{"id":66381,"date":"2005-05-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-05-03T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/05\/03\/le-pentagone-est-fou-comment-sen-sortir\/"},"modified":"2005-05-03T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-05-03T00:00:00","slug":"le-pentagone-est-fou-comment-sen-sortir","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/05\/03\/le-pentagone-est-fou-comment-sen-sortir\/","title":{"rendered":"Le Pentagone est fou: comment s’en sortir?<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le Pentagone est fou: comment s’en sortir?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t3 mai 2005 Ci-dessous, un extrait d’un article de Defense News du 2 mai<\/a> relate l’atmosph\u00e8re d’une audition, le 27 avril, entre les s\u00e9nateurs de la commission des forces arm\u00e9es et le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Rumsfeld. Le sujet : les d\u00e9penses devenues incontr\u00f4lables du Pentagone, et comment s’en sortir. R\u00e9action piteuse du bouillant Rumsfeld, pour une fois plut\u00f4t discret: \u00ab Something is wrong.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe constat est rapidement fait:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le DoD re\u00e7oit plus d’argent qu’il n’en a jamais re\u00e7u depuis la Deuxi\u00e8me Guerre mondiale. (A notre sens, il en re\u00e7oit plus que dans la plupart des ann\u00e9es de guerre, une fois qu’on a tent\u00e9 d’\u00e9tablir les \u00e9quivalences. Seule l’ann\u00e9e 1944, sans doute, surpasse en valeur relative les budgets r\u00e9els<\/strong> d’aujourd’hui, et encore cela est-il discutable.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La plupart des programmes importants sont en pleine d\u00e9route. (Voir, sur ce site<\/a>, quelques remarques sur le petit dernier, le programme des destroyers DD(X) de la Navy.) Le DoD est totalement incapable de r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 sa programmation minimale pour les ann\u00e9es \u00e0 venir.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Quelle est la clef de l’\u00e9nigme? La recherche d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9e d’une r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 cette question va beaucoup occuper le Congr\u00e8s am\u00e9ricain ces prochaines semaines et prochains mois.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Spending on the U.S. military today surpasses anything since World War II, Sen. Daniel Inouye said. Yet even amid that bounty, the Defense Department cannot afford all that it wants to buy. Inouye, D-Hawaii, and other members of the Senate’s defense appropriations subcommittee expressed growing concern April 27 that tax money is being poured into the Pentagon at an almost unprecedented rate, but is buying less and less.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The military is paying more and more for fewer fighter jets, cargo planes and warships, lawmakers said. Even as technology prices drop in the civilian marketplace and increasingly sophisticated consumer goods seem to become more affordable, technology costs for the military continue to climb, said Sen. Ted Stevens, R-Alaska, subcommittee chairman.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledged that something is wrong with the Defense Department’s acquisition system, but he said it’s not just spiraling costs. Weapons being produced today are far more capable than those that they replace, he said. A ship built today might cost twice as much as its predecessor, but it will be three times more capable. Similarly, smart bombs cost more than dumb bombs, but one smart bomb can do the work of 10 unguided bombs, Rumsfeld said.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Military leaders will examine the defense acquisition system in detail this year while conducting their Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), he said. The QDR’s results will be factored into the Pentagon’s 2007 budget request to be sent to Congress in February.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The soaring cost of weapons has become a central defense issue in the Senate this spring. Armed Services Committee members focused on weapon costs and contracting problems during hearings on the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) and during a confirmation hearing for Kenneth Krieg to become undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tCela fait quarante-cinq ans (formellement, depuis l’arriv\u00e9e de McNamara au Pentagone, en 1961) que l’on tente de r\u00e9former le Pentagone. A la m\u00eame \u00e9poque, le d\u00e9rapage a commenc\u00e9, gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la premi\u00e8re r\u00e9forme lanc\u00e9e par McNamara (le TFX, chasseur-bombardier commun \u00e0 deux armes, devenu en 1963 le F-111 garanti \u00e0 $2 millions l’exemplaire, et acquis \u00e0 partir de 1967 \u00e0 $12 millions l’exemplaire).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn pourrait penser que le Pentagone n’est pas r\u00e9formable. Probable. Ce n’est pas pour autant que l’issue de la catastrophe lui est interdite. On s’en approche lorsqu’un bombardier co\u00fbte $2,4 milliards (le B-2), un chasseur $347 millions (le F\/A-22), un destroyer $7 milliards (le DD(X)), et ainsi de suite. Les arguments pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s par Rumsfeld sur l’augmentation des capacit\u00e9s sont sempiternels et sans int\u00e9r\u00eat, parfaitement sophistiques en ce qu’ils sont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9s dans l’absolu alors qu’ils doivent \u00eatre mesur\u00e9s relativement: les nouvelles capacit\u00e9s sont \u00e0 \u00e9valuer dans l’environnement d’\u00e9poque, avec des mesures de d\u00e9fense ou des contre-mesures adapt\u00e9es \u00e0 ces capacit\u00e9s et qui en r\u00e9duisent d’autant les effets et l’efficacit\u00e9. L’argument vaudrait et le co\u00fbt serait peut-\u00eatre acceptable si l’on avait produit un F\/A-22 avec ses capacit\u00e9s actuelles dans les ann\u00e9es 1950 ou 1960. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe probl\u00e8me est que la cause centrale de la crise n’est pas le gaspillage et l’incapacit\u00e9 de la gestion; gaspillage et incapacit\u00e9 de gestion existent toujours mais sont rel\u00e9gu\u00e9s au second plan par un autre facteur qui est extraordinairement multiplicateur, qui est au cur de la crise: l’incapacit\u00e9 de r\u00e9sister \u00e0 l’am\u00e9lioration technologique syst\u00e9matique, \u00e0 la conception, en cours de d\u00e9veloppement, apr\u00e8s, etc. Du m\u00eame Defense News<\/em>, \u00e0 propos du DD(X): \u00ab Navy sources say the service does not blame prime contractor Northrop for the rising cost of the DD(X) program, a position that company also backs. We’re on cost and on schedule, and mitigating risk as planned, said Brian Cullin, a spokesman for Northrop’s Ship Systems unit. Instead, it’s the Navy’s ambitious effort to develop so many cutting-edge technologies, including new radar, electric system and gun, he said.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuant \u00e0 Rumsfeld, nous lui conseillons de relire son brillant discours du 10 septembre 2001, qu’il pourra trouver sur notre site<\/a>. Tout y est.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le Pentagone est fou: comment s’en sortir? 3 mai 2005 Ci-dessous, un extrait d’un article de Defense News du 2 mai relate l’atmosph\u00e8re d’une audition, le 27 avril, entre les s\u00e9nateurs de la commission des forces arm\u00e9es et le secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense Rumsfeld. Le sujet : les d\u00e9penses devenues incontr\u00f4lables du Pentagone, et comment… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4543,4544,569,3531,4096],"class_list":["post-66381","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-ddx","tag-gaspillage","tag-rumsfeld","tag-senat","tag-technologies"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66381","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66381"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66381\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66381"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66381"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66381"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}