Abrams<\/em> en Irak depuis l’invasion du printemps 2003. Le texte est impr\u00e9cis sur la question de savoir si les chars (tr\u00e8s peu) d\u00e9truits pendant la premi\u00e8re phase, la guerre elle-m\u00eame (19 mars-10 avril 2003) sont inclus dans ce total. Des commentaires que nous avons recueillis nous disent que non, que ce chiffre de 80 repr\u00e9sente les pertes de l’apr\u00e8s-guerre, et qu’en plus elles ont \u00e9t\u00e9 en progressant (les 40 derniers chars d\u00e9truits l’ont \u00e9t\u00e9 sur la p\u00e9riode juillet 2004-janvier 2005).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tQuelques pr\u00e9cisions de USA Today<\/em>: \u00ab In the all-out battles of the 1991 Gulf War, only 18 Abrams tanks were lost and no soldiers in them killed. But since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, with tanks in daily combat against the unexpectedly fierce insurgency, the Army says 80 of the 69-ton behemoths have been damaged so badly they had to be shipped back to the United States.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb At least five soldiers have been killed inside the tanks when they hit roadside bombs, according to figures from the Army’s Armor Center at Fort Knox, Ky. At least 10 more have died while riding partially exposed from open hatches.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb The casualties are the lowest in any Army vehicles, despite how often the Abrams is targeted about 70% of the more than 1,100 tanks used in Iraq have been struck by enemy fire, mostly with minor damage.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’int\u00e9r\u00eat de ce texte concerne surtout l’information. La nouvelle des pertes de ces chars pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s comme indestructibles, m\u00eame s’il est admis qu’ils sont peu adapt\u00e9s au conflit actuel en Irak, est in\u00e9dite. Rien n’avait \u00e9t\u00e9 publi\u00e9 d’une fa\u00e7on si d\u00e9taill\u00e9e, et manifestement de sources officielles, sur les pertes d’Abrams<\/em>. Cela en dit long sur la politique officielle d’information des Am\u00e9ricains sur les pertes en Irak, et rend d’autant plus al\u00e9atoires les informations g\u00e9n\u00e9rales qui sont diffus\u00e9es au jour le jour.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tQuoi qu’il en soit de la pr\u00e9sentation qui nous en est faite, le texte de USA Today<\/em> montre que le char lourd, malgr\u00e9 son inadaptation, est tr\u00e8s largement utilis\u00e9 dans les affrontements, et qu’il subit des pertes non n\u00e9gligeables. L’enseignement est important quant \u00e0 l’inadaptation des tactiques de combat de l’U.S. Army, l’obsession de la protection des forces (l’emploi d’un v\u00e9hicule inadapt\u00e9 mais tr\u00e8s fortement prot\u00e9g\u00e9) de ces m\u00eames forces, enfin quant \u00e0 l’intensit\u00e9 des batailles en Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 1er avril 2005 \u00e0 20H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Un article de USA Today du 29 mars annonce que l’U.S. Army a perdu 80 chars lourds Abrams en Irak depuis l’invasion du printemps 2003. Le texte est impr\u00e9cis sur la question de savoir si les chars (tr\u00e8s peu) d\u00e9truits pendant la premi\u00e8re phase, la guerre elle-m\u00eame (19 mars-10 avril 2003) sont inclus dans ce… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66290","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66290","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66290"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66290\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66290"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66290"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66290"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}