{"id":66280,"date":"2005-03-29T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-03-29T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/03\/29\/laparanoia-des-dirigeants-americains\/"},"modified":"2005-03-29T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-03-29T00:00:00","slug":"laparanoia-des-dirigeants-americains","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/03\/29\/laparanoia-des-dirigeants-americains\/","title":{"rendered":"La\u00a0parano\u00efa des dirigeants am\u00e9ricains"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_a.deepblue\" style=\"color:#0f3955;font-size:2em;\">La parano\u00efa des dirigeants am\u00e9ricains<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>29 mars 2005 &mdash; Reprenant la fameuse phrase de la National Defense Strategy of the United States of America de la QDR 2005, o&ugrave; les organisations multinationales sont identifi\u00e9es <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=1412\">sur un m\u00eame plan de dangerosit\u00e9 que le terrorisme<\/a>, Norman Solomon, sp\u00e9cialiste am\u00e9ricain des m\u00e9dias, rel\u00e8ve le silence assourdissant de la grande presse \u00e9videmment libre et combien professionnelle des Etats-Unis. Qu&rsquo;il se rassure : chez nous, ce n&rsquo;est pas diff\u00e9rent. La chose, &mdash; la simple \u00e9vidence &mdash; est fort difficile \u00e0 distinguer par les m\u00e9dias dont l&rsquo;activit\u00e9 intellectuelle, habill\u00e9e du terme de \u00ab\u00a0raison\u00a0\u00bb, est caract\u00e9ris\u00e9s par l&rsquo;expression postmoderne de \u00ab\u00a0bienpensance\u00a0\u00bb ou telle autre, plus conformiste, de \u00ab\u00a0conformisme\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"normal\" style=\"font-size:1.05em;\">\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Journalists often refer to the Bush administration&rsquo;s foreign policy as &quot;unilateral&quot; and &quot;preemptive.&quot; Liberal pundits like to complain that a &quot;go-it-alone&quot; approach has isolated the United States from former allies. But the standard American media lexicon has steered clear of a word that would be an apt description of the Bush world view.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Paranoid.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Early symptoms met with tremendous media applause in the immediate aftermath of 9\/11. Skepticism from reporters and dissent from pundits were sparse while President Bush quickly declared that governments were either on the side of the USA or &quot;the terrorists.&quot; Since then, the paranoiac scope of the administration&rsquo;s articulated outlook has broadened while media acceptance has normalized it &ndash; to the point that a remarkable new document from the Pentagon is raising few media eyebrows.<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>Fort justement, Solomon rel\u00e8ve combien l&rsquo;attitude des dirigeants am\u00e9ricains rel\u00e8ve purement et simplement <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/orig\/solomon.php\">de la parano\u00efa<\/a>. Cette explication a \u00e9videmment beaucoup de logique et de bon sens pour elle, en plus de pr\u00e9c\u00e9dents historiques s\u00e9rieux. Quoique assez simple (quoique radicale) puisqu&rsquo;elle fait appel \u00e0 une pathologie tr\u00e8s compr\u00e9hensible, mais justement parce qu&rsquo;elle fait appel \u00e0 des facteurs non politiques et non id\u00e9ologiques, cette explication a toujours d\u00e9plu aux esprits universitaires. C&rsquo;est la m\u00eame d\u00e9marche que ceci, que signale John Kenneth Galbraith dans son petit livre <em>Des amis influents<\/em> (<em>Between friends<\/em>) : Galbraith faisait partie de l&rsquo;\u00e9quipe am\u00e9ricaine charg\u00e9e d&rsquo;interroger les criminels de guerre nazis captur\u00e9s. Il les appr\u00e9cia tous comme des m\u00e9diocres, sauf Albert Speer, avec lequel il s&rsquo;entretint longuement. Speer lui expliqua que les dirigeants nazis vivaient, \u00e0 partir de 1943-44, &laquo; <em>dans un oc\u00e9an d&rsquo;alcool<\/em> &raquo;. Speer expliquait ainsi en tr\u00e8s bonne partie les difficult\u00e9s, les incoh\u00e9rences, les irrationalit\u00e9s dans l&rsquo;exercice du pouvoir dans ces conditions, sur la fin de la guerre. Pour conclure cette anecdote, Galbraith remarque les r\u00e9ticences consid\u00e9rables des historiens et du monde acad\u00e9mique \u00e0 prendre en compte de tels facteurs, manifestement pathologiques, pour expliquer des comportements et, surtout, des politiques.