Les rapports entre la Chine et le Japon sont d\u00e9sormais un point important de tension. Les manifestations anti-japonaises en Chine ont donn\u00e9 \u00e0 cette tension un caract\u00e8re dramatique et urgent. Il est d’autant plus int\u00e9ressant, pour mieux en comprendre les enjeux, de bien embrasser le cadre g\u00e9n\u00e9ral o\u00f9 cette tension s’est d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tCi-dessous, nous restituons une appr\u00e9ciation assez compl\u00e8te de ce cadre g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, que nous avons trouv\u00e9e dans une interview de Steven Clemons, sur le site Democracy Now !, le 19 avril<\/a>. L’interview portait sur un tout autre sujet, les d\u00e9bats de la commission s\u00e9natoriale des affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res sur la nomination de John Bolton comme ambassadeur US \u00e0 l’ONU. Clemond, avec son site The Washington Note<\/a>, a organis\u00e9 un mouvement de r\u00e9sistance \u00e0 la nomination de Bolton, et de mani\u00e8re tr\u00e8s efficace si l’on en juge par les derniers \u00e9chos \u00e0 ce propos<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tClemond est aussi un sp\u00e9cialiste des affaires japonaises: Senior Fellow<\/em> \u00e0 la New America Foundation, Clemond a \u00e9t\u00e9 pendant sept ans directeur de la Japan America Society of Southern California et il est co-fondateur, avec Chalmers Johnson, du Japan Policy Research Institute. Dans l’interview de Democracy Now !<\/em>, la pr\u00e9sentatrice Amy Goodman termine son intervention par une question hors sujet, sur la crise sino-japonaise. Voici la r\u00e9ponse de Clemond.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab Yeah. Very virulent nationalism is being let out of the box in both Japan and China. And, regrettably, I feel that the United States is complicit in what’s going on. And just to give a very brief take on this, the United States sort of pushed Japan hard recently to state that Taiwan was part of its security concerns, and that if there was an engagement, a conflict between China and Taiwan, and the United States was involved, Japan would support the United States and support Taiwan. This is an agreement, an arrangement that has always been known privately. What mattered more recently is that America compelled Japan to make this a public articulation.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb And China took great umbrage at that at what it already knew was Japan’s policy, but the overtness of it created pressure on China to respond in kind. In addition, there is a serious effort underway, which the United States supports, to try to get Japan as a permanent member of the Security Council. And beneath this, you have a an ongoing uneasiness and in many cases a denial of history in Japan that has continually given the Chinese, the Koreans and others, opportunities to continually hit Japan for its failure to acknowledge and reform like Germany has in some part done, for its World War II and prewar activities six decades ago. So what has come out of the box is essentially an orchestration by China to hit Japan back both for its global pretensions in the U.N. Security Council, but also because of our effort to try to get Japan to sort of declare itself in our camp more. Why is that important? Well, China’s economic activity with Japan has surpassed American economic activity with Japan. The United States is very worried that Japan will slowly and incrementally slip towards a greater affection with China. Thus, we wanted more military-oriented declarations from Japan. This has essentially upended the apple cart, and both governments are basically unleashing their people. And it’s very, very dangerous.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 20 avril 2005 \u00e0 20H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Les rapports entre la Chine et le Japon sont d\u00e9sormais un point important de tension. Les manifestations anti-japonaises en Chine ont donn\u00e9 \u00e0 cette tension un caract\u00e8re dramatique et urgent. Il est d’autant plus int\u00e9ressant, pour mieux en comprendre les enjeux, de bien embrasser le cadre g\u00e9n\u00e9ral o\u00f9 cette tension s’est d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e. Ci-dessous, nous restituons… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66341","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66341","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66341"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66341\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66341"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66341"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66341"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}