{"id":66329,"date":"2005-04-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-04-16T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/04\/16\/chine-et-japon-nationalisme-et-xenophobie-et-le-moralisme-us\/"},"modified":"2005-04-16T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-04-16T00:00:00","slug":"chine-et-japon-nationalisme-et-xenophobie-et-le-moralisme-us","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/04\/16\/chine-et-japon-nationalisme-et-xenophobie-et-le-moralisme-us\/","title":{"rendered":"Chine et Japon, nationalisme et x\u00e9nophobie, et le moralisme US <\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Chine et Japon, nationalisme et x\u00e9nophobie, et le moralisme US <\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t16 avril 2005 La grande question strat\u00e9gique du jour est sans aucun doute celle de la Chine, avec les variantes: o\u00f9 va-t-elle? Que veut-elle? Quels risques nous fait-elle courir? Etc. D’une certaine fa\u00e7on, on pourrait penser que la Chine est sur la voie de remplacer le terrorisme dans nos imaginaires (le nos, c’est \u00eatre bons princes pour notre compte), c’est-\u00e0-dire dans les imaginaires am\u00e9ricanis\u00e9s qui peuplent nos cercles de pens\u00e9e et autres \u00e9lites.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa potentialit\u00e9 de ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne ne date pas d’hier. Il est faux de croire que les esprits \u00e9chauff\u00e9s de Washington d\u00e9couvrent le danger chinois avec les premiers chiffres colossaux du commerce, les chiffres de la consommation d’\u00e9nergie, etc., c’est-\u00e0-dire d’une mani\u00e8re rationnelle<\/strong>. Par exemple, nous \u00e9crivions dans de defensa<\/em>-papier, dans la rubrique de defensa<\/em>, le 10 mai 2001, d\u00e9crivant le climat washingtonien apr\u00e8s la relaxe par la Chine d’un l’avion-espion P-3 de l’U.S. Navy qui avait viol\u00e9 l’espace a\u00e9rien chinois en mars 2001:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Le 19 avril <\/em>[2001], dans The Spectator’, le journaliste britannique John Laughland rapportait, avec une frayeur et une indignation qu’il ne dissimulait pas, l’hyst\u00e9rie anti-chinoise qui transparaissait dans un s\u00e9minaire washingtonien de haut vol dont il rapportait le climat, o\u00f9 se trouvaient des scholars’-strat\u00e8ges prestigieux de l’establishment washingtonien. L’un d’entre eux, que Laughland qualifie de highy-influential American decision-maker : in fact, it sait Distinguished scholar’ on his business card, alors \u00e0 la tribune, s’exclamait (nous conservons la langue originale, c’est plus s\u00fbr) : Take em out ! We took out the Soviets, we can take out the Chicoms !; pour expliquer un peu plus loin les avantages d’un conflit pr\u00e9ventif (Si nous attendons 5 ans, ils seront plus puissants). Un peu plus tard, discutant avec l’orateur, Laughland lui faisait remarquer les risques d’une confrontation avec la Chine, puisqu’il semblait qu’on envisage\u00e2t cela d’un cur l\u00e9ger : Cela pourrait \u00eatre un peu risqu\u00e9, non? Je veux dire, ils pourraient perdre un million d’hommes, il leur en resterait 999. La r\u00e9ponse (avec l’accent allemand, note Laughland, comme ledocteur Strangelove) fut sans appel : Jahn, si nous lan\u00e7ons une attaque thermo-nucl\u00e9aire sur la Chine, nous en liquiderons plusieurs centaines de millions, pas un seul million.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t (Nous nous sommes toujours demand\u00e9 si cet interlocuteur de Laughland, avec l’accent allemand, qui dit Jahn au lieu de John, n’\u00e9tait pas Kissinger? Myst\u00e8re)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn voit dans tous les cas que le choc du 11 septembre n’\u00e9tait pas vraiment n\u00e9cessaire, question hyst\u00e9rie dans les salons chic de Washington, et, pour notre propos, hyst\u00e9rie anti-chinoise. L’\u00e9valuation alarmiste de la Chine aujourd’hui est tr\u00e8s fortement influenc\u00e9e par cette hyst\u00e9rie structurelle, dans les cercles am\u00e9ricanistes de Washington d’abord, dans les cercles concentriques des colonies europ\u00e9ennes et asiatiques ensuite, comme relais et miroirs des premiers.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL\u00e0-dessus s’est greff\u00e9 un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne significatif et remarquable : le Japon a, comme on dirait, pris le train en marche. Les Japonais de l’aile nationaliste ont d’excellents contacts avec les nationalistes US, et aussi avec les n\u00e9o-conservateurs. Il est difficile de distinguer s’il y a chez les Japonais une analyse concr\u00e8te concluant \u00e0 un danger chinois mais la chronologie des attitudes ne laisse gu\u00e8re de doute: l’hyst\u00e9rie anti-chinoise de Washington a \u00e9t\u00e9 jug\u00e9e comme une opportunit\u00e9 justifiant, du point de vue japonais, de prendre le risque d’une affirmation nationaliste, voire pr\u00e9-militariste. Cela fut fait. Le jeune premier ministre Junichiro Koizumi n’a jamais cach\u00e9 ses ambitions de ce c\u00f4t\u00e9, l’aspect tactique restant \u00e0 \u00eatre \u00e9tabli : une affirmation japonaise contre l’influence am\u00e9ricaine ou avec la b\u00e9n\u00e9diction am\u00e9ricaine? Les circonstances ont dict\u00e9 son choix. Nous voici donc devant un second probl\u00e8me : la mont\u00e9e du nationalisme japonais, sous le couvert d’une r\u00e9action contre une pr\u00e9tendue menace chinoise. Le sc\u00e9nario a l’accord complet de Washington.