{"id":66377,"date":"2005-05-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-05-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/05\/02\/le-remplacement-des-trident-revele-langoisse-britannique-de-la-dependance-americaine\/"},"modified":"2005-05-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-05-02T00:00:00","slug":"le-remplacement-des-trident-revele-langoisse-britannique-de-la-dependance-americaine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/05\/02\/le-remplacement-des-trident-revele-langoisse-britannique-de-la-dependance-americaine\/","title":{"rendered":"Le remplacement des \u201cTrident\u201d r\u00e9v\u00e8le l’angoisse britannique de la d\u00e9pendance am\u00e9ricaine<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le remplacement des Trident r\u00e9v\u00e8le l’angoisse britannique de la d\u00e9pendance am\u00e9ricaine<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t2 mai 2005 Le quotidien The Independent<\/em> publie aujourd’hui un article annon\u00e7ant que Blair a pris la d\u00e9cision de principe de d\u00e9velopper une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration de sous-marins nucl\u00e9aires (SSBN) lanceurs d’engins \u00e0 t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires (SLBM) ou assimil\u00e9s, \u00e0 port\u00e9e strat\u00e9gique. Il s’agit de remplacer les quatre sous-marins SSBN am\u00e9ricains lanceurs du SLBM Trident<\/em> qui \u00e9quipent la Royal Navy depuis les ann\u00e9es 1990. Les SSBN Trident<\/em> commenceront \u00e0 \u00eatre d\u00e9commissionner \u00e0 partir de 2024, ce qui laisse une vingtaine d’ann\u00e9es pour organiser la succession.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Tony Blair has secretly decided that Britain will build a new generation of nuclear deterrent to replace the ageing Trident submarine fleet at a cost of more than \u00a310bn a move certain to dismay thousands of Labour Party loyalists in the approach to polling day.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The disclosure that the decision has already been taken will expose Mr Blair who has struggled throughout the election campaign to fend off accusations that he lied over the Iraq war to fresh allegations of deception. He said last week that the decision would be taken after 5 May.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But The Independent has learnt that he has already decided to give the go ahead for a replacement for Trident to stop Britain surrendering its status as a nuclear power when the Trident fleet is decommissioned. The choice over the type of nuclear missile system that Britain will deploy is yet to be made. One Labour candidate described the new deterrent as Blair’s weapons of mass destruction.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t()<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Both the Liberal Democrats and the Tories support the retention of a nuclear deterrent, but Mr Blair will face a battle with his own party. Rows over the British nuclear deterrent split the Labour Party in the 1980s and made it unelectable, until Mr Blair took over as leader and finally ditched any lingering support for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But since the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, the nature of the threat has dramatically changed. Many Labour members believe Britain faces a greater threat from terrorists with a dirty nuclear bomb than a rogue state firing sophisticated nuclear weapons.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Trident is virtually useless against such a terrorist threat, because the enemy does not present a target. The US is converting some of its Trident missile submarines to fire conventional cruise missiles, armed with tactical warheads, instead of the unwieldy ballistic nuclear missiles.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe d\u00e9bat sur l’utilit\u00e9 du nucl\u00e9aire aujourd’hui est pav\u00e9 de bonnes intentions, de faux proc\u00e8s et d’arri\u00e8re-pens\u00e9es. Sur le fond, il est \u00e9vident que l’int\u00e9r\u00eat de continuer \u00e0 disposer d’une force nucl\u00e9aire n’est pas vraiment discutable, dans tous les cas, si l’on consid\u00e8re toutes<\/strong> les possibilit\u00e9s existantes o\u00f9 cette dissuasion pourrait jouer (et le toutes<\/strong> invite \u00e0 des r\u00e9flexions audacieuses). La r\u00e9duction du danger strat\u00e9gique majeur aux menaces terroristes et aux ADM correspondantes est \u00e9videmment inacceptable si l’on pense \u00e0 l’\u00e9chelle d’un demi-si\u00e8cle, alors qu’elle est terriblement suspecte \u00e0 l’\u00e9chelle pr\u00e9sente. La dissuasion nucl\u00e9aire, le statut de puissance nucl\u00e9aire, constituent aujourd’hui un \u00e9l\u00e9ment fondamental de la souverainet\u00e9 et de l’ind\u00e9pendance d’une puissance, lorsque cette puissance est d\u00e9j\u00e0 nucl\u00e9aire. Abandonner cette dissuasion constituerait un acte irresponsable.