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Le cas avec l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique d&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui est peut-\u00eatre assez semblable sur le plan du comportement psychologique. Certes, il n&rsquo;est question ni d&rsquo;alcool, ni d&rsquo;autres interventions du m\u00eame type, mais l&rsquo;influence \u00e9crasante du syst\u00e8me de communication et de diffusion de l&rsquo;information doit \u00eatre ici envisag\u00e9 comme un facteur \u00e9ventuel de modification de la psychologie. C&rsquo;est un point essentiel de notre th\u00e8se sur le virtualisme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Dans le m\u00eame sens, on lira avec profit le texte de l&rsquo;\u00e9ditorialiste am\u00e9ricain Alan Bock, dans sa <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.antiwar.com\/bock\">chronique d&rsquo;Antiwar.com du 25 mars<\/a>. Bock propose, sous le titre &laquo; <em>Signs of Imperial Sclerosis?<\/em> &raquo;, le r\u00e9cit d&rsquo;une visite que le vice-pr\u00e9sident Cheney vient d&rsquo;effectuer au quotidien dont lui-m\u00eame, Bock, est \u00e9galement \u00e9ditorialiste, le Orange County <em>Register<\/em>, quotidien californien tirant \u00e0 300.000 exemplaires. Bock compare cette visite avec celle d&rsquo;un autre vice-pr\u00e9sident, Dan Quayle, probablement en 1990.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Quelques mots sur la visite :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"normal\" style=\"font-size:1.05em;\">\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>The meeting with Dick Cheney, however, was an order of magnitude or so different from the meeting so long ago with Dan Quayle, or any of the other political editorial board meetings I&rsquo;ve attended. It wasn&rsquo;t just a few Secret Service agents a couple of days before the meeting, but squadrons of them, for at least four days prior to the brief interview, going over every detail you can imagine and some you probably can&rsquo;t, not a couple of times but seven or eight times. The meeting was on a Monday and our boss was involved in meetings with the Secret Service and vice presidential staff &ndash; along with the Santa Ana police &ndash; almost the entire day Friday.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Previous meetings with politicians sometimes caused a minor amount of inconvenience for the rest of the newspaper staff. This one disrupted the entire buildingfor long stretches of the day. We have a five-story building, and the publisher&rsquo;s conference room is on the fifth floor. On previous political visits, Secret Service people were content to station a couple of people by the doors to the conference room. For this meeting, they closed off half of the fifth floor to everybody but those scheduled to be in the meeting. They checked IDs of the advertising people who work on the other half of the floor. They cleared everybody &ndash; everybody &ndash; from the fourth and then the fifth floor for about 45 minutes so they could check with bomb-sniffing dogs and who knows what kind of equipment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>There were at least 30 Santa Ana police in various parts of the building, including stairwells, beginning about two hours before Cheney got there. I don&rsquo;t know how many Secret Service people were deployed in the building and at the entrances, but I would be surprised if it was fewer than 50. A couple of helicopters circled the building continuously from about an hour before the vice president arrived. I hate to think how much it all cost the taxpayers.