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa question devient donc de savoir qu’est-ce qui importe le plus, de la perception hyst\u00e9rique de la menace chinoise ou de la mont\u00e9e dissimul\u00e9e du nationalisme agressif japonais. Ci-dessous, nous publions deux textes, et nous donnons, \u00e0 la fois nos appr\u00e9ciations et les orientations implicites de ces textes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Du premier, il n’y a rien \u00e0 dire du point de vue critique sinon qu’il s’agit d’une analyse s\u00e9rieuse de la politique actuelle du Japon, avec l’avantage implicite de remettre \u00e0 sa place le courant anti-chinois. Il s’agit d’une analyse de Erich Marquardt, de PINR<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Du second, il y a beaucoup \u00e0 dire. Il s’agit d’un \u00e9ditorial du New York Times<\/em>, qui repr\u00e9sente une sorte de d\u00e9monstration acceptable de la structure de pens\u00e9e que l’on pourrait baptiser de l’expression d’hypocrisie structurelle. C’est une critique virulente de la mont\u00e9e du nationalisme x\u00e9nophobe chinois, largement sous-entendu comme agressif, anti-japonais, etc. Cette attaque s’appuie sur une condamnation sans appel du nationalisme x\u00e9nophobe en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral dont il semble implicite dans ce texte que seule la Chine se rende coupable; ce jugement rend un son \u00e9trange quand on a \u00e0 l’esprit que le New York Times<\/em> s’affiche lib\u00e9ral et s’aligne sans un pli sur les lignes de l’administration la plus nationaliste et la plus agressive qu’aient connue les Etats-Unis. Nous disons hypocrisie structurelle, n\u00e9cessaire \u00e0 la pr\u00e9servation de la vertu lib\u00e9rale, parce qu’elle pr\u00e9tend \u00e0 l’objectivit\u00e9 de la balance \u00e9gale selon les torts suppos\u00e9s et pes\u00e9s des deux parties, avec une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence oblique, type froncement de sourcil, \u00e0 certains actes japonais appr\u00e9ci\u00e9s comme un peu trop d\u00e9sordre. Mais le contraste entre les maladresses nippones, produit excusable de tentations accessoires, et l’\u00e9pouvantable x\u00e9nophobie des foules chinoises soutenue en sous-main par des dirigeants machiav\u00e9liques, tranche \u00e9videmment le cas. Il faut remarquer la transcription moralisatrice, probablement involontaire et encore plus \u00e9tonnante, des analyses des documents du Pentagone, du Defence Policy Guidance de Paul Wolfowitz en 1992<\/a>, \u00e0 la strat\u00e9gie de la QDR 2005<\/a> expos\u00e9e il y a quelques semaines. Dans la remarque introductrice: \u00ab It is inevitable that China’s rise as an economic power will generate tensions with other countries<\/em> \u00bb, il y a la justification indirecte de la volont\u00e9 du Pentagone, affirm\u00e9e en 1992 et r\u00e9affirm\u00e9e en 2005, d’emp\u00eacher l’apparition de puissances qui puissent mettre en cause sa sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 suppos\u00e9e. Ici (cas des USA), la puissance et la sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 sont moralement justifi\u00e9es puisque nulle part mises en cause, l\u00e0 (dans le cas chinois) elles sont fortement condamn\u00e9es, implicitement pour absence de justification morale. Tout est dit par le moralisateur lib\u00e9ral. Le syst\u00e8me est parfaitement huil\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Japan’s Nationalism Risks its Power Position in East Asia<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Erich Marquardt, PINR, 13 April 2005<\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAnti-Japanese protests that spread through China over the weekend are the latest manifestation of Japan’s growing nationalism. The protests erupted after formal approval by Japan’s Ministry of Education to print a school textbook that glosses over Japanese war atrocities during its early 20th century history. An estimated 10,000 to 20,000 Chinese demonstrators marched to the Japanese Embassy in Beijing, throwing stones at the facility; additionally, on April 10, an estimated 20,000 demonstrators marched in two cities in southern Guangdong province, with protestors attacking a Japanese department store in Shenzhen.