e8res non commerciales contre les produits ext\u00e9rieurs, c’est-\u00e0-dire non n\u00e9gociables \u00e0 moins d’une abdication fondamentale du vendeur de ces produits, l’abdication allant jusqu’\u00e0 l’am\u00e9ricanisation pure et simple (cas du britannique BAE). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes recommandations de AmChamEU sont donc du type : faites comme nous vous disons, pas comme nous faisons. C’est un peu comme si les treize \u00c9tats de l’Union, puis les autres qui suivirent, avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 invit\u00e9s \u00e0 se mesurer, diplomatiquement, militairement, \u00e9conomiquement, etc., avec le reste du monde, avant de se regrouper dans une f\u00e9d\u00e9ration, l’union dite des \u00c9tats-Unis d’Am\u00e9rique. Curieuse id\u00e9e. L’histoire \u00e9conomique et commerciale des USA devrait au contraire servir de mod\u00e8le \u00e0 l’Europe et \u00e0 son industrie, y compris l’armement : les USA se form\u00e8rent en Union, s’agrandirent en veillant constamment \u00e0 maintenir un protectionnisme de fer pour permettre \u00e0 leur puissance \u00e9conomique et industrielle de se d\u00e9velopper et de se renforcer. Ce point est une des causes principales de la Guerre de S\u00e9cession : le Sud, gros exportateur de coton, voulait un syst\u00e8me de libre-\u00e9change tandis que le Nord entendait imposer son protectionnisme. Comme l’on sait, le Nord l’a emport\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans son livre Qui sera le Ma\u00eetre, Europe ou Am\u00e9rique ?<\/em> (datant de 1927 mais infiniment plus actuel et int\u00e9ressant que l’avalanche de sornettes publi\u00e9es aujourd’hui sur le sujet), l’historien Lucien Romier distinguait le protectionnisme conservateur, ou protectionnisme tranquille, du protectionnisme jaloux, ou protectionnisme inquiet. L’Am\u00e9rique fit partie \u00e9videmment des ma\u00eetres et pratiquants du premier, disposant de mati\u00e8res premi\u00e8res, du march\u00e9, des masses pour produire et ainsi de suite. \u00ab Le cas du protectionnisme heureux existe pleinement en Am\u00e9rique<\/em> \u00bb, \u00e9crivait Romier en 1927. L’Am\u00e9rique ne rompit cette r\u00e8gle au niveau global et en apparence pour elle-m\u00eame qu’en 1940 (\u00e0 partir de 1940), en imposant \u00e0 un Royaume-Uni confront\u00e9 aux folles d\u00e9penses de la guerre des accords (lend lease<\/em> et Charte de l’Atlantique) o\u00f9 le libre \u00e9change \u00e9tait adopt\u00e9, y compris pour l’Empire. La puissance infiniment sup\u00e9rieure de l’Am\u00e9rique lui assurait d’acqu\u00e9rir les plus larges march\u00e9s possibles, ce qui fut fait. Le libre-\u00e9change devint la politique ext\u00e9rieure des USA, mais nullement, comme on l’a vu plus haut, leur r\u00e9alit\u00e9 int\u00e9rieure.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEffectivement, les USA deviennent libre-\u00e9changistes et imposent le libre-\u00e9change partout \u00e0 partir de 1940-45, \u00e0 partir de 1945 essentiellement, lorsqu’ils dominent un monde \u00e9puis\u00e9 et exsangue du fait de la guerre. Toute citation de l’image du profiteur de guerre pour caract\u00e9riser ce comportement est absurde et l’on s’en tiendra \u00e0 l’ic\u00f4ne de la g\u00e9n\u00e9reuse expansion de la d\u00e9mocratie universelle (Plan Marshall, OTAN, CIA , Pentagone & Cie). La le\u00e7on est claire, qui nous est donn\u00e9e par le ma\u00eetre en ce domaine qu’est l’Am\u00e9rique: seules la puissance et la ma\u00eetrise de ses propres march\u00e9s autorisent le passage au march\u00e9 libre et au libre \u00e9change au-del\u00e0 de ses fronti\u00e8res. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tVoici le texte de The American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Position paper response to the European Commission’s Green Paper on Defence Procurement<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

\tFebruary 22nd, 2005<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Executive Summary<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn response to the September 23rd European Commission’s Green Paper on Defence Procurement from the Directorate-General Internal Market, the American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union submits the following comments for your consideration:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• AmCham EU welcomes the European Commission’s initiatives in clarifying the EU’s defence procurement rules and recognising, for example, that many dual use items and technologies may no longer be entitled to the protection from competition afforded by Article 296.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• However, AmCham EU highlights that the Green Paper does not attempt to place the trends in the European defence industry and the European defence equipment market in the broader context of the global market for defence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Given the increasingly integrated and globalised nature of the defence industry, AmCham EU believes that it is would be beneficial to develop European standards and technologies related to transatlantic or global standards. Such an approach would make European industry more efficient and globally competitive.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• As it is widely recognised that European industry needs better access to the U.S. technology base and to the U.S. market, AmCham EU stresses that Europe’s own market must therefore remain open to participation by the global defence industry if European firms are themselves to increase their competitiveness.