discours de Rumsfeld du 10 septembre 2001<\/a>, qui constitue un point d’orgue de la critique de la puissance destructrice de la bureaucratie.) Cette critique est particuli\u00e8rement forte et dramatique, et, du point de vue technique, certainement fond\u00e9e. Voici ce que dit l’IHT \u00e0 ce propos :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n« The false assumptions about Iraq’s arsenal were not the result of deliberate distortion, nor were they influenced by pressure from outside the agencies, the report found. Rather, it said, they came about because the intelligence bureaucracy collected far too little information \u00ab\u00a0and much of what they did collect was either worthless or misleading.\u00a0\u00bb Moreover, the commission concluded, intelligence officials failed to make it clear to policymakers how deficient their information was.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n» Describing the intelligence bureaucracy as \u00ab\u00a0fragmented, loosely managed and poorly coordinated,\u00a0\u00bb the commission said the government’s 15 intelligence organizations \u00ab\u00a0are a ‘community’ in name only and rarely act with a unity of purpose.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
» Like the commission that investigated the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the Senate Intelligence Committee, which also studied intelligence lapses leading up to the American-led war against Iraq, the Silberman-Robb commission was critical of some of the most familiar entities in the bureaucracy — the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation — as well as the huge National Security Agency, much of whose function is electronic eavesdropping and analysis.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n» \u00ab\u00a0The CIA and NSA may be sleek and omniscient in the movies, but in real life they and other intelligence agencies are vast government bureaucracies,\u00a0\u00bb the nine-member commission told the president. \u00ab\u00a0They are bureaucracies filled with talented people and armed with sophisticated technological tools, but talent and tools do not suspend the iron laws of bureaucratic behavior,\u00a0\u00bb the commission said. \u00ab\u00a0The intelligence community is a closed world, and many insiders admitted to us that it has an almost perfect record of resisting external recommendations.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n» Despite the reference to the talented people in the bureaucracies, the commission hinted that the human makeup needs change. \u00ab\u00a0We need an intelligence community that is truly integrated, far more imaginative and willing to run risks, open to a new generation of Americans and receptive to new technologies,\u00a0\u00bb the commission said.<\/em> »<\/p>\n<\/p>\nCela \u00e9crit, et qui n’est pas nouveau, il reste aussi une dimension politique autour de ce rapport. La critique ne fait aucune place aux interf\u00e9rences du pouvoir politique dans le processus d’\u00e9valuation et de d\u00e9cision.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Que se passe-t-il exactement avec ce rapport? D’abord, la CIA en est la principale accus\u00e9e, alors que les \u00e9valuations grotesques sur les ADM de Saddam sont venues directement des manipulations des neocons<\/em>, du Pentagone, des \u00e9quipes de communication de Blair, etc. Le premier r\u00e9sultat politique int\u00e9ressant du rapport, quelle que soit la v\u00e9racit\u00e9 de sa critique, est celui-ci : on met la CIA sur la touche. Ensuite, le rapport d\u00e9plore la m\u00e9connaissance actuelle, dans la logique du pass\u00e9 tel qu’il est analys\u00e9, des capacit\u00e9s de ses adversaires actuels (toujours \u00e0 cause de la CIA, bien sûr) : « The bad news is that we still know disturbingly little about the weapons programs and even less about the intentions of many of our most dangerous adversaries.<\/em> » On est invit\u00e9 \u00e0 penser que la Cor\u00e9e du Nord et, surtout, l’Iran sont ici concern\u00e9es. (Le texte de la BBC est explicite \u00e0 ce propos : « The commission did not name any country in the declassified version of the report — but analysts say the statement refers to such countries as North Korea and Iran.<\/em> »)<\/p>\n<\/p>\nLa Maison-Blanche va donc agir. Comment? Des r\u00e9formes vont \u00eatre lanc\u00e9es, comme c’est l’habitude dans cette sorte de circonstances. Mais tout le monde reconnaîtra qu’il y a un probl\u00e8me politique imm\u00e9diat : la Cor\u00e9e du Nord et surtout l’Iran, dont les services de renseignement am\u00e9ricains admettent ne pas connaître grand’chose des capacit\u00e9s en mati\u00e8re d’armes de destruction massive. Pour l’imm\u00e9diat, on va donc lancer des missions d’\u00e9valuation pressantes des potentiels de ces deux pays, surtout (bis) l’Iran. Ces missions ne seront pas confi\u00e9es \u00e0 la CIA, en pleine crise et dont l’incomp\u00e9tence affirm\u00e9e vient d’\u00eatre expos\u00e9e sur la place publique. Elles seront confi\u00e9es \u00e0 des groupes plus \u00ab\u00a0sûrs\u00a0\u00bb, dont l’hostilit\u00e9 politique \u00e0 ces deux pays, et \u00e0 l’Iran principalement, est av\u00e9r\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
On pourrait alors, justement, retrouver le sch\u00e9ma irakien. L’administration utiliserait la m\u00eame m\u00e9thode, qui n’est nullement d\u00e9nonc\u00e9e dans le rapport puisque l’essentiel de l’attaque est port\u00e9 contre la bureaucratie, la CIA et les autres agences classiques. Le but de l’administration serait d’autant mieux rencontr\u00e9: trouver une mise en cause de l’Iran, qui pourrait servir de casus belli<\/em> en cas de besoin. Belle manœuvre qu’on qualifierait de virtualiste, en plusieurs \u00e9tapes: utiliser ses propres manipulations renouvel\u00e9es pour mettre hors course les services embarrassants qui faillirent mettre \u00e0 jour ces manipulations d\u00e9j\u00e0 r\u00e9alis\u00e9es dans le cas pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent (ce fut le cas de la CIA, qui s’opposa \u00e9galement \u00e0 certaines \u00e9valuations des n\u00e9o-conservateurs) ; justifier compl\u00e8tement les manipulations \u00e0 venir, qui seront du m\u00eame type \u00e0 propos de l’Iran. Cette appr\u00e9ciation est moins un proc\u00e8s d’intention qu’une pr\u00e9vision fond\u00e9e sur la logique des situations et des comportements.<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Une attaque contre la CIA utile \u00e0 l’Iran 1er avril 2005 — Encore un rapport mettant en \u00e9vidence les \u00e9normes erreurs am\u00e9ricaines d’\u00e9valuation du potentiel militaire de l’Irak avant la guerre (les oc\u00e9ans d’ADM de Saddam introuvables). On en trouve des d\u00e9tails sur BBC.News du 31 mars, sur The International Herald Tribune (IHT) du 1er… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[1104],"class_list":["post-66284","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-neocons"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66284","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66284"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66284\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66284"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66284"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66284"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}