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe protests are considered the largest anti-Japanese demonstrations in China since the two countries normalized diplomatic relations in 1972. They are also the largest protests in the country since the United States destroyed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during the conflict in Kosovo. Smaller protests in South Korea also sprang up over the weekend due to the same issues; both countries were victimized by Japan’s expansion in the first half of the 20th century.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe decision by Japan’s Ministry of Education follows a series of nationalistic actions taken by Tokyo that have enflamed emotions in the region. For instance, Tokyo is engaged in an island dispute with China and Taiwan over the Senkaku\/Diaoyu Islands; it has claimed that the South Korean-controlled Dokdo (or Tokdo) islets, known as Takeshima in Japan, are part of its territory; Japanese leaders, including Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, continue to visit the Yasukuni Shrine which, while honoring Japanese war dead, also honors more than 1000 World War II war criminals, among them 14 Class A war criminals; the Japanese military has been increasing its power potential, building up its military and projecting its forces to locations as far as Iraq; and Tokyo has declared a more assertive foreign policy, best seen through its declaration that it will join the United States in defending Taiwan against an invasion from mainland China.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tJapan’s Nationalism<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJapan’s growing nationalism derives from its desire to develop a more independent foreign policy and to increase its military power; much of the country’s political elite want to see a return of a powerful Japan. Fomenting nationalism among the Japanese population is a necessary development to increase support for a stronger military.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhile in the past such levels of nationalism would be restrained due to the country’s recognition of its violent expansion throughout East Asia in the first half of the 20th century, in recent years Japan’s society has changed; the memory of Japan’s actions before and during WWII are fading, China is dramatically increasing its power, and the difficulties encountered by the U.S. in Iraq have eroded the certainty that Washington will intervene completely in defense of Japan upon a conflict with China.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis explains why a growing segment of the Japanese political elite has been stoking Japanese nationalism in order to create the societal conditions conducive to military growth. Tokyo has laid claim to a series of island chains, such as the Dokdo\/Takeshima islands, which are presently held and occupied by South Korea, and the Senkaku\/Diaoyu Islands, which are held by Japan but are contested by China and Taiwan. Additionally, it has resisted international pressure to include much of its militant WWII-era past in its history books. For instance, in one of its latest approved school textbooks, Japan’s Ministry of Education permitted the use of a history book that ignores Japan’s forced seizure of some 100,000 to 200,000 \u00a0\u00bbcomfort women\u00a0\u00bb that were used as prostitutes and sex slaves for Japanese troops, its use of forced labor, and its failure to mention the details of the Japanese military’s actions in Nanjing, China, where tens of thousands of Chinese civilians and prisoners of war were killed by Japanese soldiers in 1937.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe organization that authored the controversial textbooks, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, consists of nationalist academics who are \u00a0\u00bbdeeply concerned by the very serious state of history education in Japan.\u00a0\u00bb Nobukatsu Fujioka, the vice chairman of the organization, explains that Japan is currently \u00a0\u00bbeducating our children using unsubstantiated, wartime, enemy propaganda. You can easily imagine how children come to believe that their ancestors were murderous monsters. In actuality, there is no evidence proving that Japanese war crimes were any worse than war crimes committed by other nations.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhen discussing the \u00a0\u00bbcomfort women,\u00a0\u00bb Fujioka stated, \u00a0\u00bbProstitution in itself is a tragedy, but there is no evidence to indicate that the women were forced into it by the Japanese military. If this had been the case, I am sure the proud Koreans would have been so outraged that they would have stood up to kill all Japanese, no matter what the consequences.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn light of how sensitive Japan’s neighbors are to the country’s history, Tokyo’s endorsement of the preceding statements are bound to spark anti-Japanese nationalism in those countries that were affected by Japan’s early 20th century expansion, a development we now see today. The demand by neighboring countries led by China and South Korea to have Tokyo include such information in its textbooks is being played off by the Japanese political elite as being anti-Japanese rhetoric, which then ignites Japanese nationalism, moving the population more toward supporting rearmament and a nationalist foreign policy. As argued by Fujioka, \u00a0\u00bbMore and more people share our opposition to instilling self-hatred in our children.