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• AmCham EU considers that interim steps of consolidating Europe first may, in fact, impede the adjustments required for Europe’s industries to attain and maintain their global roles. Indeed, the defence market is global, not regional, and efforts to improve market efficiency must take this reality into account. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Background<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe European Commission has published a Green Paper on Defence Procurement as part of an ongoing effort by the Commission to encourage creation of what is termed a European Defence Equipment Market. The paper explicitly recognises that the current European defence marketplace is highly fragmented on both the supply and demand sides. Procurement decisions remain the prerogatives of national governments. Defence industries are widely distributed and often protected or subsidized by governments. The result is overcapacity and an inability to achieve efficient rates of production.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe reduction in total defence expenditures following the end of the Cold War, combined with the fragmentation of the European market, have made it difficult for European defence industries to invest in new technologies and to maintain viable production rates. Economies of scale are virtually impossible to achieve at the national level, and European multilateral or cooperative programs have so far not been especially numerous or notably successful.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThat the European defence market has been slow to adapt to changed market conditions can be attributed to several unique aspects of defence markets, as recognised in the Green Paper: the dominant role of the state as customer, source of research funds, and sometimes as owner; the special needs for classified information and security of supply; the long product life cycle of defence equipment. These unique features have exempted the defence sector from the rules governing open competition, procurement, and state aid in the EU. These exemptions are codified in Article 296 EC of the Treaty. These exemptions create a number of legal uncertainties for suppliers in contrast to common EU standards. Among other questions, the Green Paper asks whether the EU should clarify or modify its legal framework with an aim toward clarifying exemptions and procedures under Article 296. An interpretive Communication or an EU Directive on procedures are two options identified.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Discussion<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe aim of the Green Paper is to encourage the creation of a European market for defence equipment, ostensibly to create more efficient spending and to make European industry more competitive. Implicitly, the assumption is that the problems of overcapacity and fragmentation in industry will be overcome if national barriers to competition are removed and markets are opened to competition at least a limited type of Europe-wide competition.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tInevitably, this will mean that the industry reorganises itself around a small number of firsttier prime contractors that are globally competitive and supported by a broad network of second- and third-tier suppliers. Reference in the Green Paper to the benefits to SME’s of market opening can be interpreted to mean that suppliers will have access to a broader range of opportunities with prime contractors, although this is not stated explicitly.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Green Paper does not attempt to place the trends in the European defence industry and the European defence equipment market in the broader context of the global market for defence. At a time when globalization and the internationalization of many key defence programs are important characteristics of the global market, this omission is notable. The assumption appears to be that the European marketplace can be opened within Europe and consolidated on a Europe-only basis without regard to these larger trends.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

AmCham EU Comments<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe fundamental objective of creating a more unified defence equipment market should be to provide better value for money for the governments that purchase the equipment. Reducing national barriers or consolidating industry are means to this end, not ends in themselves. If the European industry is to be able to supply the leading edge capabilities required, it must be able to draw from and access the international marketplace and to develop and maintain the capacity to be globally competitive.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe absence of harmonised operational military requirements and a cooperative (or centralised) procurement authority currently present obstacles to efficient military procurement. In the absence of these conditions, opening up of defence markets and breaking down national barriers to procurement are likely to remain empty goals. If the decision making responsibility remains at the national level, only a process of harmonising requirements (and agreeing on common standards) can produce cross-national efficiencies.