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCela \u00e9crit, il faut consid\u00e9rer le Royaume-Uni comme un cas particulier, surtout lorsqu’on \u00e9voque la garantie de souverainet\u00e9 et d’ind\u00e9pendance que donne la dissuasion nucl\u00e9aire. Ce constat est vrai pour un pays comme la France, il l’est beaucoup moins pour le Royaume-Uni. Survient alors toute la probl\u00e9matique sp\u00e9cifiquement britannique de la d\u00e9pendance des Etats-Unis, laquelle d\u00e9pendance est aujourd’hui compl\u00e8te avec les Trident<\/em>. La question de la modernisation par remplacement de cette flotte devient alors tr\u00e8s diff\u00e9rente et s’\u00e9nonce de cette fa\u00e7on: en rempla\u00e7ant leur actuelle force de dissuasion, les Britanniques se lib\u00e9reront-ils de la d\u00e9pendance US? Le probl\u00e8me est d’une br\u00fblante actualit\u00e9<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe texte de The Independent<\/em> est int\u00e9ressant parce qu’il est plein d’allusions, \u00e0 notre avis compl\u00e8tement involontaires dans le sens que nous lui trouvons, et, dans tous les cas, \u00e0 interpr\u00e9ter de fa\u00e7on indirecte \u00e0 cette probl\u00e9matique. Ces allusions involontaires sont le signe que le dilemme strat\u00e9gique britannique (faut-il rester compl\u00e8tement int\u00e9gr\u00e9 dans l’alliance am\u00e9ricaine?) est aujourd’hui au cur de toute la r\u00e9flexion strat\u00e9gique, y compris celle qui concerne une d\u00e9cision \u00e0 prendre dans les presque vingt ann\u00e9es qui viennent, pour 2024. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici quelques exemples montrant que la question, sous la forme d’une mise en question, des relations avec les USA est au cur de cette probl\u00e9matique. Il n’y avait aucun sentiment de cette sorte lorsque les Britanniques acquirent les SLBM Polaris<\/em> en 1962, et les SLBM Trident<\/em> en 1985, ces acquisitions impliquant une totale d\u00e9pendance des Am\u00e9ricains. Le d\u00e9bat l\u00e0-dessus n’existait pas; il existe aujourd’hui.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0Une source du MoD, cit\u00e9e dans l’article, pr\u00e9cise: \u00ab The decision <\/em>[to replace Trident] has been taken in principle very recently. US law does not allow the US to build bombs for us. We have to build our own.<\/em> \u00bb Un peu plus loin, l’article pr\u00e9cise, toujours dans le domaine l\u00e9gislatif qui implique une situation aujourd’hui diff\u00e9rente, lorsqu’elle est compar\u00e9e \u00e0 1962 et 1985: \u00ab But nuclear non-proliferation agreements forbid Britain from exchanging nuclear technology with the US, and so they would have to be equipped with British-made nuclear warheads.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0Cette intention de s’en remettre aux seules capacit\u00e9s nucl\u00e9aires britanniques est r\u00e9affirm\u00e9e : \u00ab Aldermaston, Britain’s nuclear bomb-making facility, has been hiring physicists and mathematicians for the past year to retain the capability to build a new nuclear weapon when a new system is agreed. The source explained: If you looked at the scientific press over the past year you would have seen an increase in advertisements for everything. It’s mostly physicists and mathematicians, but it’s a sign we are gearing up.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0Pour ce qui concerne les syst\u00e8mes hors de l’arme nucl\u00e9aire impliqu\u00e9s dans ce projet, les intentions semblent \u00e9galement d’aller vers le tout-britannique: \u00ab Defence experts said the replacement for Trident would still be based on submarines, which are less vulnerable to counter measures. New submarines could be built in British yards, saving thousands of jobs. Britain could buy the missiles off the shelf from the US. The front-runner is a new generation of cruise missiles, based on the RAF’s air-launched weapon, Storm Shadow, with its range increased.