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIndeed, Japan’s political elite has argued that anti-Japanese rhetoric is a tool of foreign governments to conceal their failure to provide for and satisfy their populations. Shinzo Abe, the acting secretary general of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party, commented on this, stating, \u00a0\u00bbJapan is an outlet to vent that anger.\u00a0\u00bb Abe further argued, \u00a0\u00bbBecause of the anti-Japanese education [in China], it’s easy to light the fire of these demonstrations and, because of the Internet, it’s easy to assemble a lot of people.\u00a0\u00bb Statements such as these convince segments of Japan’s population to give more power to the country’s nationalists.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIndeed, following the protests, the Japanese government asked Beijing to apologize for the demonstrations; Beijing, wary of its population’s own nationalism that is driving its regional power ambitions, refused, with Chinese government spokesman Qin Gang declaring that \u00a0\u00bbthe Japanese side must earnestly and properly treat major issues that relate to Chinese people’s feelings such as the history of invasion against China.\u00a0\u00bb Qin continued, \u00a0\u00bbIt should do more to enhance mutual trust and safeguard the overall interests of China-Japan relations, instead of doing the contraries.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tTokyo Endangering its Interests<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJapanese actions have hurt its relations with South Korea and China. While there has always been nationalist tension between Japan and China, its relations with South Korea have been stable as both rely on Washington’s military umbrella. Both countries were supported and protected by the United States during the long Cold War with the Soviet Union, a time when China was in the Communist orbit and when the U.S. fought on the side of South Korea against the invading North. It is important for Tokyo to keep its relations with Seoul strong. By alienating South Korea, Japan is driving Seoul closer to Beijing this development is welcomed by Beijing but it should not be welcomed by Tokyo. [See: \u00a0\u00bbThe Importance of Strong Relations Between Japan and South Korea\u00a0\u00bb] <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSouth Korean President Roh Moo-hyun already warned on March 23, \u00a0\u00bbNow, the South Korean government has no choice but to sternly deal with Japan’s attempt to justify its history of aggression and colonialism and revive regional hegemony.\u00a0\u00bb Roh cautioned, \u00a0\u00bbthere could be a hard diplomatic war that may reduce exchanges in various sectors and cause economic difficulty. But we do not have to worry much about it we are determined to take the hardship on our shoulders if we really have to.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIndeed, Seoul has said that it would campaign against Japan’s attempt to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Japan’s campaign to join the Security Council is part of the country’s desire to increase its regional power; it is supported by the United States and Australia in its U.N. bid. In the words of South Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations, Kim Sam Hoon, \u00a0\u00bbThere are difficulties for a country that does not have the trust of its neighboring countries because of a lack of reflection on the past to play the role of a world leader.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tChina has joined South Korea in opposition to Japan becoming a permanent member of the Security Council. On April 12, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said this of Japan, \u00a0\u00bbOnly a country that respects history, takes responsibility for history and wins over the trust of peoples in Asia and the world at large can take greater responsibilities in the international community.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhile Japan enjoys the strategic support of the United States and Australia, two countries that currently utilize Japan to retain the present balance of power in East Asia, these countries are distant, making it important for Japan to build a coalition of strategic allies among its immediate neighbors, with South Korea being the most obvious choice due to its history of being on the West’s side in the Cold War and also being a strong economic power in East Asia. Therefore, the souring of relations with South Korea will have a negative impact on Japanese interests by further isolating Tokyo in the region.