la situation va de mal en pis en Irak<\/a>. C’est-\u00e0-dire qu’on se retrouve \u00e0 un niveau \u00e9quivalent aux pires moments de l’Irak d’apr\u00e8s la victoire, mais deux ans apr\u00e8s cette victoire. La victoire a donc \u00e9t\u00e9 remport\u00e9e et s\u00e9curis\u00e9e, la d\u00e9mocratie \u00e9tablie, le gouvernement constitu\u00e9, et tout va toujours aussi mal, et peut-\u00eatre m\u00eame de mal en pis. C’est donc que tout va de plus en plus mal. \u00c7a aussi, on vous l’avait bien dit.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tC’est ce que nous dit le Washington Times<\/em>, pourtant tr\u00e8s, tr\u00e8s proche de Bush, autant que peut l’\u00eatre le r\u00e9v\u00e9rend Moon, propri\u00e9taire du journal. (L’analyse vient de UPI, qui fait partie du m\u00eame groupe.) Vous lirez l’extrait ci-dessous avec un double regard : avec \u00e0 l’esprit, un peu ironiquement, qu’on vous l’avait bien dit, et avec l’int\u00e9r\u00eat, un peu plus s\u00e9rieusement car l’analyse est pertinente, de d\u00e9couvrir que les choses vont vraiment tr\u00e8s mal. L’extrait nous parle de l’\u00e9volution de la situation ces derni\u00e8res semaines.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00ab The scale of these attacks certainly did not come as a surprise to U.S. military intelligence officers in Iraq or to professional analysts in Washington. Most of them have repeatedly warned both within the Army and in think tanks for many weeks that the idea that the elections had knocked the steam out of the insurgency and politically isolated it was illusory. There has been no significant evidence whatsoever on the ground to support that contention.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Even when assaults on U.S. forces in Iraq fell significantly in number and in terms of casualties inflicted through February and March, murderous assaults on Iraqis, especially on the new Iraqi security forces continued unabated. And even where U.S. casualties fell significantly, they never fell below the level of at least one U.S. soldier being killed per day. During March, 34 were killed; more were seriously injured.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Furthermore, U.S. military analysts had noted the increasing coordination, ambition and sophistication of attempted insurgent operations over the past few weeks. Nor did the timing of the new offensive come as a surprise to them. The prime political goal of seeking to discredit the new government before it could establish itself was an obvious one.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb What is of far greater concern to U.S. commanders and analysts is that despite this broad strategic sense of when, and even on what scale, the new attacks would come, U.S. forces and their Iraqi allies have so far proven totally unable to prevent them. This appears to graphically demonstrate that U.S. forces in Iraq two years after occupying the country are losing the most important front in the war the intelligence one.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb In this sense, indeed, the position of the U.S. troops and their Iraqi allies, for all the overwhelming superiority of U.S. forces and firepower, is far inferior to that in Vietnam during the 1967-72 period. For the Phoenix counter-insurgency program did indeed inflict devastating damage on the political, undercover and intelligence forces or cadres of the Viet Cong. By contrast, U.S. forces and those of the new Iraqi government have so far signally failed to systematically penetrate the insurgent forces and significantly disrupt their organization.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 3 mai 2005 \u00e0 09H45<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
La fascinante \u00e9volution de la dialectique washingtonienne (qui est l’avatar avanc\u00e9 de la dialectique postmoderne de la raison triomphante) sur la situation en Irak illustre la grande latitude laiss\u00e9e par la libert\u00e9 d’expression, fondement number one de la plus vertueuse d\u00e9mocratie du monde. Cela permet d’avance ce truisme qui p\u00e8se de tout son poids: puisqu’on… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66380","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66380","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66380"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66380\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66380"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66380"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66380"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}