{"id":66330,"date":"2005-04-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-04-16T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/04\/16\/leurope-la-chine-lembargo-la-riposte-us-et-le-jsf\/"},"modified":"2005-04-16T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-04-16T00:00:00","slug":"leurope-la-chine-lembargo-la-riposte-us-et-le-jsf","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/04\/16\/leurope-la-chine-lembargo-la-riposte-us-et-le-jsf\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;Europe, la Chine, l&#8217;embargo, la riposte US et le JSF"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Il faut un auteur am\u00e9ricain,  mais quel auteur, et de quelle qualit\u00e9, l&rsquo;historien et commentateur William Pfaff,  pour mettre en \u00e9vidence quelques r\u00e9alit\u00e9s qui devraient importer tant aux commentateurs europ\u00e9ens responsables et qu&rsquo;on trouve si rarement chez eux. Dans son dernier article (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.iht.com\/articles\/2005\/04\/15\/news\/edpfaff.html\" class=\"gen\">aujourd&rsquo;hui dans l&rsquo;International Herald Tribune<\/a>), Pfaff analyse la question de la lev\u00e9e de l&#8217;embargo europ\u00e9en des armes vers la Chine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;analyse de la question par Pfaff a le m\u00e9rite, pr\u00e9visible avec lui, d&rsquo;\u00e9carter les sornettes accessoires (l&rsquo;hypocrite rh\u00e9torique du lien droits de l&rsquo;homme-armes, ridiculis\u00e9e par ses avocats dans nombre d&rsquo;autres cas) pour \u00e9clairer l&rsquo;essentiel. Il s&rsquo;agit du passage d&rsquo;une mati\u00e8re jusqu&rsquo;alors anodine dans le domaine sup\u00e9rieur des relations strat\u00e9giques,  par la volont\u00e9 des Am\u00e9ricains, exclusivement. Il s&rsquo;agit \u00e9galement d&rsquo;une appr\u00e9ciation r\u00e9aliste et juste des arguments utilis\u00e9s contre les Europ\u00e9ens dans cette affaire, notamment la critique du renforcement potentiel d&rsquo;une suppos\u00e9e puissance chinoise (\u00ab <em>vast overestimation of China&rsquo;s actual power<\/em> \u00bb, ou bien encore : \u00ab <em>the rising tempo of <\/em>[Chine] <em>threats against Taiwan&rsquo;s independence <\/em>[is] <em>alarming those who want to be alarmed <\/em> \u00bb). Il s&rsquo;agit enfin d&rsquo;une appr\u00e9ciation frappante des cons\u00e9quences d&rsquo;\u00e9ventuelles mesures de r\u00e9torsion US, qui terrorisent l&rsquo;<em>establishment<\/em> europ\u00e9en en mettant en \u00e9vidence aussi bien sa servilit\u00e9 d&rsquo;esprit que sa compl\u00e8te inculture des mati\u00e8res consid\u00e9r\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t Ce dernier point \u00e9nonce les \u00e9vidences de la situation transatlantique: que les menaces US sont vides puisqu&rsquo;elles portent sur des restrictions de transferts vers l&rsquo;Europe de technologies strat\u00e9giques US qui n&rsquo;existent pas; que les premiers frapp\u00e9s, par contre, seront ceux qui ont ridiculis\u00e9 l&rsquo;esprit europ\u00e9en dont il font si grand cas en s&rsquo;engageant dans un programme d&rsquo;avion de combat (le F-35\/JSF) qui d\u00e9pend d&rsquo;une technologie US dont l&rsquo;acc\u00e8s leur sera \u00e9videmment restreint, voire interdit (de toutes les fa\u00e7ons, mesures de r\u00e9torsion ou pas, la restriction sera de mise de bout en bout) ; que la chose, finalement, devrait b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier \u00e0 l&rsquo;Europe, qui devra se replier sur ses propres syst\u00e8mes de haute technologie, qui existent, eux (au contraire du JSF), et qui valent bien ceux des Am\u00e9ricains.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVoici ce qu&rsquo;\u00e9crit Pfaff sur cette question:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>A curious element in the situation is that current American threats of retaliation against Europe jeopardize American interests.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The Bush administration&rsquo;s threat to cut U.S. technology transfers to Europe is empty, because there is practically no transfer to Europe of strategically important American technology.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Even inside transnational corporations, such as British Aerospace, which hold Pentagon contracts, sensitive work is tightly held and sequestered in separate American-controlled entities.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The only visible exception is the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35, which America wants to sell to Europe. The program already has several West European partners who have made heavy financial commitments.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The Joint Strike Fighter is not made to function on its own. It depends on an elaborate external system of intelligence acquisition, selection and target assignment based on the ground or in another aircraft. Unless the means for that external control  core software codes and accompanying technology  are included in the delivered aircraft, the fighter cannot function as it is designed to do.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The countries currently expected to buy the fighter are America&rsquo;s closest allies in Western Europe. If the United States withholds Joint Strike Fighter technology, they will have wasted their money. Those that would benefit from a cutoff in Joint Strike Fighter technology transfer are Europe&rsquo;s own aerospace manufacturers, which are French, German and Swedish.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 16 avril 2005 \u00e0 10H35<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Il faut un auteur am\u00e9ricain, mais quel auteur, et de quelle qualit\u00e9, l&rsquo;historien et commentateur William Pfaff, pour mettre en \u00e9vidence quelques r\u00e9alit\u00e9s qui devraient importer tant aux commentateurs europ\u00e9ens responsables et qu&rsquo;on trouve si rarement chez eux. Dans son dernier article (aujourd&rsquo;hui dans l&rsquo;International Herald Tribune), Pfaff analyse la question de la lev\u00e9e de&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1131],"class_list":["post-66330","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-pfaff"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66330","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66330"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66330\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66330"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66330"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66330"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}