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tConclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJapan’s nationalism is a response to what it perceives as a changing balance of power in East Asia. The growth of China as a power has caused Japan to rethink its foreign policy strategy. It recognizes that despite its excellent trade relations with Beijing trade between the two countries grew by 17 percent in 2004 China is a threat to Japan’s power and influence in East Asia since its current path will supplant Japan’s role as the most powerful regional state. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn order to prepare for this future, Tokyo is increasing its military power while indirectly declaring that it supports the containment of China, evidenced by its statement that it would join the United States in defending Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. While its relationship with the United States is critical if it wishes to keep its regional power, it needs to also work with other Asian powers so it does not find itself isolated on the fringe of East Asia, facing a Chinese-dominated bloc spanning its entire western coast. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

China’s reckless nationalism <\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tThe International Herald Tribune (The New York Times), April 13, 2005<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt is inevitable that China’s rise as an economic power will generate tensions with other countries, especially neighbors like Japan. But it is important that these tensions be managed responsibly by both sides. Judging by last weekend’s huge anti-Japanese demonstrations in several Chinese cities, the Beijing government is not meeting its obligations. China would be wise to curb the xenophobic outbreak now, before the quarrel of the two Asian powerhouses takes on a life of its own.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe protests were said to be triggered by Japan’s campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council and by Japanese textbooks that purportedly played down Japanese atrocities against the Chinese in World War II. Certainly, Japan has become more assertive of late, with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visiting a shrine to the Japanese war dead and joining the United States for the first time in expressing concern over tensions between China and Taiwan. Tokyo has not done enough to confront its appalling record in World War II, and resentments will smolder on among the Chinese and Koreans until Japan demonstrates that it really does understand and regret the many war crimes Japanese soldiers committed in China and other territories they occupied. If Japan wants to mount a credible bid for a Security Council seat, it must do so carefully, especially when it comes to China.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut the active connivance of the Chinese authorities in fanning anti-Japanese feelings has other, self-serving motives. For years, the ruling Communist party depicted World War II in Marxist terms, with Japanese workers and peasants as fellow victims of militant imperialists. But with the authority of Communist ideology in decline, Beijing appears to be fomenting nationalism as a substitute, whether it be over Taiwan or history. That is a cynical game, and judging from the violence of the weekend’s protests, which seemed to run out of the control even of the Chinese authorities, it could be a very dangerous game.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt would be unrealistic to expect China and Japan to passively accept the changing nature of the political and economic balance in Asia. There’s plenty of reason on both sides for suspicion. That’s why it is important for both countries to seek ways of defusing the tensions, and for the rest of the world, especially Asian governments and the United States, to use their influence with either country to stop the quarrelling. There are simply too many flash points in Asia North Korea, Taiwan and disputes over various islands and resources, to name a few to allow nationalist passions to grow unchecked.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Chine et Japon, nationalisme et x\u00e9nophobie, et le moralisme US 16 avril 2005 La grande question strat\u00e9gique du jour est sans aucun doute celle de la Chine, avec les variantes: o\u00f9 va-t-elle? Que veut-elle? Quels risques nous fait-elle courir? Etc. D’une certaine fa\u00e7on, on pourrait penser que la Chine est sur la voie de remplacer… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66329","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66329","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66329"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66329\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66329"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66329"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66329"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}