<\/em> \u00bb Quoique la formulation reste ambigu\u00eb, il semble que nous devions comprendre que la solution d’acheter am\u00e9ricain sur \u00e9tag\u00e8res ne soit pas favoris\u00e9e. Le Storm Shadow<\/em> est le nom donn\u00e9 au missile de croisi\u00e8re europ\u00e9en (franco-anglais), dont le Scalp<\/em> est la version fran\u00e7aise. Le Storm Shadow<\/em> a r\u00e9alis\u00e9, en Irak, des performances qui ont stup\u00e9fi\u00e9 les Am\u00e9ricains et le placent largement au-del\u00e0 du Tomahawk<\/em> am\u00e9ricain.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0M\u00eame les opposants au renouvellement du nucl\u00e9aire, essentiellement des pacifistes travaillistes, s’y opposent en r\u00e9f\u00e9rence aux liens avec les Am\u00e9ricains, et aux risques que ces liens impliquent. C’est le cas de l’ancien ministre Clara Short: \u00ab It’s just a symbol saying that Britain is in the big league, but if you need nuclear weapons to be in the big league, it’s no wonder India and others want them. But when is Britain ever going to use a nuclear weapon when the US isn’t? I would favour Britain becoming a leader in getting the non-proliferation treaty updated and back on course rather than going along with American breaches of it.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0Dans l’historique que trace The Independent<\/em> de la force nucl\u00e9aire UK, appara\u00eet une formulation compl\u00e8tement inhabituelle pour cette sorte de compte-rendu (les passages soulign\u00e9s par nous en gras): \u00ab The first British Polaris submarine went on patrol in 1968, an event signalling two changes that are still in effect to this day the UK<\/em> independent<\/em><\/strong> deterrent began to be operated by the Royal Navy, instead of the RAF, and<\/em> became directly dependent on the Americans.<\/em><\/strong> \u00bb La chose \u00e9tait jusqu’ici implicitement connue mais vertueusement pass\u00e9e sous silence, surtout dans la presse g\u00e9n\u00e9rale; qu’elle soit brutalement affirm\u00e9e comme ici, jusqu’aux guillemets amers de independent<\/em>, avec une r\u00e9f\u00e9rence actuelle (still in effect to this day<\/em>), a une r\u00e9elle signification implicite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0On ajoutera que le rappel, dans cet article, de l’aventure du Skybolt est \u00e9galement tr\u00e8s pesant aujourd’hui, o\u00f9 la question du ravitaillement en hautes technologies de l’armement<\/a> est pos\u00e9e \u00e0 cause du comportement US. La formulation de The Independent<\/em> montre combien la d\u00e9cision US d’abandon du Skybolt<\/em> priva le Royaume-Uni de son ind\u00e9pendance, et dans une mesure o\u00f9 cette formulation pourrait faire croire \u00e0 une manuvre des Am\u00e9ricains dans ce but, et une manuvre r\u00e9ussie, laissant \u00e0 penser pour aujourd’hui: \u00ab Britain had counted on buying a US missile to do it, Skybolt. In 1962 the US cancelled Skybolt, thereby hoping, many thought, to deprive the UK of its independent capability. British strategic defence policy was suddenly in tatters.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0Enfin, cerise sur le g\u00e2teau pour nous rappeler d’autres d\u00e9bats \u00e0 venir du m\u00eame type au Royaume-Uni: \u00ab Labour left-wingers are also gearing up to oppose the basing of America’s national defence system in Britain, and any plans to site US missiles on British soil, which some claim would breach non-proliferation treaties.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le remplacement des Trident r\u00e9v\u00e8le l’angoisse britannique de la d\u00e9pendance am\u00e9ricaine 2 mai 2005 Le quotidien The Independent publie aujourd’hui un article annon\u00e7ant que Blair a pris la d\u00e9cision de principe de d\u00e9velopper une nouvelle g\u00e9n\u00e9ration de sous-marins nucl\u00e9aires (SSBN) lanceurs d’engins \u00e0 t\u00eates nucl\u00e9aires (SLBM) ou assimil\u00e9s, \u00e0 port\u00e9e strat\u00e9gique. Il s’agit de remplacer… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4345,3004,4542,4138,4541,2746,4137],"class_list":["post-66377","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-independance","tag-nucleaire","tag-polaris","tag-shadow","tag-skybolt","tag-souverainete","tag-storm"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66377","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66377"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66377\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66377"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66377"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66377"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}