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis harmonisation process could occur in the European Defence Agency or it could occur through NATO consultative processes or some other mechanism, but it should be explicitly addressed as a first step toward a more unified market. The Green Paper’s impact and authoritativeness could be enhanced by addressing this point in detail. European militaries are adapting to the changing strategic environment of the 21st century.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMany countries are giving up some of their traditional military missions. Many explicitly accept in their military strategies that territorial Defence is no longer the primary military mission of the armed forces. As forces shift to more deployable and sustainable configurations, in virtually all cases it is assumed that the forces will be operating with coalition partners, whether of the European Union’s Battle Groups or the NATO Response Force. These military requirements place an even higher premium on the ability to operate with other allied forces and to have compatible doctrine, technologies, and logistics. The more demanding the military task, the greater the importance of interoperability. While this argues for a more integrated European approach to defence equipment, it also argues for transatlantic involvement and global competitiveness for European industry.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGiven the increasingly integrated and globalised nature of the defence industry, it is not feasible to develop European standards and technologies unrelated to transatlantic or global standards. Such an approach would not make European industry more efficient or globally competitive. Since the United States spends more on defence research and development and procurement than all of Europe, European industry needs access to the U.S. technology base and to the U.S. market. Transatlantic industrial cooperation and transatlantic programs that include U.S. and European partners will increase the capabilities of European industry and can be important contributors to the health of the defence industry on both sides of the Atlantic. Europe’s own market must therefore remain open to participation by the global defence industry if European firms are themselves to become or remain competitive.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMany of the key technologies for future military capabilities are already being developed with the participation of transatlantic industrial teams. It is neither conceptually nor empirically necessary for a period of European consolidation to occur prior to the opening of the marketplace to global participation. Indeed, events in the global marketplace are moving faster than high-level policy in this regard, in order to deliver the high-performance networkenable systems required by government customers. Customers should and will demand competitive prices and the best globally available technology in addressing the national and international security requirements of the twenty-first century.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNo amount of codification of procurement rules, market restructuring, or industry consolidation can, in the long run, overcome inadequacies of the resource base. The defence industry needs programs and funding to survive and prosper. While greater efficiencies in spending and regulatory clarity could certainly help and would be welcome, the absolute level of military spending in Europe today is not sufficient to meet the identified and agreed military needs. Reforms of procedures will not, by themselves, assure a robust defence technology base in the future at current levels of funding.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tClarifying the EU’s defence procurement rules and recognizing, for example, that many dual use items and technologies may no longer be entitled to the protection from competition afforded by Article 296, are initiatives to be welcomed and supported. Indeed, all defence equipment suppliers would benefit from EU defence procurement rules based on more consistency between EU Member States (easier to make investment decisions) and more transparency (better legal clarity). By themselves, however, these initiatives will not address the underlying causes of insufficient investment and inefficient procurement that characterize the market today. A move to an open and globally competitive marketplace, where European industry takes its rightful place as part of a global industry, must be the objective. Interim steps of consolidating Europe first are not necessary and may, in fact, impede the adjustments required for Europe’s industries to attain and maintain their global roles.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un message chaleureux de AmCham EU \u00e0 propos du march\u00e9 europ\u00e9en de l’armement D’abord, un commentaire amical Le 22 f\u00e9vrier, The American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union (AmCham EU) a diffus\u00e9, d’une mani\u00e8re informelle dont nous avons pourtant b\u00e9n\u00e9fici\u00e9 par l’un ou l’autre myst\u00e9rieux canal, une analyse critique sur le Green Paper publi\u00e9… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[1097],"class_list":["post-66273","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notes-de-lectures","tag-protectionnisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66273","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66273"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66273\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66273"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66273"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66273"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}