<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>Bock pr\u00e9sente sa description du point de vue de l&rsquo;affectation de \u00ab\u00a0volont\u00e9 de puissance\u00a0\u00bb, dans une phase nettement d\u00e9cadente, qu&rsquo;il y distingue. On peut lire son texte, de fa\u00e7on compl\u00e9mentaire, du point de vue de la parano\u00efa qui touche le syst\u00e8me. On a alors l&rsquo;indication que cette parano\u00efa est g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, bureaucratique, structur\u00e9e, &mdash; donc bien une sorte de pathologie collective, qui impr\u00e8gne et transforme les psychologies individuelles faibles \u00e0 l&rsquo;int\u00e9rieur de ce syst\u00e8me, plut\u00f4t que des pathologies individuelles constituant par leur addition une pathologie artificiellement collective. Tout cela est justement explicable par l&rsquo;hypoth\u00e8se de la puissance de la pression des communications.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>L&rsquo;argument de la parano\u00efa collective est d&rsquo;autant plus convaincant que Bock poursuit en observant que cet homme archi-prot\u00e9g\u00e9, archi-s\u00e9curis\u00e9, archi-isol\u00e9 du reste du monde, archi-puissant en apparence, Dick Cheney, est un homme comme vous et moi, d&rsquo;ailleurs assez sociable, \u00e9ventuellement avec un certain sens de l&rsquo;humour (&laquo; <em>Perhaps the most important thing to take from this is that he is a man like any other man. <\/em>[&#8230;] <em>He has strong points and weak points. But despite the pomp that surrounded his visit, he&rsquo;s just one of us.<\/em> &raquo;). Cette normalit\u00e9 qui pourrait para&icirc;tre rassurante en d&rsquo;autres circonstances, laisse au contraire \u00e0 penser lorsqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit de l&rsquo;homme au c&oelig;ur du syst\u00e8me, qui active et renforce sans cesse la parano\u00efa du syst\u00e8me par sa propre conduite, son acceptation des pressions du syst\u00e8me. On est conduit \u00e0 penser que cette normalit\u00e9 est de plus en plus marginalis\u00e9e dans l&rsquo;individu ainsi soumis au syst\u00e8me, l&rsquo;essentiel de l&rsquo;activit\u00e9 renvoyant \u00e0 l&rsquo;id\u00e9e de la pathologie collective impr\u00e9gnant \u00ab\u00a0les psychologies individuelles faibles \u00e0 l&rsquo;int\u00e9rieur de ce syst\u00e8me\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Bock observe encore :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote class=\"normal\" style=\"font-size:1.05em;\">\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>The empire is not staffed by the great and powerful Oz behind the curtain but by fallible human beings. There are no gods or demigods guiding policy.<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><p>Effectivement, et c&rsquo;est l\u00e0 toute la faiblesse du syst\u00e8me, une sorte d&rsquo;activit\u00e9 auto-destructrice: le syst\u00e8me en phase terminale, agissant avec une masse assourdissante de capacit\u00e9s de communication, n&rsquo;influence plus les psychologies que pour les affaiblir, au point de les rendre totalement influen\u00e7ables \u00e0 lui-m\u00eame, et aussi totalement ferm\u00e9es et st\u00e9riles, jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 alt\u00e9rer gravement la capacit\u00e9 de perception et de jugement. Avec le syst\u00e8me de l&rsquo;am\u00e9ricanisme \u00e0 son stade \u00ab\u00a0bushiste\u00a0\u00bb, il est probable que nous y sommes.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>La parano\u00efa des dirigeants am\u00e9ricains 29 mars 2005 &mdash; Reprenant la fameuse phrase de la National Defense Strategy of the United States of America de la QDR 2005, o&ugrave; les organisations multinationales sont identifi\u00e9es sur un m\u00eame plan de dangerosit\u00e9 que le terrorisme, Norman Solomon, sp\u00e9cialiste am\u00e9ricain des m\u00e9dias, rel\u00e8ve le silence assourdissant de la&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[1294,4482],"class_list":["post-66280","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-cheney","tag-qdr"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66280","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66280"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66280\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66280"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66280"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66280"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}